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ABSTRACT 
 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the Latin American region experienced a profound 
shift in development ideologies that resulted in the creation of a new type of state: 
the Latin American neoliberal state. This state emerged in three stages: the 
stabilization stage—focused on balance of payments and austerity; the structural 
adjustment stage—which was more broadly and deeply focused on changing the 
structure and culture of society; and the institutional turn—which was an 
acknowledgment that the neoliberal state had not effectively dealt with poverty, 
inequality, or the quality of institutions that integrated market, society, and polity. 
Beginning in the early 2000s, an electoral shift to the left swept through the region 
and was characterized by antagonistic rhetoric towards neoliberal policies. This 
study compares the historical developments of Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru and 
shows that in cases where the neoliberal state was fully developed, the leftist shift 
either did not occur (Peru) during the 2000s, or where it did occur (Argentina) did 
not constitute a break with the neoliberal state but rather formed a fourth stage of 
neoliberalism. In this stage, the government sought to increase spending on some 
social programs but did so in ways that legitimated the wider neoliberal state rather 
than creating a new developmental model that would move beyond neoliberalism. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
In 1973, when Augusto Pinochet seized control of the Chilean government 
and implemented Latin America’s first neoliberal “shock treatment,” a new project 
began. Although it would take almost thirty years to fully ripen, the seeds of the 
Latin American neoliberal state were sown. Pinochet’s violent and authoritarian 
project in Chile was part of a wider wave of authoritarian take-overs throughout the 
region in the 1960s and 1970s. As the “third wave of democratization” spread 
through the region beginning in 1978 (Hagopian and Mainwaring 2005), the 
neoliberal project quickly spread throughout the rest of the continent, becoming a 
democratic (though never quite peaceful) project along the way.1 The debt crisis of 
the late 1970s – early 1980s was the precipitating event that initiated the regional 
shift. By the early 1990s, most countries in the region had elected governments and 
most had also carried out some neoliberal reforms.  
In 1998, Hugo Chávez was democratically elected president in Venezuela 
after the country’s party system collapsed (Morgan 2011) during hesitant attempts 
to carry out neoliberalization. Within a decade, an undeniable shift away from 
rightist/center-right presidents and towards leftist/center-left ones had occurred in 
Latin America. The politicians who embody these “left turns” in the region are 
almost invariably rhetorically opposed to the neoliberal project of what came to be 
                                                 
1 This project, because of its radical departure from the previous economic 
development projects has been met with (often violent) protests in virtually every 
country where such reforms were implemented (see for example: Shefner, Rowland, 
and Pasdirtz forthcoming; Walton and Seddon 1994; Auvinen 1990). 
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referred to as the Washington Consensus. This new left has elicited anxiety for some 
(Castañeda 2006; Edwards 2010), and hope for others (Arditi 2010; Cameron and 
Sharpe 2010), but how does it affect the Latin American neoliberal state that was 
constructed over the previous two decades? This is an extremely important (and 
timely) question as governments around the world have turned to austerity 
measures in the wake of the “Great Recession” that followed the financial crisis of 
2008.  
The experiences that Latin American countries have had with 
neoliberalization in the 1980s and 1990s is not completely analogous to what the 
United States and European nations are facing today, but that does not mean that 
there are no lessons to be learned from exploring the Latin American neoliberal 
state and how it affects current attempts by leftist governments in the region to 
create a new developmental model. It is vitally important to recognize the way that 
the neoliberal state has altered the structure and governing logic of Latin American 
states. It is also important at this historical conjuncture to better understand the 
possible trajectories that Latin American states are on based on the structural 
possibilities (and limitations) of the types of states that they are working within and 
trying to reform. Without a better understanding of the structural limitations leftist 
governments in the region face, analysts of these left turns are likely to over- or 
under-estimate the types and directions of change they are capable of. 
The term neoliberalism has been in common use in the sociological literature 
for three decades now. It is frequently used to denote a series of economic and 
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social policies that generally “suggests that within states, governments should 
disengage from management of the domestic economy, deregulate, privatize state-
owned enterprises, and eliminate social welfare programs to promote fiscal 
austerity… [I]n the international arena there are calls for reductions of tariff 
barriers, the opening of capital markets, and a liberalization of restrictions on 
foreign investment” (Jenness, Smith and Stepan-Norris 2007: vii). This definition is 
emblematic of the way that neoliberalism is routinely discussed in the literature. In 
my discussion of neoliberalism in Latin America in Chapter III, I treat the concept 
with much more nuance, showing that neoliberalism grows and changes over time. 
In the following pages, I will show that neoliberalization in Latin America has 
proceeded through four distinct stages rather than remaining constant over time. In 
addition, I argue that once the first two stages are successfully implemented, the 
changes they make to the state constitute enough of a transformation that what 
exists is a new type of state: the Latin American Neoliberal State. This state is 
qualitatively different than other types of states and it is within the structure of this 
neoliberal state that many parties and social movements of the new left are 
attempting to oppose neoliberal policies. One of the implications for this is that 
where the neoliberal state was fully erected, the lefts do not necessarily break with 
neoliberalism. In one of the cases I present, I argue that the policies of the left 
functions as a fourth stage of neoliberalism. 
The stages of neoliberalism that I present are an analytical improvement 
over previous research on the history of neoliberalism in the region. It is generally 
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acknowledged in the literature that beginning in the late 1990s, neoliberalism had 
(of necessity) shifted to a “second generation” of reforms (Burki and Perry 1998; 
Kuczynski and Williamson 2003). This is a misreading of what actually occurred 
during the thirty or so years that neoliberal policies were implemented in the 
region. My work will address this misunderstanding directly as I describe the 
different intent of the stages, their different temporal manifestations, and the 
different types of policies the stages focus on. I will show that neoliberalism does 
not look the same everywhere at all times. 
However, neoliberalism does have a core logic to it and I will discuss this 
more thoroughly in Chapter III, but briefly: neoliberalism has several central 
components. First, the social world can best be understood through the doctrine of 
methodological individualism as adopted by economics – central to which is the 
assumption that all actors are rational self-maximizers. Second, government is 
inherently inefficient because following the first component, politicians and 
government bureaucrats are concerned with maximizing their own power and 
incapable of acting in the national interest (which according to James Buchanan 
does not exist anyway). Government actions distort the price mechanism, which is 
the market’s means of signaling imbalances. When price signals are distorted, the 
market cannot move towards equilibrium. Lastly, the welfare of citizens is best 
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assured through macroeconomic growth policies rather than through a welfare 
state.2 
Most accounts of neoliberalization—even when focused on a single case—
attribute it to global factors or international pressures (or both) on states, forcing 
them to adopt neoliberal reforms. In these accounts, the global crisis of 
accumulation that began during the late 1960s, the heavy borrowing by Latin 
American states, and the oil shocks of the 1970s are the primary causal factors in 
the shift to neoliberalism during the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America. These are all 
very important factors in why states neoliberalized, as are the pressures that 
governments in the region felt from the United States, the international financial 
institutions, and the process of globalization. These global aspects of causality are 
widely recognized and I acknowledge their importance. However, this study differs 
from most in focusing on the national level, on politics at this level and on how the 
structure of the state affects politics and policy making. It is the internal process of 
neoliberalization that I want to illuminate and this is one of the ways that this work 
sits apart from the rest of the literature. 
The neoliberal state failed to produce anything like the growth rates its 
proponents thought that it would. In addition, the growth that did occur was often 
immiserating as the poorest in society frequently became poorer and throughout 
the region, within country levels of inequality rose during the neoliberal era. These 
                                                 
2 This last assumption is based on the belief that welfare policies distort rational 
self-maximizing actions in the market and foster dependency among poor 
individuals. 
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developmental failures were an undeniable contributing factor in the electoral shifts 
to the left in many countries. The politicians of the new left campaigned on anti-
neoliberal platforms and pledged to address the region’s high levels of poverty and 
inequality. Part of the process of creating the neoliberal state however, has included 
opening up domestic economies to global capitalism. These countries are far more 
interwoven into global and regional trade and capital networks than they were prior 
to the neoliberal period and attempts to reverse this process could prove 
economically traumatic and thus politically dangerous. 
It has become commonplace to treat neoliberalism as a radical break from 
the preceding developmental model in Latin America which had been based on 
structuralism. The structuralist theory of underdevelopment in the region had led to 
the policy of import substitution industrialization (ISI) and significant state 
involvement in the economy. Given that history, the problem that this research 
project seeks to address deals with the current changes to the state wrought by the 
leftist shift in the region and the way that the neoliberal state shapes/limits/defines 
the possibilities of change at this historical moment. I seek to determine how 
changes in the role, emphasis, and structure of the state in Latin America occur once 
neoliberal theory has been adopted and reforms inspired by this theory 
implemented. This requires us to explore the extent to which neoliberal reforms 
varied by country in the region. Some states carried reforms further than others, 
carried them out sooner than others, more democratically than others, etc. and this 
has implications for how difficult it became for the new lefts to attempt changes to 
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the model. Also, I am interested in investigating if, once in power, the new lefts in 
Latin America alter the neoliberal model enough to constitute a “post-neoliberal” 
state. Are social outcomes different under the regimes of the new left than they were 
under the neoliberal state in Latin America? In this project I address all of these 
research questions by examining three Latin American states: Argentina, Peru, and 
Ecuador.  
I have elsewhere (Rowland 2009) documented the origins and theoretical 
justifications of neoliberalism.3 In the fourth chapter I will elaborate a concept of the 
neoliberal state in the context of Latin America. This state is the result of neoliberal 
reforms. I do not formally define at what point a state moves from being something 
else to being a specifically neoliberal state. For purposes of this study, I argue that 
both Argentina and Peru carried out enough neoliberal reforms to have made this 
transition by the late 1990s, and I provide evidence to back up this assertion. I also 
argue that Ecuador failed to make this transition, though Ecuadorian 
administrations did carry out some neoliberal reforms. Conceptually defining the 
exact point at which the transition takes place is unnecessary for the project at 
hand. 
Similarly, there is an enormous literature on defining/delimiting/ 
conceptualizing/studying the state, which I will very briefly touch on in Chapter II. I 
am not creating a theory of the state in this project, but rather a theory of a 
                                                 
3 Others who have similarly done so include: Klein (2007); Harvey (2005); Stedman 
Jones (2010); Van Horn and Mirowski (2009); Van Horn, Mirowski and Stapleford 
(2011). 
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particular type of state rooted in the history of Latin America in the period of the 
1980s-present. I argue that, following Jessop’s (2008) strategic-relational approach 
(SRA) to studying the state, this model can help us better understand the structural 
selectivity that frames the actions and rhetoric of politicians, political parties, and 
social movements seeking to act on and through the structures of the neoliberal 
state, and how their struggles constitute and reconstitute the structure. 
Jessop asserts that states are moving targets to study because they are 
constantly evolving and they respond to active attempts to alter them. The SRA 
starts from the proposition that the state is not a thing in and of itself but rather a 
social relation. Despite his warning that the state is notoriously difficult to define 
and study, Jessop gives this “preliminary” definition: “the core of the state apparatus 
can be defined as a distinct ensemble of institutions and organizations whose 
socially accepted function is to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on a 
given population in the name of their ‘common interest’ or ‘general will’” (2008: 9, 
emphasis in original). In the following chapters, I will develop a model of the 
neoliberal state that is based on this definition. My use of the concept state should 
be understood to be a reference to the state as this institutional and organizational 
ensemble. I make no attempt to set forth a list of the institutional forms of the 
neoliberal state because they will vary both between any two states and within a 
state over time. Following the SRA, I conceive of the state as a structuring system of 
political representation and policy implementation. At the same time, the state is the 
object of political struggle, resulting in the alteration of its shape and its system 
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structuring capabilities by the groups and individuals who occupy positions within 
it. In other words, the state is both the result of past social, political, and ideological 
struggles and a force that structures current social, political, and ideological 
struggles. 
This project is an historical comparative analysis of the way that the creation 
of the neoliberal state in one period affects attempts to construct a new 
development model (or simply to alter the state) in a later period. As such, I will be 
comparing several states to one another and to themselves at two different time 
periods. Comparative inquiry is often abstracted from time and place and “cases” 
are treated as autonomous “wholes” in an external relationship with other cases and 
the wider system. This ignores the fact that they are part of an interconnected, 
emergent whole—partly determined by and partly determining the constant 
unfolding of the system (McMichael 1990).  
Alternatively, incorporated comparison is an internal comparison. The units 
are not considered to be directly separate units but rather seem to be separate 
aspects that are part of a broader global, historical process. McMichael (1990) lays 
out two types of incorporated comparison—singular and multiple—and I use both 
of them in this project simultaneously. Singular incorporated comparison has a 
particularizing thrust and examines variations in a process across space (cases) in a 
particular historical conjuncture. Multiple incorporated comparison follows a 
generalizing thrust and examines a singular process by analyzing its time- and 
space-differentiated aspects. McMichael says of them: “They share the goal of 
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historical specificity, but the former focuses on cross-sectional analysis in time (e.g., 
the conjuncture), whereas the latter focuses on processes through time (e.g., the 
era). These foci are not mutually exclusive and a combination is both feasible and 
enhancing” (1990: 393). 
Using successive time periods within a single society as separate cases for 
comparison presents its own special problems distinct from those encountered 
while attempting to compare two different countries (Haydu 2010, 1998). Haydu 
argues that both narrative and path-dependency descriptions of event sequences 
often fail to explain the way that events are linked to one another across different 
times (as opposed to simply arranging them in temporal order). As an alternative, 
he suggests the use of reiterated problem solving, which he says “constructs 
narratives of historical switch points that are followed by more or less durable 
social regimes” (1998: 349). Also, by connecting events in two time periods as 
separate chapters in one ongoing story, it is easier to show that the two sets of 
events are causally related to one another. It also allows us to balance structural 
limitations with the agency of actors. By focusing on actors (in this study: political 
parties and politicians) attempting to solve perceived problems (economic crises), 
we provide ourselves with “a mechanism through which multiple causal 
trajectories—such as fleeting political opportunities, slower-moving changes in 
economic resources or strategic allies, and long-standing cultural repertoires—are 
brought together in episodes of social transformation” (Haydu 2010:32). 
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In this project, I use single incorporated comparison in Chapters V and VI to 
examine similarities and differences in neoliberalization and the leftist shift 
respectively. These chapters also follow Haydu’s reiterated problem solving 
narrative to balance structural constraints imposed by time order within cases. In 
addition, I use multiple incorporated comparison in Chapter II to compare various 
models of the state, and in Chapters IV, V, and VI to examine neoliberalism as an 
evolving process over time. The neoliberal state is not one thing. It is a process that 
changes over time and across space. 
In order to analyze the neoliberal state and changes to it wrought by the left 
turns in my three cases, I am focusing on the period from the early 1980s up to 
2010. I focus on the Latin American region because of the thoroughness of 
neoliberalization in this region compared to other regions of the developing world. 
For a variety of reasons (shared intellectual ties, lack of front-line status in United 
States’ geopolitics, etc…) Latin American states became a laboratory of neoliberal 
experimentation. My three cases during the period of study offer a wide array of 
comparable traits and contrasting information that enrich this analysis of the 
neoliberal state and the left turns. These cases were chosen for their dissimilarity on 
a variety of traits in order to explore as many different possible paths of 
convergence and divergence.  
Two of my cases—Argentina and Peru—exemplify the Latin American 
neoliberal state while a third case—Ecuador—provides us with a case that has not 
made the complete transition to that status. These states exemplify various 
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differences in their structures prior to the neoliberal period. Argentina and Ecuador 
both have extensive and well-established ISI developmental models in place prior to 
neoliberalization. Peru on the other hand has always had among the more classically 
liberal economic models in the region. Similarly, the outcomes for all three countries 
in the post-neoliberal period all differ. Most analysts of the recent leftist shift in the 
region place Argentina in a center-leftist and Ecuador in a more radical leftist 
position. Peru is a case where neoliberalism did not transition into a left turn and 
thus provides a contrast to the other two cases. Finally, Ecuador offers us an 
example of a country that has large oil reserves and the ability to engage in 
extractive activities. This neo-extractivism gives the Ecuadorian state much more 
latitude in determining social policy. 
This project provides a better general understanding of the results of the 
process of neoliberalization on the state and how this affects social well-being in 
Latin America. It also demonstrates that the creation of the neoliberal state is an 
evolving process rather than a point in time. The left turns in Latin America 
represent a range of changes to the neoliberal state, but in Argentina’s case, these 
changes are mostly in the areas of social protections. The other aspects of the 
neoliberal state remain relatively untouched. As such, I propose that the left turns in 
less radical states in Latin America do not represent a shift away from neoliberalism 
but rather a fourth stage of neoliberalism, one in which limited social protections 
are used a tool of legitimation to further entrench the neoliberal state. 
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Chapter Outline 
    
The next chapter lays the groundwork for a model of the Latin American 
neoliberal state by giving a very brief overview of the various ways that the state 
has been conceptualized previously before outlining some specific models of the 
state in the developing world. The first of these that I examine is the 
developmentalist state in East Asia. I focus on how the authors of this model develop 
the concept in a way that is both theoretically interesting and concretely tied to 
historically specific cases. This is followed by an examination of the corporatist and 
bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) models of the state, developed to specifically study 
Latin American states at different times. I use these examples to make the case that 
a concept of the neoliberal state in its historically specific Latin American form 
offers us an important tool for analyzing changes in the state from the 1980s to the 
2010s. 
Chapter III examines the Latin American region’s experience with 
neoliberalization by calling into question previous work that treats neoliberal 
reforms as if they were a homogenous experience throughout the region. I stress the 
extent to which these reforms were sometimes partial and always contingent on 
context. Building on this discussion, I develop a more grounded, contextualized 
examination of the process of neoliberalization in Latin America. Finally, I 
synthesize a major (though not uniform) conceptualization of Latin America’s 
neoliberal history. Many previous researchers have argued that this history roughly 
conforms to several stages, each of which has its own organizing logic. As developed 
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in this study, the three stages all seek to address separate but related developmental 
issues and have different goals, however all of the goals fall within the same 
overarching ideology: that economic growth and development requires liberal 
institutions that foster individualism, free trade, and maximal capital freedom. 
Chapter IV sets up a model of the Latin American neoliberal state analogous 
to the developmentalist, corporatist, and bureaucratic-authoritarian state models 
discussed in the second chapter. This model has seven major components that were 
mostly shared throughout the region and roughly correspond to the three stages 
discussed in Chapter III.  
The fifth chapter introduces my three cases (Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru) 
and documents the reforms that each country carried out in the construction 
(partial in the case of Ecuador) of the Latin American neoliberal state. This chapter 
is a systematic application of the seven parts and three stages of the model to real-
world states during the 1980s and 1990s. In each case, I focus as much as possible 
(without making the analysis too cumbersome) on specific policies and reforms. 
This chapter empirically grounds the neoliberal state concept and compares the 
similarities and differences of neoliberalization in each case. 
Finally, Chapter VI introduces the “left turns” in Latin America that many 
academics and journalists have held up as evidence of a post-Washington 
Consensus. After examining the literature that has developed around this 
phenomenon—seeking to define, analyze, critique, and categorize these new left 
turns—I explore the non-leftist continuation of the neoliberal state in Peru. I then 
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compare this to the reforms that the leftist president Rafael Correa in Ecuador has 
carried out. This allows me to compare the relatively more radical reforms of 
Ecuador and the relative lack of reforms in Peru to the middle case of Argentina 
under Néstor and Cristina Kirchner. In that chapter (and further in the conclusion), I 
argue that there has been an observable change in levels of poverty and inequality 
in my two leftist cases, mostly due to changes in the social safety net. However, in 
the case of Argentina, this in no way constitutes a shift away from the neoliberal 
state but rather a fourth (social) stage of the process in which prior reforms are 
legitimized by ameliorating some of the worst effects of the neoliberal model 
through state sponsored social safety nets. The main aspects of the neoliberal model 
(privatizations, trade and financial liberalizations) remain relatively unchanged 
despite the fiery anti-neoliberal rhetoric of the Kirchners. Despite continually being 
assessed in studies as less leftist than Ecuador, this study shows that Argentina has 
had a greater impact on the lives of the poor in terms of reductions in poverty and 
inequlity. 
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CHAPTER II 
TOWARDS A MODEL OF THE STATE 
        
  
 
Conceptualizing “the State” 
 
In order to examine the extent to which the pink tide represents a break from 
neoliberal economic policies, we must first create a framework in which to better 
understand the way that economic policies are implemented. Of course, all such 
policies, to the extent that they are formal regulatory structures, are state policies. 
Thus, in order to understand this process, we need to have a clear theoretical 
conceptualization of the state: what the state is, what the state does. In this chapter, 
I will make the case that we need a model of the state during the period of neoliberal 
hegemony, one that explicates the contours of a state that has enacted neoliberal 
reforms: a model of the neoliberal state. First, I will briefly describe a very 
successful model of the state in the developing world, the East Asian 
developmentalist state. This state model has proved valuable as a critique of the free 
market policies that proponents of neoliberalism call for. Second, as this model was 
not one that existed in Latin America, I will outline a historical progression of the 
state models that have existed in Latin America—corporatism and bureaucratic-
authoritarianism—along with a discussion of the way that clientelism distorts the 
state in certain ways. 
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These examples will be used to make the case that it is possible and desirable 
to explicitly define a neoliberal model of the state in order to understand how such a 
state places particular constraints on future actors by changing the structure of the 
social system in which they are attempting to act. Unlike previous attempts to 
delineate what the state is and does, I am attempting a more modest, historically 
and geographically situated model of a particular type of state at a particular point 
in time. Although not unique, my approach differs from the predominant method, 
which has been to construct a theory of the state, rather than a theory of a state.   
There has been a constant tension in the literature on the state, which can be 
seen within the analytical traditions that the literature on the state is often grouped 
into, between a focus on agency and a focus on structure. The changes in academic 
style over the years (from Weberian statism to pluralism to Marxism to Foucaldian 
governmentality to neo-statism to the decline of the state for example) are 
themselves exemplary of a swinging back and forth between agency and actors on 
the one hand and structural determination on the other. However, this is somewhat 
of a caricature of the different traditions, nearly all of which do attempt to strike a 
particular balance between structure and agency. The place where this balance is 
struck is a product of the particular aspects of the state that the different traditions 
are interested in illuminating. 
In the early Weberian conception, the state is described as “a compulsory 
political organization with continuous operations” in which an “administrative staff 
successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical 
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force in the enforcement of its order” (Weber 1922/1978: 54). It is also limited to a 
defined territorial space. This is the most widely explicitly and implicitly accepted 
definition of the state by scholars as it refers to the most commonly analyzed form 
of the state in modernity: the nation-state. This definition forms the basis of much of 
International Relations theory, in which the state is seen as part of the Westphalian 
system of sovereign nation-states (Skocpol 1985: 8). From this definition, it is clear 
that for Weber, the state is a set of institutions (the government and its 
bureaucracies) that have the legitimate authority to make rules and the exclusive 
ability to legitimately enforce them within a defined territory. In addition, this state 
is seen as separate from the rest of society. 
This is the same conceptualization that Alfred Stepan uses in his book State 
and Society (1979) where he says: “The state must be considered as more than the 
‘government’. It is the continuous administrative, legal, bureaucratic and coercive 
systems that attempt not only to structure many crucial relationships between civil 
society and public authority in a polity but also to structure many crucial 
relationships within civil society as well” (1979: xii). As I will note below, this focus 
on the state and its apparatuses forms the basis for the later neostatist theory of the 
state. 
Following Weber, there was a theoretical detour during the 1930s-1960s, in 
which the analysis of how power is exercised in society dominated the literature. 
The elite theorists (exemplified by C. Wright Mills 1956) and the American pluralists 
(exemplified by Arthur Bentley 1967; Robert Dahl 1958, 1961, 1967; Charles 
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Lindblom 1977; Nelson Polsby 1960; David Truman 1951; Aaron Wildavsky 1964; 
and the Yale School – for this see Merelman 2003) did not explicitly set out to 
recreate a theory of the state, which was often left implicit in their work (Smith 
2006). 
The Miliband—Poulantzas debate built off of earlier Marxist writings 
regarding the state. The debate centered around the question: “Is the modern state a 
state in capitalist society or a capitalist state?” (Hay 2006: 71). For Miliband, arguing 
the “instrumentalist” position, the state serves the general interest of the capitalist 
class because it is dominated by that class—but not due to some structural change. 
For Poulantzas, arguing the “structuralist” position, the structure of the system has 
causal priority over agents and individual actions or intended actions. The system is 
structured independently of actors, classes, or other groups that make up the 
system. As such, the state, according to Poulantzas, is autonomous from the 
capitalist class and is mainly concerned with advancing the general interests of the 
class over any particular interests of individual members of the class. By the 1980s, 
many Marxist theorists attempted to reconcile the two positions by bringing them 
back together, moderating their extremities. Fred Block’s Revising State Theory 
(1987) sought to reconcile these positions by arguing that the state is somewhat 
autonomous from the capitalist class—though structurally it is heavily influenced by 
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particular interests of that class.4 For Block, the capitalist state is primarily 
concerned with managing labor and the periodic crises that capitalism is prone to. 
Beginning in the 1970s, but epitomized by the 1985 edited volume Bringing 
the State Back In (Evans, Ruescemeyer, and Skocpol), some researchers began to 
focus on the state and its institutions/organizations as actors in their own right 
rather than as expressions of the society or the economic system. This move was 
primarily an American reaction to theoretical perspectives like pluralism and 
elitism in which the state had all but disappeared. From this statist/neo-Weberian 
perspective, the state or government institution being analyzed is not just an actor, 
it is also seen as having its own distinctive interests and the autonomy and 
rationality to pursue them. Skocpol (1985) points out however, that this is not a 
fixed feature of all states at all times. To these “neo-statists,” the autonomy of the 
state means it is not merely an arena for social struggles. Skocpol elaborates on 
exactly what it means to be autonomous. She says, “States conceived as 
organizations claiming control over territories and people may formulate and 
pursue goals that are not simply reflective of the demands or interests of social 
groups, classes, or society” (1985: 9). The basic underpinnings of the state’s capacity 
for Skocpol are a Weberian conceptualization of sovereignty, a Weberian 
conceptualization of bureaucracy, and “plentiful financial resources.” From this 
perspective, when the state is theorized as an actor, what is meant is 
                                                 
4 For Block, this limited autonomy came mainly from the multiplicity of individual-
level business interests, which left state managers to work out the best course for 
determining what policies were in the nation’s interest (1987: 17).  
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“organizationally coherent collectivities of state officials, especially collectivities of 
career officials relatively insulated from ties to currently dominant socioeconomic 
interests” (Skocpol 1985: 9). Such collectivities can alter or enact policy in 
distinctive ways and over extended periods. 
Skocpol goes on to argue that beyond the fact that these organizations are 
collective actors, there are other reasons that they are important. “They matter 
because their organizational configurations, along with their overall patterns of 
activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and 
collective political actions (but not others), and make possible the raising of certain 
political issues (but not others)” (1985: 21). This “Tocquevillian” approach to states 
is focused on the state’s unintended influence on “the formation of groups and the 
poitical capacities, ideas, and demands of various sectors of society” (1985: 21). 
With the focus over the last twenty years on globalization, the literature on 
the state has taken three new turns. First, by the 1990s, the withdrawal of the state 
in terms of welfare provision and the growing complaints by government officials in 
many developing states that domestic policies were being undermined by 
international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) as well as by increasingly volatile and less 
restricted flows of capital led many researchers to hypothesize the inevitable 
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withering (or even death) of the state  (Guéhenno 1995; Ohmae 1995; Olson 1982; 
Slaughter 1997; Strange 1994, 1995, 1996; Vernon 1971).5 
The second turn that the literature has taken focuses on the regionalization 
or even transnationalization of the state. Though they accept the argument that the 
world is economically globalizing, Held and McGrew (2007), Chortareas and 
Pelagidis (2004), and Thompson (2006), all in different ways, argue that currently 
this process is still largely taking place at regional levels.  The rise of global financial 
networks and international institutions like the WTO and other international 
governance bodies are suturing together a global economy despite the 
regionalization and segregation (triadization) of trade and actual financial flows.6 
The picture they paint is of a globalizing world economy, dominated by the member 
states of the OECD, in which states continue to matter – especially through 
multilateral governance institutions, but the interests of finance and global capital 
are becoming more and more important.  
Similar to the regionalism authors, the proponents of a theory of 
transnationalization vis-à-vis globalization reject the withering of the state thesis as 
too simplistic (Robinson 2004; Soederberg 2004). For these authors, the state is not 
so much withering away, as actively participating in the reorganization of the global 
economy around flows of financial capital. In Robinson’s case, the nation-state is an 
integral part of the emerging “transnational state.” This transnational state relies on 
                                                 
5 Also, see Evans (1995) and Weiss (1998) for critiques of the “death of the state” 
argument. 
6 Their term “triadization” refers to the fact that the United States, European Union, 
and Japan still dominate this process. 
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the nation-state to enforce policies designed at a transnational level because it lacks 
the type of enforcement mechanisms that have historically existed in the nation-
state. This emphasis on the state’s focus is close to the next argument about the 
direction that the state is moving in. 
The third turn that the literature has taken views the state as neither 
weakening nor regionalizing/transnationalizing but rather shifting its focus toward 
a new constituency, one that is interested in globalized markets. For example, 
Soederberg et al (2006) assert that what they call the “competition state” is a 
nation-state that, rather than weakening in the face of global pressures, is re-
orienting to attract foreign capital.7  
All of these previous examples from the literature on the state are focused on 
differing conceptualizations of the state and are only concerned with historically 
specific empirical cases of states as examples of the general theory of the state being 
promulgated.  In one or two examples, the theories may have been built up from one 
specific case, but they are still meant to apply generally to the state as a concept. As 
reactions to one another, these theories constitute swings back and forth between a 
greater emphasis on agency over structure and vice versa. In order to understand 
the structurally available choices of governing administrations, we must examine 
the system within which they are acting and on which they are directing their 
actions. Cardoso and Faletto (1979) argued from a structural Marxist perspective 
                                                 
7 Many of the critics of neoliberal globalization policies argue that these policies do 
not so much constitute a withdrawal of the state from economic policy-making as 
they constitute a shift in the constituency that the state is serving in its policy-
making (Cypher and Delgado Wise 2010; Harris 2000: 147-8; Harvey 2005). 
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that the way to understand the developmental possibilities of a given historical 
moment requires us to first determine the constraints on the present that previous 
historical moments have created. They argued: 
An economic class or group tries to establish through 
the political process a system of social relations that 
permits it to impose on the entire society a social form 
of production akin to its own interests; or at least it 
tries to establish alliances or to control the other groups 
or classes in order to develop an economic order 
consistent with its interests and objectives. The modes 
of economic relations, in turn, set the limits of political 
action. (Cardoso and Faletto 1979: 15) 
 
Bob Jessop’s (2010) strategic relational approach (which is a synthesis of 
Marx, Gramsci, Poulantzas, Foucault, and feminist theory) moves beyond the false 
dichotomy between structure and agency by dialectically examining their 
interrelationship as a continuous process (Hay 75). For Jessop, social and political 
change occurs as groups employ strategies against each other within the structures 
of their historically specific societies. The deployment of these strategic actions then 
change the system thereby restructuring the field within which succeeding strategic 
actions will be planned and implemented (Jessop 2010). It follows from this that 
there is no necessary guarantee that the state will successfully protect capital 
accumulation. Also, the state evolves over time and this framework allows us to 
analyze that as well. This perspective eschews any general or transhistorical theory 
of the state. If we are going to attempt to understand what strategic options are 
available in a given time and place for political actors to choose from, and thus 
better understand the degree to which they are capable of breaking with past 
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ideologies to remake the structure, then historically specific, limited models of the 
state are better than a general theory of the state. 
 
Building Models of the State 
 
One of the most successful historically specific models of the state so far has been 
the work of several scholars of East Asian development. Beginning in the early 
1980s, these writers argued that the newly industrializing countries (NICs) of East 
Asia followed a relatively similar model that allowed them to successfully develop 
globally competitive industries. The model that they created is not without 
weaknesses, even in relation to the specific cases that it is drawn from, but overall 
provides a good example of the work that I will perform in the next chapter to create 
the type of model that will allow me to analyze the Pink Tide in a strategic relational 
manner. 
 
The Developmental State and Embedded Autonomy   
Chalmers Johnson is credited with coining the term “developmental state” in 
his 1982 book MITI and the Japanese Miracle. He described the Japanese state as 
developmental because the logic of the state itself prioritized economic 
development as the first priority of the society. He says that this was a successful 
enterprise for Japan because it developed four features key to state-led 
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development. The first feature was “the existence of a small, inexpensive, but elite 
state bureaucracy staffed by the best managerial talent available to the system” 
(1982: 314). The second feature was “a political system in which the bureaucracy is 
given sufficient scope to take initiative and operate effectively” (1982: 315). This 
point means that it must be insulated from legislative and judicial pressures 
(Johnson 1999). The third feature was “the perfection of market-conforming 
methods of state intervention in the economy” (1982: 317). Fourth, there must be a 
pilot organization like MITI (which Johnson wrote did not exist in any other country 
he knew of at the time). Johnson says “The Japanese case is actually one of an 
economy mobilized for war but never demobilized during peacetime” (1999: 41). 
However, the main point of his book is that the government is guiding development 
but not planning the economy. He is careful to contrast Japan with both the 
regulatory capitalism of the US and the centrally managed economies of the Soviet 
Bloc. 
During the decade of the 1980s and into the 1990s, more research along a 
similar vein to Johnson was done in other East Asian countries, which largely bore 
out the main points in Johnson’s model (Amsden 1989, 2001; Chang 1999; Cumings 
1999; Leftwich 1995; Pempel 1999; Thompson 1996; Wade 1990; for a good review 
of several of these see Önis 1991). As the globalization era advanced however, more 
criticisms of the developmental state concept began to arise. It was criticized for 
seeing states as Weberian rational-bureaucratic actors; “in its concern to identify 
the correct ‘institutional mix’ for development to occur, it ends up believing that the 
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(best) states really do stand apart from society, forgetting that this is an illusion” 
(Gainsborough 2009). 
In a definite but partial move away from what was seen as a strong statist 
stance that had come dangerously close to losing sight of society, Peter Evans’s 
Embedded Autonomy (1995) was an attempt to examine the complex ways that the 
state is integral to the process of economic development. He criticized earlier 
Weberian conceptions of states as completely autonomous actors and the 
developmental benefits of such a situation. Comparing predatory states and 
developmental states, Evans argued that developmental states successfully create 
the bureaucratic mechanisms to develop economically. But these bureaucracies are 
not completely insulated from society, they are “embedded in a dense network of 
social ties that enable political elites to negotiate goals, policies, and implementation 
strategies with business actors” (Campbell 1998: 103).  
According to Evans, economies are embedded in social relationships that get 
expressed through the state, which “provides the institutional context within which 
economic activity occurs” (Campbell 1998: 105). This is a direct attack on what 
Evans calls the neo-utilitarian literature that was so effectively attacking the very 
idea of a developmental state in the 1980s and 1990s.8 According to Evans’s 
                                                 
8 By neo-utilitarian, Evans was referring to the Public-Choice school of economics 
associated with James Buchannan and Gordon Tullock (both of whom were Chicago 
School-trained economists). Their work built off of George Stigler’s (1971) concept 
of “regulatory capture,” the idea that regulation would necessarily come to be 
dominated by the very agents that it was designed to control. Stigler was a major 
part of what Stedman Jones calls “the second Chicago school of economics” (as was 
Milton Friedman) (Stedman Jones 2012: 128). Although Public Choice is usually 
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classification, the state can and has successfully played four possible developmental 
roles: custodian – protecting and regulating new industries; midwife – attracting 
new businesses; husbandry –nurturing an entrepreneurial culture; and demiurge – 
directly engaging in industries until they are built up enough to stand alone (Evans 
1995: 77-81). Evans also does a good job of illustrating how the changing interests 
of constituents of the state result in changing pressures by them on the state – even 
to the point of becoming antagonistic to the very agencies that made these 
constituencies possible in the first place (1995: 219, 224, and 234-5). 
One of the primary benefits of the use of specific models of the state like that 
of Evans’ embedded autonomy or the East Asian developmental state is that its 
limited focus on a specific geographic location and historical period make it possible 
to study the actions carried out through the state by specific actors. When a 
particular government reform is carried out, this type of model allows us to better 
understand the constituency the state is serving because we are already focused on 
the specific groups and individuals acting in the case. If our interest is in the ways 
that ideologies shape politics on the ground in real historical circumstances, these 
limited models provide a framework that allows us to illuminate various actors (and 
groups), their material interests, the hardships they face, and the ideological 
statements they pronounce in the public sphere. 
                                                                                                                                                 
seen as a separate intellectual school from neoliberalism, it arose from the same set 
of beginning assumptions about the world and was a major part of the cross-
fertilization that forms neoliberal developmental ideology. For this reason, I 
consider Evans’ arguments against “neo-utilitarianism” as being equally valid as a 
critique of neoliberalism. 
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Latin American Models: A Historical Progression 
It is now considered axiomatic that for the last two decades of the twentieth 
century, most of Latin America’s governments subscribed to the developmental 
ideology of neoliberalism. Thus, in studying the new Latin American left and its field 
of action, we must first have a clear understanding of the general characteristics of 
the neoliberal legacy and the way that it has socially structured the available policy 
choices. In the following sections, I argue that the best way to do this in a 
comparative framework is to first establish a model of what the neoliberal state 
looked like in Latin America prior to the left turn.9 In the following sections of this 
chapter, I will examine previous historical types of Latin American state and discuss 
how the particular types of state forms that they entail—given certain historical 
backgrounds—and the different constituencies that they represent have been 
analyzed in the literature. This will provide a series of examples for how I am 
constructing the Latin American neoliberal state model. It will also allow me to 
discuss some of the historical structural dynamics that affected the attempt to enact 
                                                 
9 In the first chapter, I will discuss the fact that a comparative study, unlike an 
historical case study, requires some means of external calibration of the means 
through which the cases can be compared. A common way of doing this, following 
Weber, is to construct an ideal-type to which the cases can be compared, thus 
making them comparable to one another. In general, an ideal-type is meant to be a 
highly abstracted version of a concept meant to be the perfected form of that 
concept. I purposely call the concept I am constructing a model because I am 
explicitly limiting it to a slightly generalized form of what actually existed in the 
population of states from which I drew the cases for this study. As such, I will not be 
arguing that my neoliberal state fits some type of theoretical ideal for what such a 
state ought to be, but rather what it came to be when various sets of actors tried to 
enact it in a particular place in a particular time. This construct will then help us 
understand how and why each of the cases presents actors of the new, leftist 
governments with differing needs, opportunities, and constraints. 
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neoliberal reforms. For these purposes, I will discuss the corporatist state, the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian state, and the clientelist state. 
The literature on Latin American political economy has been enriched by 
several different models of the state that differentiate configurations of polity, 
society, and economy at different historical conjunctures. Although these models 
have in some cases been consciously conceived as ideal-types (Schmitter 1974: 86), 
what makes them analytically and theoretically useful is their inductive 
development from individual, historically specific configurations of conditions into 
slightly more abstracted concepts that allow for cross-case comparisons.  
This type of classificatory analysis is heuristically useful for comparing Latin 
American countries especially due to the seemingly widely shared patterns that are 
visible within the region over the past century. Though cultural patterns and 
national histories clearly differ between all of these countries, most still tend to 
follow similar general political and economic trends including colonial legacies,10 
caudillo political leaders, periods of repeated military intervention into the 
democratic process, periods of authoritarian rule, repeated turns to populism, and 
more recently an economic opening to the global market followed for many 
countries in the region by an electoral resurgence of the political left. 
                                                 
10 These colonial legacies were only similar in the sense that the countries of the 
region were mostly colonized by Iberian powers. Although, as Mahoney (2010) 
points out, Latin American countries exhibited wide variation in terms of pre-
colonial society, colonial experiences, and consequently, post-colonial 
developmental outcomes.  
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What appears most striking about these patterns is that they tend to be 
regional rather than specific to one country. Additionally, the developmental 
ideologies and practices followed by the countries in the region followed some type 
of structuralist ISI developmental model associated with Raúl Prebisch and 
ECLAC;11 after the debt crisis of the 1980s, most of these countries adopted 
(sometimes reluctantly) what is now called a neoliberal model. After the 1980s-
1990s dominance of neoliberalism, many of these countries experienced an 
electoral shift towards the left in what has been called Latin America’s left turn. 
The use of state, representational, and developmental models have been a 
valuable heuristic device allowing researchers to create frameworks that facilitate 
cross-national comparisons. In the following pages, I will give several examples of 
how such models have been used to illustrate particular kinds of states and how 
these have proven to be successful comparative frameworks.  
 
The Corporatist State 
The concept of corporatism is an excellent example of the use of an 
“empirically bounded specification which focuses on a set of relatively directly 
observable, institutionally distinctive traits” that can be used as a conceptual 
framework that allows for analytical comparisons of different cases (Schmitter 
1974: 93). Corporatism became an important concept in research on Latin America 
                                                 
11 Prebisch and ECLAC (at the time Prebisch was there it was ECLA) and the 
Keynesian- and dependency-influenced structuralist ideology of development are 
discussed in more depth in the following chapter. 
  32 
beginning in the 1970s.12 From early on, researchers have divided along two 
different uses of the concept. One use of the concept, following Schmitter (1971) is 
more tightly focused on the structuring of interest group representation that takes 
on a particular institutional form. The other, following Wiarda (1973) is interested 
in broader historical patterns of cultural and ideological traditions that are traced 
back to Iberian influences. Although I will focus primarily on the former usage, the 
cultural perspective of corporatism is an important factor that cannot be left out and 
has an interesting corollary in some of the work that has been done on 
neoliberalism. 
Corporatism’s main strength, primarily for scholars from the United States—
as Collier (1995) points out, was as an alternative model to pluralism for studying 
representation. The most important early work on corporatism in the Latin 
American context was Schmitter’s (1971) Interest Conflict and Political Change in 
Brazil. This work portrayed Brazil in the 1930s and 1940s beginning under Vargas, 
as the exemplar for a corporatist state in the region. Most of the work on Latin 
American corporatism in this vein attempted to explain patterns of interest group 
representation in the authoritarian governments of Latin America during the mid-
twentieth century. As such, these researchers were focused on the state’s 
structuring of the system, especially the way that the state restricted, channeled, 
                                                 
12 Latin American corporatism is distinct from European corporatism, though a few 
of the writings on the two overlap. Some of the more important works in the 
literature on Latin American corporatism include (but are not limited to): Collier 
(1995); Collier and Collier (1979); Malloy (1974, 1977); Schmitter (1971, 1974); 
Stepan (1978); and Wiarda (1973, 1981). 
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and incorporated new groups like the urban working-class. This emphasis is clearly 
visible in Schmitter’s classic definition of corporatism:  
Corporatism can be defined as a system of interest 
representation in which the constituent units are 
organized into a limited number of singular, 
compulsory, noncompetitive, hierarchically ordered and 
functionally differentiated categories, recognized or 
licensed (if not created) by the state and granted a 
deliberate representational monopoly within their 
respective categories in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articulation of 
demands and supports. (Schmitter 1974: 93-94) 
 
There were several related aspects to the concept of corporatism that made 
it a powerful and useful analytical tool. In the first instance, as Guillermo O’Donnell 
(1973) pointed out, corporatist states exhibited a “segmentary” character. Unlike 
pluralism, which largely ignored (or rejected) the cumulative nature of power, 
O’Donnell pointed out that the corporative state had differential impacts on various 
groups. Business was less constrained by the system than labor, for example. Part of 
the reason for this is that business was never fully subjugated to the state as Latin 
America never developed full-blown corporative systems. “No country provided for 
well-institutionalized mediation among labor, business, and the state at the pinnacle 
of the corporatist system, although the region has seen unsuccessful attempts to 
establish such mediation and scholars have identified some partial approximations” 
(Collier 1995: 139).  
Another reason that the concept was useful was that the scholars using it 
recognized that the full set of attributes were too many to appear in any one 
particular case. Although Brazil was the closest to Schmitter’s corporatism as “a 
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particular model or ideal-typical institutional arrangement” (1974: 86), no one 
assumed that other countries came so close. 
 
The Bureaucratic-Authoritarian State 
The literature on the bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) state (O’Donnell 1973, 
1978; Collier 1979) is another good example of the use of a particular, historically 
specific state model. It is thus able to delineate a distinct sub-type of authoritarian 
state. Beginning in the early 1970s, the Argentine political scientist Guillermo 
O’Donnell argued that the authoritarian governments of the time in Argentina, 
Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Uruguay were a unique set of cases that exhibited a new 
type of authoritarian government that arose under specific types of historical 
conditions.13 
According to O’Donnell, the BA state was exclusionary of the popular sector, 
relying on repression rather than channeling demands in the state-dominated 
structures like the corporatist authoritarian state. According to Collier, “[c]entral 
actors in the dominant coalition include high-level technocrats—military and 
civilian, within and outside the state—working in close association with foreign 
capital” (1979:24). It is the increased importance of technocrats—due to the 
increasing bureaucratization of society during the populist ISI phase that precedes 
BA—that is so distinctive about this type of authoritarianism. As a system, it “entails 
                                                 
13 For a critique of this set of cases, see Schamis (1991) who argued that the BA 
states of the 1960s had already transformed into neoconservative authoritarian 
states by the 1970s. 
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a comprehensive dynamic, and penetrating state which, through bureaucratization, 
achieves a high degree of formalization and differentiation of its own structures” 
(Schamis 1991: 203). 
Bureaucratic-authoritarianism’s relationship to the prior period of populism 
goes beyond the rise in importance of technocrats however.14 According to 
O’Donnell, the completion of the early phase of ISI (which he identifies with 
populism), that is based on the stimulation of production for domestic consumption, 
creates a complex series of problems: expensive intermediate goods, oversaturation 
of the domestic market, inflation, and foreign debt (Collier 1979: 26; O’Donnell 
1973). These problems fracture the multi-class coalition of the initial ISI phase and 
the resulting zero-sum competition leads to political and economic crisis and a 
                                                 
14 The concept of populism has been a much more problematic one in the literature 
on Latin America than have the concepts of corporatist or BA states. Although the 
latter two concepts have been challenged on empirical grounds, conceptually, they 
have had more cohesion and durability. Not so with the concept of populism. 
Definitions of this concept vary. Collier and Collier (1991) provide the closest thing 
conceptually to a populist state. They define two variations of populism in relation 
to the incorporation of new groups into the political system. Labor Populism occurs 
when a political party mobilizes labor for electoral support, unions establish formal 
linkages to the party, and labor is rewarded with major concessions. Radical 
Populism follows the same pattern but the peasantry is also mobilized and major 
assaults are attempted against the rural elites (1991: 16, 165, 746). However, their 
analysis results in a conceptualization of populism that is only applicable to the 
early ISI phase of development in Latin America and the incorporation of labor into 
the political system. It is unclear how to broaden their concept to include political 
regimes like Menem’s or Fujimori’s that combined populist political tactics with 
neoliberal policies. This problem has led some to create the diminished sub-type of 
“neo-populism.” In addition, a brief survey of the literature will yield far more 
disagreements about what constitutes populism/neo-populism than agreement. For 
example, see: Burgess and Levitsky (2003); Dornbusch and Edwards (1991); 
Edwards (2010); Hawkins (2003); Kaufman and Stallings (1991); Knight (1998); 
Roberts (2003, 1996); Seligson (2007); Weyland (2001). 
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popular threat to the existing capitalist production system. The technocratic elites 
and the professionalized and bureaucratic military “have a low level of tolerance for 
the ongoing political and economic crisis and perceive high levels of popular sector 
mobilization as an obstacle to economic growth” (Collier 1979: 27).15 These two 
social groups form a coup coalition and seek to end the political and economic crisis 
by repressive, antidemocratic means. 
O’Donnell (1986) argues that there are two faces to the state, “first, its 
analytic reality as the political aspect of certain social relations of domination, and, 
second, its concrete objectification as a set of institutions and legal norms” (1986: 
277). Given this conception of the state more generally, the BA state is a sub-type of 
authoritarian state that lacks the cover of ‘representing the general interest’ that 
would hide its social domination over the popular sectors. Instead it is explicitly a 
reaction to the mobilization of these popular sectors designed specifically to impose 
order on the country. As O’Donnell puts it: “This order is seen as a necessary 
condition for the consolidation of the social domination that BA guarantees and, 
after achieving the normalization of the economy, for reinitiating a highly 
transnational pattern of economic growth characterized by a skewed distribution of 
resources” (1986: 281). 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 See also, O’Donnell (1973); Stepan (1973). 
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Clientelism and the State 
The presence of clientelist networks in a society has an effect on the 
structure of the state. However, looking at the development of clientelist networks 
historically in Latin America shows that the structural particularities of states affect 
the development (or absence) of clientelist networks. Studies of Latin American 
clientelist networks have shown them to be relatively stable institutions in the 
region, operating in a variety of institutional settings, democratic and non-
democratic (Levitsky 2007; Oxhorn 1998). From corporatist Mexico (Eckstein 1990; 
Shefner 2001, 2008) to neoliberal Argentina (Auyero 2000a, 2000b; Remmer 2007; 
Stokes 2005) and Peru (Roberts 1995), clientelist networks cannot be ignored 
because they are an integral part of the wider structure that constrains political 
action.  
Clientelist networks are based on “unequal access to scarce resources, and 
the exchange relationship in which a powerful actor trades such resources for 
political support from less powerful actors” (Shefner 2012). Clientelist systems 
preclude independent organizing. To get resources, groups must channel demands 
through existing power structures and are reliant on more powerful actors to 
reward their political loyalty with needed goods (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007; 
Medina and Stokes 2007; Munro 2010). Such a system relies on the existence of high 
levels of inequality (political, social, and economic) and the inability—due to 
poverty or some other lack of agency—of the subordinate group to attain what it 
needs external to the exchange relationship. 
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In Latin America, these clientelist relationships all share these 
characteristics, however, the particular manifestations of the exchange relationship 
are particular to each specific case and based on previous historical developments. 
For instance, the adoption of neoliberal reforms in Mexico degraded the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party’s (PRI) ability to continue meeting its clientelist 
obligations due to lack of state resources for the maintenance of the relationship 
(Shefner 2001, 2007, 2008). This drying up of resources resulted in a shift of 
allegiance by many poor, urban groups away from the PRI to other political parties 
and eroded the PRI’s electoral dominance in the country.  In Argentina, the presence 
of Peronist clientelist networks worked to smoothe the transition to neoliberalism 
by buying off those most hurt by the reforms and in some cases providing a 
pressure relief valve through organized food lootings when the resources were not 
enough (Auyero 2003, 2006; Brusco, Nazareno, and Stokes 2004; Calvo and Murillo 
2004; Giraudy 2007; Remmer 2007). In this case, Argentina actually used its 
clientelist networks to maintain its electoral dominance despite carrying out 
reforms that imposed economic hardships on its traditional base of support. 
 
Neoliberalism as an Economic Ideal Type  
 
As I argued above, in order to investigate whether the new left in Latin America 
represents a break with the policies and developmental ideology of neoliberalism, 
we first need to establish a model of the neoliberal state in Latin America. To date, 
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whether scholars are critical of neoliberal reforms or supporters of them, they 
engage in one of two types of analysis.16 The first is to talk about neoliberalism as an 
ideal type and focus on the region or several comparative cases. The second is to 
focus solely on one or a couple of case studies and treat neoliberalism as a single 
case. Neither of these methods is ideal for obvious reasons: as I argued above—and 
will elaborate further in the next chapter—treating neoliberalism as an ideal type 
glosses over the fact that nowhere was neoliberalism even close to its supposed 
theoretical ideal and treating it as an idiosyncratic case of reforms by a state in 
relation to global economic changes ignores the fact that many other states in the 
same region carried out similar reforms during the same period. 
In the next chapter, I will deal with this problem of idealizing the reforms in 
Latin America but there is one more issue that needs to be addressed as well. 
Throughout the literature mentioned above, neoliberalism is treated mainly as a 
series of economic reforms and to the extent that their impact on the state is 
explored at all, it is usually only in relation to whether or not the state has become 
                                                 
16 A short list of neoliberalism’s critics who discuss it as an ideal type are: Fine 
(2009), Green (2003), Gwynne and Kay (1999, 2000), Harris (2000), Harvey (2005), 
Huber and Solt (2004), Nef and Robles (2000), Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler (1998), 
Pastor (1987), Sites (2000), and Weeks (2000). An even shorter list of supporters 
who treat it as an ideal type are: Burki and Perry (1998), Edwards (1995), 
Fukuyama (2008), Walton (2004), and Williamson (1991, 2003). Even many 
researchers who attempt to treat neoliberalism more evenly tend to conceptualize it 
as an ideal type: Bresser Pereira and Nakano (1998), Kingstone (2011), and 
Weyland (2004), for example. There are similarly a number of individual case 
studies of neoliberalization, and more than a few will be cited in the next several 
chapters.  
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more or less democratic in the presence of neoliberalization.17 Most other analyses 
are focused on the social or economic outcomes of the reforms. What I argue needs 
to be done, in order to answer the questions guiding this research, is to create a 
model of the state after neoliberalization has occurred. In a sense, the state is the 
outcome, but only insofar as it allows me to illuminate the possible fields of action 
for the politicians and parties of the new left in Latin America. It provides the stage 
on which they are acting while simultaneously serving as the object on which their 
actions are directed. Once we can clearly see what the Latin American neoliberal 
state looks like, we are capable of seeing what changes have been wrought to it. 
  
 
                                                 
17 See Weyland (2004), for example. 
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CHAPTER III 
NEOLIBERALIZING LATIN AMERICA 
 
 
 
Discussions of economic and social policies in the developing world make 
wide use of terms like neoliberalism, globalization, the free market, and government 
intervention without making it clear how these terms are specifically being 
conceptualized. Unfortunately, it is left to the reader to take them in the broadest 
possible context, one that is at the same time removed from historical specificity 
and yet, highly conceptually under-specified. When used in such a way, the terms 
take on the status of an inverted Weberian ideal type. They become an ideal type 
that the reader (implicitly), rather than the author (explicitly), defines as a base-line 
comparison for the actual cases being discussed.  
In this chapter, I discuss the problematic ways in which various proponents 
and critics of neoliberalism have used the concept. I focus on how these writers have 
used idealized theoretical conceptions of what neoliberalization is in ways that gloss 
over what particular cases of neoliberalization have actually been. After giving 
examples and illustrations of these views of neoliberalism, I will analyze the partial 
and contingent ways in which various states in Latin America have carried out 
neoliberalization. Finally, I will use the preceding discussions to construct a more 
grounded, contextualized model of what the neoliberal state looked (or looks) like 
in Latin America. 
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The Literature on the Neoliberal State: An Ideal Type 
 
Regardless of whether economic policies are developed and implemented by 
democratically elected politicians, politically appointed technocrats, or 
bureaucratically promoted civil servants, the policies themselves are political—not 
merely technical—in nature and can be traced back to developmental ideologies. A 
developmental ideology defines the desired end goal to be achieved and lays out the 
acceptable/desired means through which it can be attained. It is now commonly 
understood that the period following the Great Depression and the Second World 
War followed a developmental ideology that was mainly influenced by 
Keynesianism and structuralism.18 This model was meant to achieve relatively 
stable economic growth by stimulating steadily growing, broadly-based demands 
for consumption. The means to achieve this goal were through a compromise 
between the economic elites and what was then called “mass society” in which the 
                                                 
18 Keynesianism was more influential in the developed world. In the developing 
world, this political economy model was often referred to as developmentalism 
rather than as Keynesianism and stressed slightly different priorities. In Latin 
America it was associated with Raúl Prebisch, an Argentine economist and Celso 
Furtado, a Brazilian economist, both affiliated with the United Nations’ Economic 
Commission on Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). In that region, the ISI 
model of development was ideologically justified by “structuralism” and was 
intended to alter the relations of dependent trade by which Latin American 
countries mainly exported natural resources and unfinished goods to the United 
States and European nations and imported manufactured goods and capital 
equipment. This dependent economic relationship maintained unequal terms of 
trade and was seen as structurally limiting the region’s economic development 
potential. For this reason, ECLAC argued that development required structural 
changes to the economic system that would stimulate demand and simultaneously 
foster industrial development to meet that demand. (So 1990: 91-95; Peet and 
Hartwick 2009: 64-68). 
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economic gains from growing productivity were distributed unequally but broadly, 
with no one group garnering an excessively disproportionate share. The Keynesian 
logic behind this was that by stimulating consumption at the mass level, demand 
would continue to grow, keeping a constant upward pressure on employment and 
wages in a virtuous cycle. To manage this, governments were required to maintain a 
floor level of consumption, a high level of regulation, and a readiness to intervene to 
stimulate consumption during recessions in order to smoothe out the business 
cycle. This “Keynesian” ideology of development was dominant but far from 
hegemonic from the end of the Second World War until the 1970s.19 
For a variety of reasons that I will discus in more detail below, this system 
came into crisis across the globe during the early-mid 1970s. With the system in 
crisis, counter-hegemonic discourses of development began to compete for 
dominance in both academia and in the policy-making spheres of governments and 
transnational institutions in the capitalist world-system. The foremost counter-
hegemonic discourse, centered on the Chicago School of Economics and several 
Washington-based think tanks, is now commonly referred to as neoliberalism 
(Plehwe 2009; Stedman Jones 2012; Van Horn and Mirowski 2009; Van Horn, 
Mirowski, and Stapleford 2011). 
                                                 
19 By “far from hegemonic” I mean that it was hegemonic in the developed world but 
the ISI policies were unevenly attempted throughout the Latin American region. 
Some policies (import tariffs, government involvement in production) were fairly 
widespread but others (land reform, tax reform) were less uniformly enacted (or 
even attempted). 
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All ideologies are based on certain assumptions and those of neoliberalism 
have come under repeated attack by critics of the theory. Based on a return to some 
of the basic principles of eighteenth century liberalism, the neoclassical/neoliberal 
mainstream of economics is based on the premises of “the methodological focus of 
relying upon optimising individuals in single-minded pursuit of self-interest, 
embedded within formal mathematical models centered on (deviations from) 
efficiency and equilibrium, and reputedly tested against the evidence statistically” 
(Fine 2009: 886). As Fine points out, the mainstream of the economics discipline 
(which is now neoliberal) is so single-minded in its focus and ideological in its 
indoctrination of practitioners, that it is immune to all internal criticisms by pushing 
them to the disciplinary margins and immune to all external criticisms mainly by 
ignoring them. Though, as I will describe below, neoliberals appear to take on the 
concerns of other disciplines, they do so from within their own methodological 
terms but/and economics dominates.20 For example, the Public Choice economic 
                                                 
20 Margaret Somers (2005) makes this very point about the term “social capital,” 
which she argues was seen by sociologists as the ultimate validation: economists 
realizing that exclusively dichotomous models (market vs. state) were unable to 
account for reality and turning to “the social” to better justify their anti-statist 
discourse. She says that, unrecognized by most sociologists, the concept of social 
capital is a “Trojan horse” that has intellectually colonized the study of the social 
with a market-driven logic. She argues that adopting this concept into our analyses 
stunts our understanding of the social world and that the result is the tacit 
acceptance that “the stuff of citizenship qua social capital [is] a radically anti-
political, anti-institutional, presocial, stateless and rightless kind of citizenship” 
(2005: 266).  
Similarly, in his book, On the Move: The Politics of Social Change in Latin 
America, Veltmeyer (2007) argues that in Latin America the national state has been 
forced out of the economy and the development process. Particularly problematic in 
this respect, according to Veltmeyer, is the focus on social capital development that 
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theorists departed from other neoliberals by bringing the state (long considered 
exogenous to the market) back in to the economy as an endogenous actor (Bresser 
Pereira and Nakano 1998; Stedman Jones 2012). However, they did so while 
maintaining the methodological individualist focus on rational self-maximizing 
actors such that politicians and bureaucratic officials are viewed as only following 
personal self-interest, incapable of acting for the “common good” or the “national 
interest” which as Buchanan and Tullock (1962) point out, is a logical impossibility 
(given their starting assumptions in the analysis). 
From such a perspective, the state is incapable of effectively regulating the 
market, always creating more negative economic distortions than positive ones. The 
reason this is seen as the case is that the market is understood as a self-regulating 
system that exists separately from politics and cultural systems and must be 
institutionally separated from them to function optimally. This position is based on 
the theoretical assumption that markets are naturally perfectly competitive and 
result in full and efficient use of resources (including labor) (Weeks 1995).  
                                                                                                                                                 
was at its peak popularity in the 1990s. This project focused on the replacement of 
the state’s role in welfare provision by social networks (i.e. civil society) of emotive 
connections. “What it does provide,” says Veltmeyer, “in its negation of politics, is a 
reformist alternative to pressures for more radical social change and for substantive 
improvement in socio-economic conditions of widespread and growing poverty” 
(2007: 69). Social capital is supposed to be about participatory development and the 
creation of social networks of poor people but what it amounts to is forcing poor 
people to fend for themselves in a globalized economy, while encouraging them to 
do so collectively on a small scale. Veltmeyer argues that the social capital method of 
social change weakens the peasant, working-, and lower-classes by atomizing them 
into smaller groups and placing emphasis on self-help from within the group. It does 
nothing to change the actual structure of society – which is the root of the problem. 
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One of the most strongly held assumptions of the proponents of neoliberal 
development is the idea that a “free” or “unfettered” or “deregulated” market is the 
optimally efficient means through which to increase a society’s wealth. This 
argument has persisted in various forms since the time of Adam Smith and is often 
attributed to his original argument, but some argue that it is a fundamental 
misreading of Smith’s Wealth of Nations, taken out of context—both of his writings 
more generally and of the time in which he was writing (Arrighi 2010; Hont, 
Ignatief, and Skinner 1983; Jensen 2008; Rothschild 2008). Most critics of 
neoliberalism’s history in Latin America view it as a bearer of this prescription for 
growth and development. A brief overview of the transition to neoliberalism will 
show why they hold this view. 
From the period of the 1930s through the 1960s, most of the countries in 
Latin America followed some type of import substitution industrialization (ISI). 
Very briefly, this developmental ideology was based on a structural analysis of Latin 
American economic development and had affinities with Keynesianism and 
modernization theories of development. Its main inspiration came from the writings 
of the U.N. Economic Commission on Latin America, led by Raul Prebisch. Prebisch’s 
group were sensitive to the particular impact of the colonial and post-colonial 
history of Latin America and argued that the main impediments to development in 
the region were based on structural problems like the composition of trade—which 
were themselves rooted in historical processes. In order to overcome these 
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structural impediments, these states needed to enact reforms that sought to 
structurally change the economy.  
Until the late 1960s, the ISI strategy worked well for Latin America generally 
(Weeks 1995). The region experienced consistently high growth rates and gradual 
reductions in the rate of poverty, though most states in the region continued to have 
high levels of inequality, relatively underdeveloped institutions, and frequent bouts 
of authoritarianism. Beginning in the 1960s, a confluence of events led to an 
inability to reconcile the contradictions inherent in the ISI model. During the 
“development decade” of the 1960s, Latin American countries were encouraged to 
borrow heavily to finance large, long-term infrastructural projects. These countries 
were also borrowing to support various social policies designed to increase 
domestic consumption. This period was followed by the oil price shocks and 
stagflation, which resulted in the debt crisis.21 
The spectacular rise of neoliberalism from the academic hinterland of the 
economics discipline—and the academic mainstream that looked down on it as a 
Gilded Era throwback—to hegemonic status as the legitimate economics discourse 
over the last half of the twentieth century is now well-documented (Harvey 2005; 
Nef and Robles 2000; Stedman Jones 2012; Van Horn and Mirowski 2009; Van Horn, 
Mirowski and Stapleford 2011). Its importation into economics departments, 
finance ministries, and policy circles in Latin America has also been thoroughly 
                                                 
21 I will not go farther into this subject and include it here only as a background 
discussion for the period that is the subject of this chapter. There is an enormous 
literature on this subject and my portrayal of it is based on: McMichael (2008); Rist 
(2004); Peet and Hartwick (2009); and Green (2003).  
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explored (Babb 2001; Cypher and Delgado Wise 2010; Green 2003; Klein 2007). As 
Gwynne and Kay (1999) argue, the ideology of neoliberalism wasn’t simply imposed 
from without, in Latin American states “The great majority of technocrats had been 
research students in the economics and business schools of US universities” (1999: 
17). Many of these technocrats were themselves neoliberal advocates and this 
created an internal support for adopting this ideology. 
Neoliberalism emerged as a synthesis of the Austrian and Chicago Schools of 
Economics but its popularity came from the evangelical zeal of its early 
proponents.22 In addition to their scholarly work, both Hayek and Friedman 
engaged in political policy debates by writing non-academic books for mass 
audiences, designed to sway popular opinion away from support for government 
intervention in markets, regulation, and social protections administered by the 
state. As Mirowski, Van Horn and Stapleford point out, “the leaders of the postwar 
Chicago School were not cloistered academics, but empire builders who set up or 
forged influential relationships with well-funded institutional organizations in order 
to provide vital support structures for the creation, incubation, and propagation of 
their ideas” (2011: xix).23  
The successful colonization of the Chilean academy by neoliberals educated 
at the University of Chicago or educated by those who were, saw proponents of this 
                                                 
22 Stedman Jones (2012) argues that it was a combination of more complex trans-
Atlantic synthesis between the United States and United Kingdom with the Austrian 
School as a heavy influence on both. 
23 For good (but critical) analyses of the rise of neoliberalism and the Chicago 
School’s role in it—including discussions of Friedman, Hayek, and Mises—see also 
Mirowski and Plehwe (2009) and Stedman Jones (2012). 
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theory placed where they had the opportunity to influence the coup government 
and turn Chilean society into what Naomi Klein has called a neoliberal “laboratory” 
(Fischer 2009; Klein 2007; Stedman Jones 2012). It was also during this time that 
more and more of the personnel of the major international financial institutions and 
policy think tanks were adopting neoliberal policy stances. Ben Fine (2009) 
describes this process of neoliberal ideological colonization in the context of 
development studies. 
The rise of the new developmental economics 
[neoliberalism] was promoted and accompanied by an 
increasing intolerance within the discipline of any 
heterodoxy, while development economics became less 
of a separate field and more of an application, like most 
other fields, of pervasive and uncritically deployed 
methods and principles (Fine 2009: 894). 
 
This colonization was occurring concurrently with a series of global 
economic changes that culminated in a systemic crisis in the late 1960s and early 
1970s. In Latin America, and many other developing countries around the world, 
the real manifestation of this systemic crisis was the oil shock and subsequent debt 
crisis. In this changing intellectual environment, economic crisis acted as a catalyst 
for change, opening up the opportunity for neoliberals to push for wider changes in 
economic policies within states and—through the international financial institutions 
(IFIs)—onto states from outside.  
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The Debt Crisis and Neoliberal Response 
With the onset of the debt crisis, the United States and many international 
institutions like the IMF that were heavily influenced by the U.S. came to the 
conclusion that the main problems in developing countries that had led to the debt 
crisis was not the lending practices of the World Bank and the many private sector 
financial institutions that had flooded developing countries with lent money. The 
problem according to these groups was that the developing nations had artificially 
inflated their standards of living by subsidizing food; creating bloated, inefficient 
government bureaucracies; and investing too much in social development like 
health, education, and safety nets (Rist 2004: 172-3). 
According to the view of the IMF at the time, in addition to an artificially high 
living standard, a balance of payments crisis was primarily a trade problem, 
specifically that countries were not exporting enough to keep up with foreign debt. 
In order to correct this, it was necessary (again, according to the IMF) to decrease 
internal demand by initiating a recession. This would drive down the value of the 
currency and make a country’s products more desirable to other countries. By this 
perspective, the ISI period had artificially inflated the domestic currency and 
simultaneously inflated domestic demand, both of which resulted in decreased 
terms of trade that could only be solved by decreasing domestic buying power, thus 
decreasing domestic demand (Green 2003: 46-52).24 The obvious assumption here 
                                                 
24 In addition, decreasing government expenditures and investments was a means to 
another of the goals of neoliberalism, changing culture (Oxhorn & Ducatenzeiler 
1998: 229; Portes 1997: 238;). Although I mention this here, an exploration of this 
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is that external demand for that country’s goods will automatically increase, 
balancing the debt payment outflows with increased terms of trade, revenue 
inflows, and foreign direct investment. 
In the mid-1980s, Bela Balassa led a team of conservative economists at the 
World Bank who published the equivalent of a capitalist manifesto (Portes 1997: 
237). Their advice to developing nation-states, struggling under massive debt 
burdens, consisted of seven economic reforms. According to Balassa et al. (1986), 
they needed to unilaterally open to foreign trade and to privatize state-owned or 
state-operated enterprises. Also, they needed to deregulate their markets, especially 
the labor market. In order to stimulate additional investment, they needed to 
liberalize capital markets including, of special importance: the privatization of 
pension funds. In order to address the worsening fiscal position of the national 
states, Balassa et al. advised scaling down government social programs and 
replacing them with conditional cash transfer programs. Finally, according to 
Portes, Balassa and his group advised countries to put an end to “industrial policy” 
or anything else that smacked of state capitalism and to instead engage in 
“macroeconomic management” (Portes 1997: 238). 
Neoliberals saw reliance on import tariffs by the ISI-oriented governments of 
Latin America as contributing to the trade imbalances of the region’s countries. As 
the Chicago School of Economics-trained, World Bank economist, Sebastian 
                                                                                                                                                 
aspect of neoliberalism is beyond the scope of the current project even though it 
cannot simply be bracketed-off from any attempt to understand the underlying 
goals of neoliberalism. 
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Edwards argues: “the high degree of protection granted to manufacturing in Latin 
America resulted in serious discrimination against exports, misallocation of 
resources, inefficient investment, and deteriorating income distribution” (Edwards 
1995: 117). Thus, neoliberal proponents argued that in order to grow their way out 
of debt, Latin American countries needed to open themselves up to the global 
economy and adopt an export orientation (Cypher and Wise 2010; Gwynne and Kay 
2000; Williamson 1991). 
When the IFIs stepped in to provide loans to Latin American countries, they 
attached a series of conditions that the borrowing governments had to agree to in 
order to get the loans. They even disbursed the loans in installments based on 
scheduled, quantitative targets to ensure compliance by the borrowing government 
(Pastor 1987: 249). The IMF often took the lead role, laying out a series of policy 
prescriptions and arranging for the country to get a World Bank structural 
adjustment loan and often a series of other loans from the Inter-American 
Development Bank or other institutions. Most of the time, these loans came with 
conditions imposed by those institutions as well. The IFIs coordinated their “cross-
conditionalities” such as “devaluation, limits on banking credit and public 
borrowing, removal of price subsidies, reduction of tariffs and elimination of some 
import controls, encouragement of foreign investment, and finally resistance to 
nominal wage increases” (Pastor 1987: 250). 
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The Washington Consensus 
The IFIs realized by the mid-1980s that the stabilization strategies, aimed 
primarily at the debtor countries, were incapable of addressing the long-term fiscal 
and trade deficits that these countries had become trapped in. By the time that 
Williamson wrote about the Washington Consensus, many of the technocrats of the 
IFIs had come to believe that the priority for Latin American economies needed to 
be the promotion of an export orientation. This would require structural changes 
that amounted to an overall change in government policy priorities. “The 
Washington Consensus position is that this minimum policy set was necessary to 
remove distortionary state intervention and, by getting prices right, build a base for 
renewed and sustainable economic growth” (Kingstone 2011: 53).  
 Neoliberal policy recommendations had become standard in international 
development circles by the end of the 1980s (Peet and Hartwick 2009: 84). John 
Williamson (1991) discussed these recommendations in regards to Latin America, 
saying they could be “summarized as prudent macroeconomic policies, outward 
orientation, and free market capitalism” (1991: 18).  Williamson stated that these 
were not objectives or outcomes, but policy instruments on the importance of which 
technocrats and politicians headquartered in Washington seemed to share a 
consensus. Williamson’s ten Washington Consensus “policy instruments” were: 
• Fiscal Deficits: The existence of large or sustained deficits is a failure of 
policy to be avoided. 
• Public Expenditure Priorities: Subsidies are unproductive and must be 
replaced with spending on education, health, and infrastructure—but 
from within a balanced budget. 
• Tax Reform: The tax base must be broadened and revenues increased.  
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•  Interest Rates: Interest rates should be market-determined and positive 
to encourage capital investment. 
• The Exchange Rate: Though it would be desirable to let the market 
determine this, it is more important for countries to maintain a 
competitive exchange rate to encourage the growth of nontraditional 
exports. 
• Trade Policy: Outward orientation must be combined with liberalization 
of imports to avoid distortions caused by protection. Infant industries 
may be protected for a short time. 
• Foreign Direct Investment: FDI inflows must not be restricted, though 
liberalization of foreign financial flows—while desirable—is not a high 
priority. 
• Privatization: The private sector is usually more efficient than the state 
and in many Latin American countries is seriously lacking and needs to be 
encouraged. Thus the state can use privatizations to ease fiscal pressure 
and increase competition. 
• Deregulation: The region is over-regulated and deregulation will increase 
competition. 
• Property Rights: Property rights are essential but in Latin America they 
are insecure and must be strengthened. 
 
It is important to note that no Latin American state fully adopted the entire 
list of policy reforms (Lora 2001; Williamson 2003a). However, it is possible to 
imagine what a state that followed all of these recommendations would look like. 
Surprisingly enough, what emerges is a very small, but not quite the night 
watchman minimalist state that some critics of neoliberalism fear.25 Williamson’s 
ideal state would still seek to invest in education, health, and infrastructural 
development in order to become more competitive in the global economy, however, 
                                                 
25 An extreme example of this liberal night watchman state is outlined in Robert 
Nozick’s (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia, in which he argues that even when 
starting from a purely anarchist original position (a Lockean state of nature), a 
minimalist state logically must come into being, through the invisible hand of Adam 
Smith, while grounded in the Lockean conception of natural rights. This minimalist 
or “night watchman state” is only a police, military, and judiciary apparatus that 
protects the “natural rights” of its citizens. He goes on to argue that anything other 
than a minimalist state is a violation of individual rights (as he has defined them a 
priori). 
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it would have to do so from within tight fiscal restrictions. This state would seek to 
increase tax revenues, but mainly through less progressive means—value added 
taxes (VAT) on consumption rather than income tax increases or taxes on corporate 
profits. The brunt of these tax reforms would be borne by the popular classes for 
whom taxes on consumption constitute a higher proportion of their income.26 This 
state would have a vigorous role in protecting private property rights but its overall 
role in economic management would at best, be very slight. Beyond some 
manipulation of the exchange rate, this state has no major role in regulation; 
management of trade, finance, or investment; and it will not be engaging in the 
production or financing of goods and services. 
The state that the Washington Consensus imagined can be seen as a 
normative (though not an analytical) ideal type in the sense that it was the ideal to 
which actually-existing states should aspire. Like the criticisms of the IMF 
technocrats who were a large part of this consensus, the state imagined above is an 
ahistorical abstract idea. This is largely due to the starting assumptions (discussed 
above) that underlie neoliberalism as a theory. As already explained above, 
neoliberalism’s proponents see their policy prescriptions not as ideologically 
motivated political choices but rather as purely technical responses to economic 
                                                 
26 In the literature on Latin America, the term “popular classes” is often used as a 
catchall phrase meant to encompass groups that are in the lower classes but in 
many ways distinctly different in relation to the sociopolitical structure. For 
example, the urban working class, the unemployed and structurally poor, workers in 
the informal sector, peasants, migrant workers, and in some countries the 
indigenous population are all often considered to comprise the popular classes (See 
Skidmore, Smith, and Green 2010: 394-402). 
  56 
problems. The problem with this type of analysis is that neoliberalism becomes a 
generalized concept that is useful for discussions about the logics behind policies, 
their moral implications, or their logical contradictions—at an abstract level—but it 
is not really of much use in parsing the variations in neoliberalisms practiced in 
various historical and geographic locations, how they compare with one another, or 
how they structure future strategic actions by politicians and organizations. 
However, this limitation is not exclusive to the proponents of neoliberalism. It is 
also manifested in many of the critiques of neoliberalism in the literature. 
 
The Critics 
Critics of neoliberalism offer a starkly different view of the theory, its 
intentions, and its results. However, much like the proponents of the neoliberal 
Washington Consensus, critics were often focused more on abstractions than on the 
specific locations of reforms and paint an unrealistic picture of what neoliberalism 
has been in the Latin American context. For most of these critics, neoliberalism 
becomes an ideal type concept but is not treated as a particular type of state. Many 
of these writers do talk about the state and its new role, but they focus on the state 
shrinking or decreasing its activities (Gwynne and Kay 1999, 2000; Harris 2000). 
Others, like Cypher and Wise (2010) argue that the state is redeploying to benefit a 
new constituency. “Thus while the neoliberal dogma maintained that the state was 
the source of all economic inefficiency and that the resolution of the problem of the 
state was simply to shrink it to its minimal watchman level, in practice the Mexican 
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state was both reduced and redeployed” (2010: 46-7, emphasis in original).27 In 
none of these cases does the author treat the state after neoliberalization as a 
different model of the state than it had been before the reforms. There are some 
exceptions to this. In different ways, David Harvey (2005) and William I. Robinson 
(2004, 2006, 2008) do conceptually differentiate the state that neoliberalism 
creates. 
David Harvey has been a very outspoken critic of neoliberalism. Harvey’s 
analysis is an excellent example of the process of the type of conceptual stretching 
that I am trying to avoid in this project. I agree with Harvey’s assertion that, as a 
political economy discourse, neoliberalism has become hegemonic throughout much 
of the world. He defines this discourse as “A theory of political economic practices 
that presupposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade” 
(Harvey 2005: 2). Although Harvey uses empirical examples to ground his 
arguments about the class-based intentions behind the rise of neoliberalism as a 
discourse and neoliberalization as policy prescriptions, his argument is carried out 
at the global level and as such is abstracted away from any single nation-state or 
region. He acknowledges the problem that this creates between his 
                                                 
27 Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler (1998) argue that this redeployment of the state was 
based on the assumption that a smaller, but not a weaker state would be better able 
to manage the economy while maintaining fiscal discipline. They argue that after 
neoliberal reforms were enacted, the initial assumptions were not supported, 
leading instead to what they called “predatory capitalism.” 
  58 
conceptualization of what the neoliberal state is supposed to look like in theory and 
the “systemic divergences” in its application. He notes that the uneven geographical 
development of states over diverse socio-political/spatial distances has led to 
different adaptations in various places and times. Though he ranges from the United 
States and the United Kingdom to Latin America and even to China in his analysis, he 
does not break from the global level and in so doing, he is essentially creating an 
ideal type of the neoliberal state. His explorations of local transformations are 
meant to reinforce his analysis of broad trends of neoliberalism as (one-sided) class-
struggle, to restore the power of economic elites. 
Robinson sees neoliberalism as a discourse that attempts to legitimate a 
global capitalist system that he calls the transnational state (TNS). The TNS is not a 
world government or a replacement of nation-states, rather it is a displacement of 
them as the organizing logic of the global system. He says that the TNS “is an 
emerging network that comprises transformed and externally-integrated national 
states, together with the supranational economic and political forums” (2001: 166, 
emphasis in original). This apparatus does not yet have a centralized institutional 
form. What there is, according to Robinson (2004, 2008), is a loose network of 
institutions that have penetrated and transformed nation-state apparatuses in such 
a way that the policies formed in these supranational institutions like the IMF, 
World Bank, World Trade Organization, and World Economic Forum are actually 
enforced by nation-state apparatuses of power. 
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He refers to the form of government that the neoliberal democracies in Latin 
America adopt as “polyarchy” or low-intensity democracy. He says that polyarchy 
looks like democracy but is in fact a severely limited form of it, where major 
economic decisions are carried out by technocrats, who are insulated from popular 
pressure. Robinson writes: 
“Market democracy” may be an oxymoron for those 
who see the concentration of social and economic 
power brought about by capitalist “free” markets as 
fundamentally incompatible with the democratic 
exercise of political power. Yet the phrase cynically 
captures the ideological sales pitch that a new 
transnational elite has used to sell the project of global 
capitalism in recent decades (2006: 97). 
 
It would be incorrect to characterize what Robinson is theorizing as an ideal type 
state. What Robinson is offering is an historical materialist account of how the 
nation-state is changing as part of his theory of global capitalism. However, similar 
to Harvey, Robinson’s level of analysis is global and though he supports his 
argument with evidence from national and subnational levels, he uses them merely 
to illustrate his global level processes—not as explanations of how local (or even 
national) differences relate to local (or national) history and local (or national) 
processes. 
As the above discussion illustrates, both the supporters/proponents and the 
critics of neoliberalism often use the term as if it were a generalized (and hence 
vague) concept that is a stand-in for particular ideological perspectives or as an 
ideal type to which any given state can be compared for analytical purposes. This 
approach will not work for the present study for several reasons. First, I am not 
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concerned with an abstracted version of neoliberal theory—though this aspect 
cannot be ignored. I am interested in how neoliberal theories become 
developmental ideologies and are then translated “onto the ground” in real world 
attempts to develop economies. Second, given my above interest, it is important to 
note that when neoliberalization occurred in Latin America, it did so in a manner 
that was particular, contingent, and partial. The implementation of an ideal 
neoliberal model appears in no case (not even authoritarian and brutally repressive 
Chile) in Latin America. Even in particular aspects of the reform package (e.g. 
privatization), there are no cases of complete neoliberalization (Buxton and Phillips 
1999; Green 2003; Williamson 2003a). Green (2003) makes this case in his 
examination of neoliberalism in Latin America. 
No one country has implemented the full neoliberal 
recipe. Several supposedly exemplary neoliberal 
regimes have clung to lucrative and strategically 
important state enterprises in copper (Chile) and oil 
(Mexico). Elsewhere, political opposition has forced 
governments to abandon or water down their 
privatization programs (Uruguay, Colombia, Brazil, 
Bolivia, Nicaragua, Ecuador). Several of the most 
successful countries have mixed orthodox neoliberal 
adjustment with heterodox government controls (Green 
2003: 114). 
 
What we see rather than ideal applications of neoliberal reforms, of the kind 
neoliberal proponents would like to see, are varying degrees of neoliberalization 
over time and across the region.  
This being the case, my intention is to create and deploy a more modest, 
situated, and variable concept of the neoliberal state in Latin America. After a 
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discussion of the actual neoliberal reform process in Latin America during the 1980s 
and 1990s, I will propose a model of the Latin American neoliberal state. This model 
is not intended to capture the particular experience of every single country in the 
region, but will instead provide a slightly generalized model that purposely avoids 
withdrawing to the level of abstraction that many previous writers have in their 
various analyses. My intention is to remain as historically specific to the cases as 
possible. 
 
Neoliberalism in Latin America 
 
 
Following the debt crisis of the 1970s and early 1980s, most countries in 
Latin America engaged in some form of market liberalization and the region is often 
touted as having had the most extensive experience with neoliberalization in the 
developing world. From a removed position, it is easy to accept this assertion. The 
IFIs and pro-market theorists were fairly consistent, even if contextually insensitive, 
on what specific types of reforms should be implemented and what type of state 
ought to foster development.  From the early 1970s, when the “Chicago Boys” had a 
relatively free hand to remake the Chilean economy in the context of a brutally 
repressive authoritarian regime, until the mid-late 1990s when even proponents of 
liberalization had to admit that most countries in the region had serious 
institutional insufficiencies, there was one, clear ideal-type neoliberal state that 
could act as a theoretical policy template.  
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However, once countries are investigated on a case-by-case basis, it becomes 
apparent that the countries of the region varied widely in both the breadth and the 
depth of neoliberal reforms. One of the more effective ways to conceptualize the 
differences in neoliberalization in the region is to group countries based on 
similarities of certain types. Various analysts have grouped countries based on the 
timing of the reforms (early—pre-1980s reforms, the 1980s, the 1990s) (Edwards 
1995), or first-, second-, (and sometimes) third-generation reforms (Almeida 2008; 
Burki and Perry 1998; Fukuyama 2008; Green 2003; Williamson 2003a); the types 
of reforms carried out (Cypher and Delgado Wise 2010), or the emphasis of the 
reforms (stabilization, structural reform, institutional reform) (Harris 2000; 
Kingstone 2011). In the following section, I will create an amalgamation of these 
reform groupings into several “stages” of reforms (following Leiva 2008), however, I 
will divide them up a bit differently than previously—mainly for analytical 
purposes. 
 
Latin America’s “Stages of Reforms” 
Many researchers who write about neoliberalization in Latin America do not 
temporally separate-out various types of reforms, they treat them as one unified 
package. This is problematic because it fails to examine how, when, and by whom 
the reforms were conceived and similarly ignores where, when, and how the 
reforms were implemented differently in different states in the region. However, 
there are some writers and analysts who attempt to take a more situated view of the 
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complex process by which the region came to be seen as the preeminent example of 
neoliberalism at work. For these writers, it is important to acknowledge that 
different types of reform packages were stressed (both by the IFIs and by individual 
states) at different points in time. In addition, Latin American nation-states faced 
different sets of developmental problems and politically, each had differing sets of 
societal actors and constituencies to consider.  
It is relatively common at this point, when discussing neoliberal or 
Washington Consensus policies, to refer to a first- and a second-generation of 
reforms. Analysts at the IMF and World Bank began using these terms in the mid-
1990s while proposing a new round of reforms that were then deemed necessary.28 
By this point (after the Tequila Crisis), it was admittedly quite possible that the 
original neoliberal policies were not transforming Latin American countries into the 
dynamic capitalist growth machines that the IMF’s and World Bank’s economists 
had envisioned. A new series of reforms were proposed that were intended to make 
the Washington Consensus “first-generation” reforms more effective. Outside of the 
IFI community however, the use of the terms first- and second-generation reforms is 
not quite so standardized.29  
                                                 
28 Illustrations of this argument can be seen in Edwards (1995); Burki and Perry 
(1998); and Fukuyama (2008). All of these authors lament the failure of proper 
economic and social policy reforms due to the inadequacies of Latin American 
countries’ governing institutions. They do not question the fitness of the original 
policies. They place the blame on the fact that the countries successfully enacted 
economic reforms without “the modernization of political institutions” (Edwards 
1995: 6). 
29 They are not necessarily quite so conceptually standardized within the IFIs either. 
For example, Sebastián Edwards (1995), the World Bank’s chief economist for Latin 
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Writing a few years after the IFI analysts started using the terms first- and 
second-generation, other (more critical) analysts of neoliberalization in Latin 
America have begun to use the term first-generation to refer primarily to the 
“stabilization” phase of the early-mid 1980s, where the focus was primarily on the 
balance of payments/debt crisis. And, similarly, they use the term second-
generation to refer to the “structural adjustment” reforms that sought to change the 
state’s relationship to the society and the economy in these countries (Green 2003; 
Almeida 2008). Although Green and Almeida do not specifically refer to a third-
generation of reforms, from their perspective, the second-generation institutional 
reforms that the IFI writers discuss would be a third-generation of reforms. In order 
to better understand how neoliberalization resulted in a particular type of state in 
the region, I will build off Leiva’s (2008) conceptualization of these reforms where 
he disaggregates the “first-generation” into two distinct stages of reforms. This 
approach allows me to more easily recognize and incorporate variation between 
cases while building my concept of the Latin American neoliberal state.  
In his exploration of the “post-neoliberal” rise of neostructuralism in Latin 
America, Leiva (2008) divides the neoliberal period in to two stages: 
stabilization/shock therapy and deep structural reforms. These two stages 
combined correspond to the first-generation of reforms of Burki and Perry (1998), 
                                                                                                                                                 
America and the Caribbean during the mid 1990s, characterized the series of 
reforms within countries as “stages” in which the second and third stages roughly 
correspond to the first- and second-generations of reforms respectively. He also 
divided the states of the regions into “waves” of reform that were based temporally 
on when individual states began to implement reforms.  
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Williamson (2003), and others. For Leiva (as for Green 2003), the first stage is 
focused on stabilization. Leiva says that this is the phase of “shock treatment” and 
“austerity measures.” The two main foci of this stage are creating macroeconomic 
equilibrium (balancing government expenditures with revenues—while paying-
down the foreign debt) and removing what was perceived to be the main cause of 
market distortions—the government’s interventions (in the form of trade 
restrictions, subsidies, nationalized industries). 
The second stage for Leiva is the commodification of society. He says, “the 
goal of the second stage was to expand the logic of the market to the totality of 
institutions and social relations” (2008:46). Public “goods” (such as natural 
resources, water/sewer, electricity, telecommunications, education, health care, 
even transportation systems) must be brought into the market because the public 
has mismanaged them. This follows the neoliberal assumption that government is 
inefficient and that markets would be better at allocating these goods among the 
population. However, as Leiva points out, the logic goes even deeper aiming at 
nothing less than cultural change. “No significant area of socioeconomic existence 
can remain sovereign from the role of commodity relations” (2008: 46). This stage 
sees the intensification of privatization (including in social services), labor market 
reforms (meant to discipline labor), and financial liberalization.  
The third stage of reforms is an attempt to “consolidate” the previous stages 
of reforms. This corresponds with the pro-neoliberal writers’ second-generation of 
reforms, the discovery that “institutions matter” (Burki and Perry 1998). This is 
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where my categorization diverges from Leiva’s. He categorizes this the third stage of 
reforms as neostructuralist rather than neoliberal. He quite correctly identifies this 
third stage of reforms as having some ties to the ECLAC writers and their revision of 
structuralism. However, as I will discuss more below, this shift in focus toward the 
importance of reforming institutions in Latin America also came from the 
realization by neoliberal proponents that the first two stages were not working 
(even where they were fully implemented). In addition, it does not subvert the logic 
of neoliberalism but rather seeks to create a web of supportive institutions to 
solidify the new neoliberal order (i.e. to constitute a neoliberal state). Thus, for 
purposes of this model, he third stage is a third neoliberal stage. 
 
First Stage Reforms: Economic Stabilization 
The first stage of reforms are part of the Washington Consensus package of 
reforms; however, not separating the WC out into distinct stages glosses over the 
historical process in which the reforms were carried out in the region. The first 
stage of reforms were a reaction to the debt crisis.30 This is a conceptual, not a 
temporal distinction, though it roughly follows a temporal pattern. Following the 
general path discussed just above, states usually opted for a new developmental 
ideology once it was clear that the contradictions between the internal and global 
                                                 
30 I acknowledge that there were various piecemeal reforms in some states prior to 
this, and this also leaves out Chile, which is a problem. However, Huber & Stephens 
(2012) argue that the BA states in Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil all 
embarked on harsh stabilization and austerity programs in the late 1970s and early 
1980s – prior to democratization. 
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systems and the developmental ideology then being employed had grown too 
problematic to continue. Such reforms were often begun through undemocratic 
means – either imposed by authoritarian governments or externally imposed on 
democratic ones by international financial institutions.  
Very generally, the literature on Latin American neoliberalization that 
addresses this first stage of reforms is focused on those reforms that were designed 
to deal with countries’ short-term balance of payments crises and their longer-term 
fiscal imbalances during the debt crisis. Burki and Perry (1998), writing for the 
World Bank and referring to this wave of reforms as “first-generation reforms,” 
state that these reforms focus on “issues of fiscal discipline, liberalization of trade 
and investment regimes, deregulation of domestic markets, and privatization of 
public enterprises” (1998: 1). In focusing on these reforms as one package however, 
these authors fail to distinguish between the later reforms (mainly) of the 1990s 
and the early responses to the debt crisis, the second set of which were often 
externally imposed by the IMF. The IMF’s prescribed developmental policies—
known as conditionalities because loans from or through the IMF came with target 
conditions that borrowing countries had to meet in order to receive the borrowed 
money—during the 1980s and 1990s are now notorious because they ignored local 
contexts and local governments’ concerns in their design—often to disastrous effect. 
Green (2003) described the situation like this: 
Typically, IMF “missions” from Washington fly in for 
three weeks with a blueprint for the country’s future 
economic policy already in their briefcases. Once in the 
country, they negotiate with local technocrats from the 
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Finance Ministry, often themselves former IMF or 
World Bank employees, but they do not consult other 
bodies like the Agriculture Ministry or the UN Food and 
Agriculture Organization, which have far better 
understanding of how the Fund’s economic 
prescriptions will affect people on the ground. Still less 
do they talk to the peasants’ organizations, community 
associations, trade unions, or NGOs who are most in 
touch with the poor communities the Fund is supposed 
to be helping (Green 2003: 58-9). 
 
In addition, Green argues that the IMF sees balance of payments crises as 
primarily caused by excess domestic demand and a lack of exports. To solve this, the 
IMF prescribes a “swift but painful cure of recession and reduced demand” (2003: 
51). Fiscal austerity by the state is usually prescribed in the following ways: raising 
taxes, charging user fees for government provided education and health care, 
increasing user fees for government provided goods where fees already exist (like 
power, water, transportation), cutting spending on social goods (like education, 
housing, and health care), decreasing or eliminating state subsidies for food or fuel, 
reducing salary and benefits to government employees, and severely cutting 
government employment (Almeida 2008; Green 2003; Harris 2000; Harris and Seid 
2000; Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler 1998; Portes 1997). 
Although the military juntas of the 1960s and 1970s in Latin America 
(O’Donnell’s bureaucratic-authoritarian states) were the first governments to 
implement neoliberal reforms, they only did so piecemeal and with disastrous 
results.31 For example, following the 1964 coup in Brazil, the military opened some 
                                                 
31 Of course, Chile is an exception here, as the reforms carried out there were far 
from piecemeal or hesitant and had some economic successes. 
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sectors of the economy to foreign direct investment, and sought to boost exports by 
a combination of currency devaluation and the brutal repression of organized labor 
both of which were meant to make Brazilian products more competitive 
internationally. However, the military simultaneously attempted to continue 
domestic industrial development by incurring the developing world’s largest 
national debt. In Argentina, the military junta that came to power after the 1976 
coup d’état abandoned “all protections for local producers,” except for the military 
industrial complex, and yet maintained an overvalued currency, which exacerbated 
foreign debt (Green 2003). 
Both Saad-Filho et al (2007) and Green (2003) argue that the IFIs and many 
state-level actors in Latin America believed that the balance of payments crises 
these countries were facing were due to too much internal demand, brought about 
by ISI. The initial recommendations were to devalue currencies, cut government 
subsidies, and decrease government spending across the board. The desired 
outcome of these policies was to simultaneously decrease imports and increase 
exports, which would theoretically alter the flow of wealth into the country. In the 
short term, these policies resulted in acute recession. However, they could not 
address inflation in countries like Brazil and Argentina during the early 1980s 
because these countries had transitioned to democracy in a context of high inertial 
inflation and their previous military governments had instituted price and wage 
controls that followed inflation-indexed schedules. At certain, scheduled dates, 
wages and price controls were adjusted to inflationary changes. The process was 
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disorganizing to Argentina’s and Brazil’s economies and was causing other 
economic problems (Saad-Filho et al. 2007: 19).  In order to deal with inflation, it 
was not enough to merely induce recession and decrease demand, these newly 
restored civilian governments needed to end indexation and price controls 
(Dornbusch 1993).  
In Peru, the Belaúnde administration began an attempt to implement 
neoliberal policies in 1980: devaluations, privatizations, the liberalization of trade, 
and financial liberalization to encourage foreign direct investment (FDI). However, 
the policies enacted resulted in decreased manufacturing output, decreased private 
investment, a rise in inflation, and GDP stagnation (Pastor and Wise 1992). 
In several countries, notably Argentina, Brazil, and Peru, the new 
democratically elected governments sought to avoid the pain of neoliberal austerity 
by enacting heterodox policies to deal with the crisis. These governments 
unexpectedly froze wages and many prices and switched their countries over to new 
currencies. These policies were initially successful, dramatically reducing inflation 
in the short term. However, they were unsustainable and these countries’ 
economies became more and more distorted. The heterodox attempts to stimulate 
the economy while avoiding inflation nearly universally resulted in hyperinflation 
and a return to neoliberal orthodoxy. 
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Second Stage Reforms: Structural Adjustment 
Following Green (2003) and Almeida (2008), I conceptualize the structural 
adjustment aspects of the Washington Consensus as the second stage of reforms as 
applied in Latin America in response to the debt crisis.32 This is not a temporal 
argument but rather a distinction based on the intentions behind and extensiveness 
of the reforms that I place in this category.33 The more immediate attempts to 
address the debt crisis were focused on the short-term problem that developing 
countries were in fiscal crises that threatened their abilities to continue paying their 
external debts. As such they focused on policies that would (in the short-term) allow 
these countries to avoid default. Second stage reforms, by contrast, were attempts to 
restructure these countries’ economies to bring them in line with the emerging, 
hegemonic neoliberal discourse of development. According to Green (2003), second 
stage reforms are “a more profound and longer-term process, through which the 
international financial institutions try to implant a functioning free market economy 
in the country concerned” (2003: 52). 
Although in some countries various aspects of the second stage of reforms 
were begun in earlier periods, the policies of structural adjustment were primarily 
implemented in Latin America beginning in the late-1980s and throughout the 
                                                 
32 Although, as I said in an earlier section, Green refers to them as generations rather 
than stages. 
33 I say this while acknowledging that Green (2003) does see it as both a conceptual 
and a temporal distinction. He says, “From the Mexican default in August 1982 until 
mid-1985, the IMF and its short-term stabilization approach dominated the 
response to the debt crisis” (2003: 52). 
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1990s.34 Most of the countries in the region dramatically reduced trade barriers by 
eliminating some or all import quotas and restrictions, and by lowering tariffs 
(Burki and Perry 1998; Fukuyama 2008; Green 2003; Harris 2000; Kingstone 2011; 
Lora 2001, Morley et al. 1999). Most of these countries also implemented 
deregulations of finance and investment in order to stimulate FDI (Burki and Perry 
1998; Green 2003; Harris 2000; Lora 2001; Morley et al. 1999). Despite the fact that 
the Washington Consensus called for increasing the tax base as part of the process 
of attaining fiscal balance, there was little real reform in taxes in the region 
(Kingstone 2011) and the reforms that did take place mainly shifted the tax burden 
from more progressive forms (income and corporate taxes) to more regressive ones 
(sales taxes and VAT) (Lora 2001; Morley et al. 1999; Nef and Robles 2000; 
Williamson 2003a). There was an attempt to deregulate the labor market, though 
the extent to which this was carried out varied widely between countries and is also 
a point of contention in the literature between proponents of neoliberalization 
(Williamson 2003a), who argue this was one of the least accomplished reforms, and 
critics of neoliberalization (Green 2003; Gwynne and Kay 1999; Pastor 1987; Weeks 
2000), and even some of its proponents (Burki and Perry 1998;), who argue that it 
was both carried out and devastating to labor.35 
                                                 
34 Chile is the obvious exception to this, having carried out its most extensive 
neoliberalization in the early- mid-1970s. 
35 When states did engage in labor market deregulation, the most common result 
was decreased wages in the formal sector and an increase in unemployment, 
underemployment, and informal employment (Cypher and Delgado Wise 2010: 138-
170; Itzigsohn 2000; Portes and Castells 1989; Weeks 2000). 
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Privatization was possibly the least popular neoliberal reform in Latin 
America (Checchi, Florio, and Carrera 2005; Nellis 2003). Though haltingly begun in 
several of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of the 1960s-1980s, this process 
was extensively engaged in during the period of second stage, structural adjustment 
reforms. “While few significant sell-offs occurred in the chaos of the lost decade, in 
the 1990s, Latin America came to resemble a giant fire sale, as government after 
government sold off dozens, if not hundreds, of state-owned enterprises” (Green 
2003: 104). One reason for this massive sell-off was that it was often a condition 
imposed by the IFIs on the borrowing countries. Despite the fact that it was widely 
unpopular among the popular segments of the population, technocrats in Latin 
America and the U.S. saw it as being a desirable reform. Privatizations were a way to 
both cut expenditures by selling government enterprises that routinely operated at 
a loss while simultaneously increasing government revenues (in the short run). 
Social policies were only an aspect of the Washington Consensus by their 
connection to public expenditures. Williamson (1991) argued that education and 
health care spending should not be cut as they are direct investments in future 
human capital necessary for national economic development. He singled out 
subsidies as being wasteful, distortionary, and disproportionately beneficial to the 
middle-class, and therefore represented spending that should be eliminated. This 
was after the early attempts at stabilization in which government spending on 
education and health care were allowed to stagnate or even decline throughout the 
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region (Birdsall and Székely 2003).36 The early austerity conditionalities attached to 
IMF agreements included not only cuts to subsidies but also to education and health 
services (Walton and Shefner 1994). Of all the reforms discussed so far, social policy 
varies the most during the neoliberal period. After the initial decreases in 
expenditures, during the 1990s spending on education and health care rose in 
nearly every country in the region (Walton 2004). This needs to be qualified by the 
acknowledgement that Latin American spending in these areas “tended to be low 
and highly unequal in its character” (Kingstone 2011: 50).  
However, many of the neoliberalization in the region should still be seen as 
attempts to move away from welfare state oriented policies and towards market-
based ones. “Notable here is the case of pension reform in which the private sector 
takes control of workers’ contributions, the investment of those contributions and 
the delivery of social and pension benefits” (Gwynne and Kay 1999: 24). Various 
types of social security/pension reforms that involved privatization were carried 
out in Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, and Uruguay (Green 
2003).37 The dual purpose behind such reforms was to divest governments of fiscal 
responsibility for them and to increase the pool of domestic capital for investment. 
Another means of attaining this dual purpose was to change welfare policies away 
from an emphasis on attaining universal coverage towards policies that were 
                                                 
36 This argument seems to be supported by Segura-Ubiergo’s (2007) pooled time-
series cross-section analysis, which shows that “fiscal adjustment tended to reduce 
total social spending as a percentage of GDP” and to reduce social security spending 
as a percentage of total public spending (2007: 168). 
37 Chile had pioneered this type of reform under Pinochet in the 1970s. 
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targeted and compensatory to buy-off the support of those groups most negatively 
affected by the stabilization policies (Bresser Pereira and Nakano 1998). These 
programs were typically targeted only to the least well-off and consisted of 
conditional cash transfer programs (Portes 1997) that resulted in programs that 
“were designed to be small, specific, and tightly focused” (Birdsall and Székely 2003: 
64). However, the emphasis remained on maintaining fiscal balance rather than 
addressing structural poverty or inequality (Fukuyama 2008; Birdsall and Székely 
2003). Harris (2000) argues that these programs have 1) resulted in countries being 
reliant on external NGOs, 2) countries being reliant on the funding/financing of the 
programs by foreign government aid and IFI loans and grants, and 3) a focus on 
short-term patches rather than long-term attempts to address the root causes of 
poverty (which he says is nearly always a structural phenomenon in Latin America). 
 
Stabilization, Structural Adjustment, and Protest: Contesting Austerity 
By the end of the 1990s, it was undeniable for most analysts that neoliberal 
reforms had not resulted in a new growth paradigm for Latin America. The decade 
was capped-off by the economic meltdown of what had been held up as a poster 
child of neoliberalization: Argentina. After a decade of contentious—but for the 
most part, successfully carried out—neoliberal reforms under Presidents Carlos 
Menem and Fernando De la Rúa, the Argentine economy began to implode, with its 
currency pegged to the dollar (an anti-inflationary tactic) and the dollar 
appreciating in value, Argentine exports were declining and imports increasing—
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putting a double-edged squeeze on manufacturing. This led to further increases in 
unemployment (which had been increasing for much of the previous decade) and a 
growing recession by 2000-2001 (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2007; Llanos and 
Margheritis 2006). De la Rúa responded with austerity, which only exacerbated the 
recession and caused a bank run. The government responded by freezing all 
deposits and the country erupted in massive protests that brought down the 
government (Levitsky 2005). 
As dramatic as the series of protests in Argentina were during this time, they 
were not the only show of disaffection toward neoliberal reforms. From the first 
impositions of IMF austerity packages in the early 1980s up to the present, Latin 
America has experienced high levels of protest against both austerity reforms and 
aspects of second stage reforms (Shefner, Pasdirtz, and Rowland 2010, 2012; 
Shefner and Stewart 2011; Walton and Shefner 1994). These protests were evidence 
of what Bresser Pereira and Nakano (1998) refer to as the “political support gap” 
that was a result of a “missing social contract.” After the first two generations of 
reform the resulting poverty and social discontent were obvious—as were the 
inability of neoliberal reforms to address them. The criticisms that ensued were 
internalized by the World Bank, beginning with the Structural Adjustment 
Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI) begun by World Bank president James 
Wolfensohn in 1996 (SAPRIN 2004). At first, the Bank attempted to ignore the 
scathing critique of the report but as early as the publication of the 1997 World 
Development Report, the Bank had already seemed to recognize the need for an 
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effective state in fostering development. This led to an internal struggle within the 
World Bank between pro-growth and pro-equity camps. This internal struggle 
resulted in the suppression of the SAPRI report for several years.38 Green (2003) 
calls this “a full-scale war for the Bank’s economic soul being fought between the old 
guard neoliberals headed by the appropriately named David Dollar and the new 
thinking on so-called second generation reforms [my third stage reforms] being 
proposed by Joseph Stiglitz and others” (2003: 63). 
 
Third Stage Reforms: Remembering Institutions and Rediscovering Poverty 
The Argentine problems of 2000-2003 and the shift within the World Bank to 
a (re-)recognition of institutions and poverty was prefigured in 1994 by Moisés 
Naím when he called for a “second stage” of reforms in Latin America. 
In this new stage, governments will have to do much 
more than ensure that macroeconomic stability is 
maintained and that attractive conditions for 
competitive private investment are created. While 
striving to maintain a still precarious macroeconomic 
equilibrium, they will also have to concentrate on 
building the organizational infrastructure of the state 
and tend to a potentially explosive social situation 
(Naím 1994: 35). 
 
He called this stage the transition from “Shock Therapy to Chemotherapy” because it 
was going to be a longer, still painful process of building the type of societal 
institutions that are necessary complements to the attempts at stabilization and 
                                                 
38 Though begun in 1996, SAPRI was unable to publish its report until 2004 due to 
hesitancy within the Bank to embrace its strident critique of existing Bank policy 
outcomes (Green 2003). 
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structural reforms. He says that the failure (in virtually every state in the region) to 
do so, leads to the likelihood of renewed macroeconomic imbalances in the future. 
By the turn of the century, analysts at the World Bank (Burki and Perry 
1998), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (Lora and Panizza 2002), and 
Institute for International Economics (Kuczynski and Williamson 2003) were all 
echoing the refrain that governing institutions were necessary for economic 
development in Latin America—and largely lacking throughout the region. It was 
now acknowledged that liberalizing the financial sector without a strong regulatory 
agency in place to manage it was a bad idea and would lead to financial instability. 
In their 1998 World Bank Report: Beyond the Washington Consensus: 
Institutions Matter, Burki and Perry suggest that a new set of reforms are necessary 
to address problems that were consequences of neoliberal reforms or that were not 
being addressed by them. The reforms they suggested were: first, policies focused 
on improvements in human development. Second, they argued for the development 
of sound and efficient financial markets. Third, they stress the need for enhancing 
the legal and regulatory environment—including completing the deregulation of 
labor markets, improving regulations for private investments in infrastructure and 
social services; improving the quality of the public sector—primarily the judicial 
system. Lastly, they say that states need to focus on fiscal strengthening. Williamson 
(2003) proposed a similar set of reforms: 1) reforming the judiciary, 2) reforming 
education, 3) reforming the civil service (strengthening budget offices, securities 
and exchange commissions, and central bank autonomy), 4) strengthening property 
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rights and reforming bankruptcy law, and 5) improving oversight of the financial 
sector. He said that the emphasis on growth must now be balanced by an emphasis 
on growth with equity. However, equity must not be sought through redistribution. 
He argues that the only way to ensure that the poor become less poor without 
triggering “Okun’s ‘Big Trade-Off’” (where increases in equity are necessarily 
matched by decreases in overall income) is to do it through economic growth. He 
asserts that even if a country only relies on trickle-down economics, the poor will 
benefit.39 Despite this, Williamson also calls for a shift from the regressive taxes like 
VAT and towards more progressive direct taxes (e.g. property tax) and more 
efficient collection, with the increased proceeds “devoted to spending on basic social 
services, including a social safety net as well as education and health, so that the net 
effect will significantly reduce inequality, particularly by expanding opportunities 
for the poor” (2003: 16). 
The fears of early critics of the rise of neoliberalism to a hegemonic 
discourse, whether founded or not, were that the objective was to remake the state 
into the minimalist institution of libertarian theory.40 This of course, did not happen. 
What has happened instead is the evolution away from the state-led ISI 
developmental model towards a still incomplete social neoliberalism (Lora 2007). 
Such a state prioritizes market solutions, is fully inserted into the global economy, 
                                                 
39 This of course is disputed by studies like Shefner, Pasdirtz and Blad (2006), which 
demonstrate that growth is not always beneficial to the poor and that in some cases, 
countries can experience “immiserating growth” in which GDP per capita increases 
while at the same time the poverty rate increases. 
40 My usage of the term hegemonic discourse here follows that of Edward Said 
(1978/1994). 
  80 
and must seek to maintain legitimacy domestically while remaining sensitive to the 
desires of international economic forces. Cerny, Menz, and Soederberg (2005) refer 
to this type of state as the “competition state.” They define neoliberalism as “the 
assertion that the market is the core institution of modern—capitalist—societies 
and that both domestic and international politics and policy-making are (and should 
be) primarily concerned with making markets work well” (2005: 12, emphasis in 
original). These authors argue that neoliberalism is still consolidating its place as a 
hegemonic discourse of development while changing and evolving “from raw 
market orthodoxy in the 1980s” to social or embedded neoliberalism in the twenty-
first century (2005: 3).41 This view of the state sees it as organizing itself around the 
process of global capital flows and as such becoming an apparatus of competition 
for attracting capital. This process is durable and ongoing and Cerny et al. argue that 
states like those in Latin America that experienced neoliberalization in the 1980s 
and 1990s will have severe difficulty in reorienting away from market logics. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 See also Goldman (2005) for a similar discussion of the way that the World Bank 
has changed its environmental policy to incorporate criticisms within what he calls 
a “green neoliberalism.” In addition to this, Vilas (2006) states that “during the last 
decade the question of social inequality has been incorporated into the agendas of 
the most relevant actors of financial globalization and neoliberal capitalist 
restructuring, such as the IMF, the IDB, and the World Bank” (2006: 233). He argues 
that this is a response to the need to strengthen institutional stability in the face of 
unrest due to the unpopularity of these institutions’ neoliberal conditionalities in 
the past. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Neoliberalism in Latin America has been vilified by its critics, who see it as 
either an elite-class driven attempt to remake society in their own best interests or, 
alternatively as a misguided set of economic policies that fail to properly 
acknowledge local context and thus cause more damage than benefit. Too many of 
these critics are based on an ideal type of neoliberalism that never really existed in 
anything approaching a pure form in Latin America. My review of the literature here 
argues that there are some common themes running through the period that 
roughly fits into the 1980s-early 2000s in the region. I have further shown that, 
following Leiva (2008), we can divide the neoliberal period in Latin America into 
three distinct periods or “stages” of reforms. The stages as I conceive of them are 
different from the way that many other writers have previously done so, but I argue 
that my (altered version of Leiva’s) conceptualization is more analytically useful for 
understanding the intent of the reforms and the chronology they were implemented. 
Now that we better understand the actual neoliberal reforms carried out in 
specific Latin American states, it is possible in the next chapter to construct a model 
of the Latin American neoliberal state. This model or conceptual framework will 
then allow me, in subsequent chapters, to analyze the degree to which certain 
neoliberal reforms were carried out in my cases (Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru). I 
will be able to compare these cases in their individual “neoliberal” periods to their 
“post-neoliberal” periods of the 2000s when the region experienced a leftist 
electoral shift that was openly anti-neoliberal in rhetoric. At that point, I will be able 
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to make a determination as to how much of a break (if any) these states have made 
with the neoliberal developmental ideology. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE LATIN AMERICAN NEOLIBERAL STATE: A MODEL 
 
 
Introduction  
 
 
In the previous chapters, I discussed the ways that neoliberalism has been 
treated in the literature and argued that neoliberalization should be seen as having 
created a new form of the state in Latin America. I also analyzed the specific ways 
that neoliberal reforms in Latin America were contingent, partial, and context-
specific and that this precluded the use of an ideal type when discussing the 
resultant neoliberal state in the region. In this chapter, I develop my model of the 
Latin American neoliberal state. I also discuss the specific reforms that I will 
examine in order to better understand whether the leftist electoral shift in the 
region can be seen as a break with neoliberalism or simply a new set of reforms that 
leave the neoliberal state altered but leave its logic and basic form intact. 
   
“The Neoliberal State” in the Social Science Literature 
 
    
Having made the case that the neoliberal state model is useful and important, 
I argued that such a model has not been used to discuss economic development and 
political change in Latin America. This is not to imply however, that the concept 
does not exist in the literature. There are several works that deal with “the 
neoliberal state” as a concept. However, they fail to do so in a satisfactory way. For 
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example, although Gill (1995) uses the phrase “the neoliberal state” a couple of 
times in his exploration of surveillance mechanisms in the global economy, he never 
actually defines what he means by neoliberal state. He remains focused on the 
theoretical foundations and surveillance functions of Western core states and 
largely ignores the developing world. He also spends very little time discussing 
actual policies that relate specifically to the neoliberal state as opposed to other 
types of state. 
This vague use of the term “neoliberal state” is evident in most of the other 
works that employ the concept. Craske (2002) devotes a whole section of her essay 
to “the neoliberal state” in Latin America and defines it in terms of its two main 
features, which are “the withdrawal of the state from the economy” and “the 
promotion of the political individual with rights and responsibilities” (2002: 104). 
She discusses some structural adjustment policies and focuses on their effects on 
women’s political participation. However, she never conceptualizes “the neoliberal 
state” as a new type of state that results from the imposition of neoliberal reforms.  
This lack of conceptualization of the term neoliberal state is also evident in 
Canova’s (2000) examination of the global monetary system. Excluding the title and 
a section heading, Canova only mentions “the neoliberal state” three times. Not once 
does he attempt to define (operationally or otherwise) the term. He merely uses it 
as a placeholder. Cooper and Ellem (2007) are even more imprecise, although “the 
neoliberal state” is in the title of their article, they only use the term once in (the 
introduction to) the body of their article. They never define it and they never 
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explicitly discuss the neoliberal state as a concept separate from other types of state 
although they mention “the state” throughout their article. Ben Wisner (2001) 
includes a very brief section on “the neoliberal state” in his examination of state 
preparedness for natural disasters in El Salvador but he fails to explicitly discuss 
how neoliberal policies implemented by a state actually constitute a neoliberal state. 
He lays out an ideal type neoliberal policy package but is not concerned with the 
actual details except for the few policies that impact the topic of natural disaster 
preparedness. He thus joins the (growing) list of researchers who use the term 
“neoliberal state” without specifying what that term means. 
In his review of the literature on neoliberalism, geographer Jamie Peck 
(2001) builds up an implicit, ideal type of the neoliberal state. He makes some very 
interesting arguments regarding the social production of neoliberalism as a 
“natural” phenomenon and the way that this creates a cognitive inability to envision 
or express alternatives to neoliberalization. He carefully defines what neoliberalism 
is, but even though he has sections on “state spaces,” “state edges,” and “state 
insides” he never gives a straightforward definition of the neoliberal state as a 
model (even though he is in effect creating a model of the neoliberal state). In fact, 
though he discusses the effects of neoliberalization on states, “neoliberal policy 
objectives,” “neoliberal guise,” and “neoliberalized policy environments,” he never 
actually uses the term “neoliberal state” even though the types of changes he is 
focusing on clearly constitute a new type of state – one that is completely different 
from the state that existed prior to these neoliberal reforms (2001: 452).  
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Although sociologist Loïc Wacquant (2010) does not explicitly define the 
neoliberal state, he does give a clear conceptualization of it as a “centaur state.” By 
this, he means that it appears to be both laissez-faire toward the economically well-
off and yet coercive and penal toward those most negatively affected by 
neoliberalization (2010: 217). Of the writers that have used the term neoliberal 
state (with the exception of David Harvey, whom I discuss below), Wacquant comes 
the closest to actually trying to conceptualize a specifically neoliberal state. He 
discusses four “institutional logics” of the neoliberal state: economic deregulation; 
devolving, refocusing, and shrinking the welfare state; expanding and empowering a 
more intrusive penal apparatus; and naturalizing “the cultural trope of individual 
responsibility” (2010: 213). However, like the above authors, he does not explicitly 
create a model of the neoliberal state based on its structure and actual policies. 
David Harvey (2005) does attempt to explicate a model of the neoliberal 
state, spending a whole chapter on the subject in his book: A Brief History of 
Neoliberalism. Despite this, the closest that Harvey comes to a definition of the 
neoliberal state is in a passage in the introduction to the book: 
The role of the [neoliberal] state is to create and 
preserve an institutional framework appropriate to 
such [neoliberal] practices. The state has to guarantee, 
for example, the quality and integrity of money. It must 
set up those military, defense, police, and legal 
structures and functions required to secure private 
property rights and to guarantee, by force if need be, 
the proper functioning of markets. Furthermore, if 
markets do not exist (in areas such as land, water, 
education, health care, social security, or environmental 
pollution) then they must be created, by state action if 
necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not 
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venture. State interventions in markets (once created) 
must be kept to a bare minimum because, according to 
the theory, the state cannot possibly possess enough 
information to second-guess market signals (prices) 
and because powerful interest groups will inevitably 
distort and bias state interventions (particularly in 
democracies) for their own benefit (Harvey 2005: 2). 
 
This description of what the state should and should not do is, according to Harvey, 
how the neoliberal state should work in theory. However, Harvey is clear that such a 
conception diverges in practice because of “frictional problems of transition 
reflecting the different state forms that existed prior to the neoliberal turn” (2005: 
71). Despite this acknowledgment, Harvey’s description of the neoliberal state in 
practice is mainly concerned with pointing out the contradictions in neoliberal 
theory. His analysis of the neoliberal state in practice is not a useful model of the 
neoliberal state for this project because Harvey’s examples of the neoliberal state in 
practice are mainly used as anecdotal evidence of his theoretical argument. They 
also are primarily drawn from Western core nations—especially the United States 
and United Kingdom. It has primarily been in developing countries where 
neoliberalism has been carried the farthest. Harvey does not focus on differences 
between neoliberalization in core states and in developing states. Although he takes 
the concept farther than the previously discussed authors, Harvey’s model of the 
neoliberal state is thus of only very limited use here.  
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The Latin American Neoliberal State: A Model 
 
Within Latin America there has been a great deal of heterogeneity in both the 
manner in which neoliberal reforms were carried out, and the depth and breadth of 
the actual reforms themselves. This is not surprising, given the different 
social/institutional structures and their country-specific balance of social forces 
operating at the national level in the region (Teichman 2012). Despite these 
differences, there are some general types of reforms that were carried out by nearly 
all of the countries in the region and that form a definite pattern.  
Broadly, we can distinguish 7 major areas of reforms that constitute the Latin 
American Neoliberal State: government austerity, privatization, trade liberalization, 
financial liberalization (both domestic and foreign direct investment), social reforms 
(in education, healthcare, poverty relief, and pensions), regressive tax reform, and 
labor market deregulation aimed at flexibilization. Though not all Latin American 
countries carried out the entire list of reforms, most of these countries carried out 
(or attempted to carry out) most of these reforms. In addition, following my 
argument in the last chapter, these reforms broadly fall into the first and second 
stages of policy reforms. Government austerity is the main policy implemented 
during the first stage of reforms, which were primarily concerned with economic 
stabilization in the wake of the debt crisis. During the second stage of reforms, or 
the structural adjustment stage, most of the countries in the region carried out some 
mixture of privatization, trade liberalization, financial liberalization, social reforms, 
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tax reform, and labor market deregulation that was aimed at flexibilization of the 
labor market. 
 
First Stage Reforms 
 
Government Austerity 
As I stated in the previous chapter (following Green 2003 and Saad-Filho et 
al 2007), the neoliberal diagnosis of the debt crisis in Latin America was that the 
crisis was primarily one of balance-of-payments—too much internal demand and 
too little export trade. Compounding this was out-of-control government spending, 
which was seen as ineffective and distortionary to the market—increasing 
government debt and driving high (or even hyper-) inflation. One of the responses 
prescribed by the IMF and widely adopted throughout the region was the 
imposition of austerity policies. The term austerity has varied in meaning over time 
in the literature. It has often been used to broadly mean neoliberalization in general 
(Walton and Seddon 1994). Sometimes it is equated with the term structural 
adjustment and includes privatization (Walton and Shefner 1994). I am following 
more recent definitions of austerity that usually “include currency devaluation and 
reduction of public-devoted expenditures such as social welfare spending and 
consumer subsidies” (Shefner, Pasdirtz, and Blad 2006). These also include public 
sector wage cuts or lay-offs, and the elimination of inflation-adjusted wage 
indexation (Auvinen 1996). Austerity measures can also mean legislation to make 
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central banks “independent” or to place legal restrictions on deficit spending, even 
in times of recession (Babb 2005).42 Two brief examples (Mexico and Argentina) 
display some of the typical actions that government austerity in the region followed. 
In response to its 1982 crisis and through negotiations with the IMF which 
argued for a decrease on spending for citizens’ needs and increasing the priority of 
debt payment, “the Mexican government eliminated many government jobs, cut 
consumer subsidies… and reduced wages” (Shefner and Stewart 2011: 362). It also 
devalued the peso and decreased government social spending (Shefner and Stewart 
2011). Cypher and Delgado Wise (2010) observe that Mexican public sector capital 
investment in the economy fell at an annual rate of 7.8 percent between 1980 and 
1985 (2010: 45). 
Similarly, during its hyperinflationary crisis Argentina’s newly elected 
president, Carlos Menem, carried out a series of austerity policies in 1990: raising 
the fees on government services and government controlled gasoline prices—along 
with a series of other price hikes, cutting government employee wages, eliminating 
80,000 federal civil service jobs and cutting another 80,000 contract workers from 
government-owned companies (Reuters 1990b; Jarvie 1990). In addition, alongside 
one of Latin America’s most zealous privatization programs, for purposes of 
                                                 
42 According to Lora (2007a), “Between 1988 and 1996, the central banks of 12 
Latin American countries were reformed by law or by the constitution, granting 
them greater independence in the design and conduct of monetary policy with the 
objective of guaranteeing price stability” (2007a: 18). In addition, Filc and 
Scartascini (2007) report the adoption of “fiscal responsibility laws” that restrict 
government spending, deficits, and the public debt by Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Panama, and Peru; with separate “numeric rules” on government spending 
in Bolivia, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Uruguay. 
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austerity, “state-owned service or industrial, sectors that found no buyers, such as 
passenger railroad lines, were shut down” (Pozzi 2000: 70). 
 
Second Stage Reforms 
As I stated in the previous chapter, the first stage of reforms had been a 
reaction to the debt crisis and were generally short-term policies designed to 
decrease government involvement in the economy through decreases in 
government spending. The second stage of reforms was more ambitious, as 
reformers sought to change the very rules of the game and began the transition to 
an export oriented development model. In this second stage of neoliberalization, the 
structures that may foster deeper cultural changes are put in place. These deeper 
changes constitute the commodification of social relations that had previously been 
shielded from the market by the more statist ISI model of development (Leiva 2008: 
43-53). 
 
Privatization 
One of the most common neoliberal policies adopted throughout the region 
was the privatization of government enterprises. Privatization was one of the main 
ways neoliberals sought to separate the state from the market in Latin America. This 
reform is key to the neoliberal restructuring of the state for this very reason. Ideally, 
the neoliberal state has no direct role in the production/distribution of goods and 
services. From a neoliberal standpoint, the state is inherently inefficient and market 
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distorting.43 Thus, neoliberals pushing from both within countries and from the IFIs 
outside countries, heavily pushed privatization during the second stage of reforms.  
Chong and Benavides argue that “Privatization in Latin America started 
earlier and spread farther than anywhere in the developing world” (2007: 283). 
According to Lora (2001), in the 19 Latin American countries in his dataset, between 
1986 and 1999, there were 393 sales and transfers of government owned/run 
enterprises to the private sector. This number excludes the many enterprises that 
countries decided to simply close down rather than sell off. Overall, 
telecommunications, electricity, and gas were the industries most often privatized in 
the region, while transportation systems (roads, rail, and ports) were less often 
privatized (Checchi, Carrera, and Florio 2004). 
Although it was one of the most ubiquitous types of neoliberal reforms in the 
region, the actual process and the types of enterprises various countries successfully 
privatized were heterogeneous. Chile under the Pinochet dictatorship was the 
earliest country to engage in broad privatization, selling off over five hundred firms 
between 1974 and 1978. In fact, “by 1992, 96% of all Chilean state enterprises had 
been sold” (Morley, Machado, and Pettinato 1999: 17). In Mexico, under Salinas, the 
number of state-owned enterprises decreased from 1,150 to less than 80 (Morley et 
al 1999). Other countries engaged in far less privatization. Some countries, like 
Venezuela and Ecuador, had a large public sector but did not privatize much of it 
                                                 
43 This was acknowledged by the structuralist inspired ISI model of development, in 
which the state was purposely distorting markets with the intention to spur certain 
paths of economic development. Where particular industries did not exist, or lacked 
forward or backward linkages, the state often stepped in to create those. 
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due to fierce political/popular resistance. Others, such as Guatemala, El Salvador, 
and the Dominican Republic appeared not to engage in large-scale privatization 
because they had relatively small public sectors to begin with (Morley et al 1999).44 
Additionally, the manner in which privatization occurred varied between 
countries. Some countries, like Argentina and Peru, engaged in direct sell-offs of 
enterprises and started with both firms in competitive industries (like 
manufacturing) and major strategic enterprises (like utilities, infrastructure, and 
resource extraction). Other countries like Bolivia, Chile, and Mexico started with 
competitive industries before attempting more strategic firms. Also, some countries, 
like Bolivia, mainly used privatization for debt-swaps or capitalization schemes 
rather than selling firms outright. 
In the end, many of the countries in the region engaged in at least some level 
of privatization, though even the largest-scale privatizers chose to hold on to certain 
key industries or firms: Chile refused to privatize its important copper industry, 
Brazil kept much of its power generation sector, and Peru held on to its oil industry 
(Chong and Benavides 2007). However, “Overall, Latin America truly embraced 
privatization” and this embrace was part of a fundamental change in the structure 
and role of the state (Chong and Benavides 2007: 269). 
 
 
                                                 
44 Lora’s dataset shows that they still managed to privatize some enterprises, 
however. Interestingly, all 19 countries in his dataset engaged in at least some type 
of privatization for the period of his study: 1985-1999. 
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Trade Liberalization 
Trade liberalization is a key neoliberal policy for two main reasons. First, 
according to neoliberal theory, all government interventions in the market are 
pernicious. Tariffs, which are intentional price distortions are assumed to be more 
problematic than beneficial in the long run because they move the market farther 
from equilibrium. Secondly, the export oriented model of development that 
neoliberalism favors relies on the theory of comparative advantage. In order for 
countries to know where their comparative advantages lay, they need accurate price 
signals on the international market.  For these reasons, neoliberals stressed the 
importance of decreasing trade restrictions during the second stage of reforms.45 
The second half of the decade of the 1980s saw major decreases throughout 
the region on tariffs and other barriers to trade (such as quotas or import 
restrictions). The Southern Cone countries had started selectively reducing tariffs 
during the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes of the 1970s. For the most part 
however, major reforms only began to occur and become widely adopted after the 
debt crisis and the failed attempts by several countries in the region to use 
heterodox policies (including raising tariffs and restrictions on trade) to escape the 
crisis (Morley et al 1999). Overall, by the mid-1990s, “no country in the region was 
                                                 
45 In many cases, countries began – and were heavily encouraged by the IFIs – to 
begin dismantling trade barriers during the first stage, but for many of these 
countries, the brief heterodox reaction to early neoliberalization that I described in 
Chapter III coincided with a return to increased import restrictions in the for of 
tariffs and quotas. It wasn’t until the late 1980s and early 1990s that trade 
liberalization was widely adopted. For this reason I include it within the second 
stage rather than the first. 
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using its tariff system to protect domestic industry or to promote particular sectors 
except for the Brazilian automobile industry” (Morley et al 1999: 15). Lora reports 
that tariffs dropped from an average level of 48.9 percent prior to neoliberalization 
to 10.9 percent in 1999 (Lora 2001: 4). There was also an enormous decrease in the 
levels of quotas and trade restrictions during this time. This represents a clear break 
from the ISI period of restricted trade to protect domestic industries.  
 
Financial Liberalization 
In the Latin American neoliberal state, financial liberalization was 
theoretically justified by the belief that the market was superior to the government 
in allocating investment and lending. Part of the motivation behind this series of 
reforms was the belief that unless the market was solely determining interest rates, 
then price signals couldn’t work properly. From the neoliberal perspective, this 
would result in decreased growth. Morley et al (1999) say that prior to the debt 
crisis, “A good deal of credit was allocated by government decision rather than by 
supply and demand” (1999: 15). In the Latin American neoliberal state, the 
government would no longer be involved in setting lending targets, interest rates 
restrictions, or controls on foreign capital in the form of investment restrictions and 
profit repatriations. By the end of this second stage however, the call to deregulate 
financial markets shifted to liberalization that included “prudential oversight” of 
financial markets and institutions.  
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Financial liberalization as a category overlaps substantially with the 
categories of privatization and social protections because it involves the 
privatization of state banks (often linked to austerity measures) and the 
transformation of publicly operated pensions into either private institutional 
investment funds or public-private hybrid systems. Financial liberalization has also 
occurred in several temporal stages that do not neatly conform to a 
conceptualization of “stages” of reforms. In the first phase (during the 1970s), 
several countries in the region—predominantly the Southern Cone—engaged in 
rapid financial liberalization and “after an initial boost in credit, the laissez-faire 
financial policies that supported unrestricted private participation in financial 
markets led to a general financial crisis throughout the region” (Galindo, Micco, and 
Panizza 2007: 292). This was followed by re-regulation and some bank 
nationalizations during the early 1980s. However, following the recommendations 
of the IFIs during the structural adjustment (second) stage of reforms, most 
countries in the region moved towards more privatization of banks, liberalization of 
banking controls, and greater openness to foreign participation in the banking 
sector and financial markets (Edwards 1995; Galindo, Micco, and Panizza 2007; 
Lora 2001; Morley et al 1999).46 
                                                 
46 In some countries, liberalization of banking controls and financial markets also 
included the creation of “prudential regulation and supervision” often in the form of 
new agencies or oversight procedures that were meant to avoid moral hazard and 
“promote financial stability” to avoid the problems associated with the financial 
crises of the late 1970s/early 1980s (Galindo, Micco, and Panizza 2007: 302). 
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The most ubiquitous form of financial liberalization in the region was the 
privatization of state banks. Between 1970 and 1995, every country in the region 
except Uruguay saw a decrease in the share of state owned banks in the banking 
sector (Galindo, Micco, and Panizza 2007). Ecuador, Chile, and Peru were the most 
thorough privatizers, “moving from levels of state ownership hovering around 90 
percent, to state ownership below 40 percent” (Galindo, Micco, and Panizza 2007: 
296). For some countries, there was an initial wave of privatization followed by an 
increase in state ownership, followed by a subsequent and deeper wave of 
privatization.47 Coupled with the privatization drive, many countries have also 
liberalized domestic banking, specifically in abandoning control on interest rates—
carried out in all countries by 1995 (Lora 2001: 7)—and abandoning the 
requirements that banks follow lending targets for particular industries or market 
sectors (Edwards 1995; Galindo, Micco, and Panizza 2007; Lora 2001; Morley et al 
1999). 
Public social security pension funds have been another major area of 
privatization in Latin America. Mesa-Lago and Márquez (2007) reported that twelve 
countries in the region attempted to either fully or partially privatize their pension 
systems between 1980 and the first decade of the twenty-first century. A total of six 
countries, Bolivia (1996), Chile (1980), Dominican Republic (2001), El Slavador 
(1997), Mexico (1996), and Nicaragua have attempted to fully privatize their 
                                                 
47 Countries that fit this trend include: Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Mexico, and 
Nicaragua. 
  98 
pension systems. All except Nicaragua were successful.48 Two countries, Colombia 
(1993) and Peru (1992), instituted parallel systems in which the public system was 
maintained, but a private system was created parallel to it with citizens given the 
choice between one or the other. Finally, Argentina (1993), Costa Rica (2000), 
Ecuador, and Uruguay (1995) created mixed systems in which the publicly 
administered system provides a basic pension and various private systems act as 
supplementary pensions beyond the basic level.49 These privatizations were, in part, 
meant to stimulate private investment in the domestic financial markets, but as 
Galindo, Micco, and Panizza (2007) point out, they have largely failed to stimulate 
financial markets. 
Increasing openness to foreign capital investment (also meant to stimulate 
financial markets) has been much less uniform across the region than other 
financial liberalizations. A few countries, such as Argentina, Costa Rica, Honduras, 
Peru, and Venezuela, had relatively open financial systems in the 1970s, but after 
the financial crises at the end of that decade, Argentina and Peru subsequently 
increased government control of foreign investment. After the debt crisis, and under 
pressure from the IMF, IDB, and World Bank, more countries began to open their 
markets. Many countries (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Chile) however, maintained 
significant controls on foreign capital (Morley et al 1999). 
 
                                                 
48 Nicaragua indefinitely suspended its pension privatization when the fiscal costs 
became too great. 
49 Ecuador never carried out the law reforming its pension system after the courts 
struck down several parts of the law in 2001 (Rofman 2008: 261-2). 
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Social Policy Reforms 
Social policy reforms in Latin America during the 1990s varied widely in the 
details but were generally focused on two main areas (poverty alleviation and 
education reform) and had a consistently uniform logic. By the 1990s, neoliberal 
reformers came to see absolute poverty as a problem that was not being addressed 
by the market. They also recognized that in the short-run, some of the policy 
changes that they argued were necessary (such as fiscal austerity and trade 
liberalization) would have negative effects on the already worst-off sectors of 
society. They needed to address this, both to ensure quiescence from these groups 
and also as part of a wider agenda to break the cycle of poverty these groups faced. 
The system of subsidies that many states had in place on basic food stuffs, energy, 
and fuel often provided more benefit to the middle class than to the poorest of the 
poor in Latin America (Edwards 1995: 290). To neoliberals, this was wasteful 
spending that governments needed to better target to only those groups who 
needed it most. 
Throughout the region, a shift took place during the 1990s away from 
universal programs and government subsidies and toward targeted, conditional 
cash transfer (CCT) programs.50 These programs were based on the neoliberal logic 
that “A cycle-breaking intervention would require income transfers to the poorest in 
                                                 
50 During the first generation of reforms (the austerity period of the early-mid-
1980s), most countries in the region were forced to cut social spending levels. By 
the end of this period, “with the acknowledgement that structural adjustment 
programs and economic reform were not addressing the needs of the large number 
of poor people” in the region, there was a new focus on addressing poverty (Bidsall 
and Székely 2003: 63). 
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society, conditioned on greater family investment in education, health, and child 
nutrition” Mesa-Lago and Márquez 2007: 376). Such programs were implemented in 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Peru (Lora 2007a; Teichman 
2009). Overall these programs were successful in reducing levels of absolute 
poverty in most countries, but as many critics (Reygadas and Filgueira 2010) and 
even some cheerleaders (Mesa-Lago and Márquez 2007) have pointed out, such 
incremental changes do not address the structural nature of poverty and inequality 
in the region. Due to the methodological individualist focus of neoliberalism, 
poverty is seen as an individual problem that can best be addressed by increasing 
individuals’ access to human capital development. However, CCT programs “cannot 
change the economic environment or the underlying elements in the structure of the 
economy that are contributing to poverty and slowing overall growth” (Bidsall and 
Székely 2003: 66). 
The main social policy reform that neoliberals sought to carry out to address 
the structural nature of Latin American poverty targeted the educational system. 
Following reforms carried out in Chile in the early-1980s, countries in the region 
followed two main paths of education reform. The first was decentralization of the 
administration (and funding) of the educational system (Lora 2007a). Policies of 
decentralization were carried out in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El 
Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, and Nicaragua (Navarro 2007). Several other 
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countries either partially decentralized or decentralized and then reversed it. These 
countries included: Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Venezuela (Navarro 2007). 
The second major educational reform was the privatization of schools (often 
referred to as public-private partnerships). The World Bank pushed these reforms 
in the interest of increasing educational equity, though they often increased the 
inequality of educational outcomes in terms of years completed and quality of 
education (Davidson-Harden 2009).  The three main ways that privatization was 
pushed were: the voucher system, the “competitive bidding model,” and the 
“negotiated agreement model” (Lora 2007a; Navarro 2007). In the voucher system, 
the government gives educational vouchers to students and the schools (public and 
private) must compete for enrollment. In the competitive bidding model, private 
schools compete for public funding from local governments. In the negotiated 
agreement model, the government subsidizes private schools as long as these 
schools agree to accept a certain number of low-income students. As Navarro 
(2007) points out, despite the World Bank’s justification for these reforms, 
inequality in educational outcomes that is directly related to income persists 
throughout the region.  
 
Tax Reform 
Another of the most commonly carried out sets of reforms in the region is the 
transformation of taxation from systems based on progressive income taxes and 
import tariffs to a much more regressive system of sales taxes and value-added 
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taxes (VAT).51 The stated goals of tax reform were to increase tax collection 
efficiency (and overall revenues) and broaden the tax base, while also increasing 
“neutrality” and decreasing tariffs—which were seen as trade restrictions (Lora 
2007a; Williamson 2003a).52 “Every country in the region has reduced its top 
marginal tax rate since 1970” with Uruguay eliminating personal income taxes 
altogether (Morley et al 1999: 16). In addition, the corporate tax rate fell from a 
regional average of 42 percent in 1986 to an average of 30 percent during the late 
1990s (Lora 2007a: 23). After being introduced to the region in the 1970s in nine 
countries, the VAT spread during the 1980s to “all the remaining countries in the 
region” (Morley et al 1999: 16). The results of these tax changes have been to 
generally increase the regressiveness of taxation while only modestly increasing 
overall revenues in a few countries, while other countries have seen decreasing 
collections (Lora 2007b: 185).   
 
 
 
                                                 
51 Referring to the income tax system in Latin America as “progressive” is more a 
designation of the design of the system than a description of how the system 
actually worked. It is widely acknowledged that income tax evasion was endemic in 
the region and most countries’ tax collections were inefficient. 
52 Neutrality as used here refers to the reduced differences between groups or 
sectors, as well as the elimination of incentives and exemptions that are not 
consistent with neoliberal, market-centered values because they represent 
intentional government interventions in the market. For example, progressive 
income taxes are partly meant to shape the income/wealth distribution in order to 
decrease levels of inequality. 
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Labor Market Deregulation 
The area of labor market deregulation has been a contentious one in the 
literature in two different ways. Critics of neoliberalization claim that labor 
deregulation led to increased “flexibilization” throughout the region and resulted in 
the rise of informalization of the workforce along with decreasing wages and 
increasing unemployment. However, pro-reform analysts argue that little or no real 
deregulation has occurred and that if it did, levels of employment and wages would 
both rise. 
Lora and Panizza (2002) are an example of the latter group. In their analysis 
of why Latin Americans seemed to be suffering from “reform fatigue” in the late 
1990s—early 2000s, they say “virtually no country has capitalized on the potential 
to introduce flexibility into labor regimes” (2002: 11). They say that the only real 
reforms passed in the region in the area of labor markets were ones that increased 
temporary employment and made laying-off and dismissing workers easier. 
Similarly, Edwards (1995) calls labor the “forgotten sector” of reforms, saying that it 
was not part of the reform package in most countries (1995: 277). He goes on to 
argue that the rise in informality in the region is the result of too much regulation of 
labor markets combined with macroeconomic austerity. Slightly contradictory to his 
stance above, Lora’s (2001) analysis of how much reform took place in Latin 
America points to a bit more labor market reform than “virtually none.” He points 
out that six countries: Argentina, Colombia, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, and 
Venezuela had actually “made substantial labor reforms between the mid-1980s and 
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1999” (Lora 2001: 17). However, the reforms that he cites are primarily 
encouraging temporary employment and making laying-offs and dismissals easier. 
Weeks (2000) stands in sharp contrast to these other authors when he says: 
“In virtually all of the countries [in Latin America] labor market ‘reforms’ were 
introduced in the 1980s to create greater ‘flexibility’” (2000: 92-93). He argues that 
during the period of deregulation, the record was, at best, mixed with only one 
country (Chile) showing gains in both wages and employment. There is a flaw in 
Weeks’ analysis however: he makes no attempt to demonstrate that any actual 
reforms took place. Outside of his claim (which appears unsubstantiated in his 
paper) there is no other mention of any actual reforms, they are merely assumed to 
have occurred. 
Despite the stark disagreement over how much labor market deregulation 
took place, I include it in the model because most authors are in agreement that at 
least a third of the states in the region carried out some type of deregulation. In 
addition, neoliberal advocates saw labor deregulation as essential to development. 
As Anner (2008b) points out, deregulation became a standard conditionality 
imposed by the World Bank on Latin American countries.  
 
Third Stage Reforms 
By the mid- to late-1990s, after two decades of disappointing growth rates 
and several economic crises in the region, neoliberals began to call for a “second 
generation” of reforms (Williamson 2003a). After privatization came to be 
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associated with corruption and financial deregulation led to banking crisis, 
neoliberals came to recognize the importance of governance and effective 
institutions. In this context, the use of the term institution by neoliberals refers to 
the “rules that shape the behavior of organizations and individuals in a society” 
(Burki and Perry 1998: 2, italics in original). This is a clear call for reforms that will 
enforce cultural changes that buttress the neoliberal state by changing the 
subjective reality of the country. In some cases, these reforms were also seen as 
necessary cultural underpinnings to the proper functioning of the neoliberal state. 
Broadly speaking, the third stage reforms called for an efficient and effective 
state apparatus, as opposed to a minimal state (Kuczynski 2003; Williamson 
2003b). This included another call for the continued privatization of government 
productive activities. This focus on the state also included a call for the 
“decentralization” of the state – preferably down to the local level of administration 
wherever possible.53 Two of the more important third stage reforms proposed by 
analysts working for the IFIs were closely linked to one another and seen as 
especially problematic: crime prevention and judicial reform. During the period of 
the first two stages of reforms in the region, crime rates (especially violent crime) 
rose precipitously (Kuczynski 2003: 41). In addition, the judiciary was seen as too 
                                                 
53 Although this was always an aspect of neoliberalization I do not include it in my 
model as one of the seven policy areas because it is not exclusive to neoliberalism. 
For example, the plurinational lefts in Ecuador and Bolivia seek decentralization in 
order to secure the rights of indigenous persons and communities. However this is a 
very different logical justification that that used by neoliberals who were motivated 
by a deep-rooted phobia of large, centralized states which they inherited from 
Ricardo’s economic theory (Blyth 2013).  
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closely tied to governments and parties. In addition, it was seen as inefficient and 
slow in delivering justice. 
In their 1998 World Bank Report: Beyond the Washington Consensus: 
Institutions Matter, Burki and Perry suggest that a new set of reforms are necessary 
to address problems that were consequences of neoliberal reforms or that were not 
being addressed by them. The reforms they suggested were: first, policies focused 
on improvements in human development. Second, they argued for the development 
of sound and efficient financial markets. Third, they stress the need for enhancing 
the legal and regulatory environment—including completing the deregulation of 
labor markets, improving regulations for private investments in infrastructure and 
social services; improving the quality of the public sector—primarily the judicial 
system. Lastly, they say that states need to focus on fiscal strengthening. Williamson 
(2003) proposed a similar set of reforms: 1) reforming the judiciary, 2) reforming 
education, 3) reforming the civil service (strengthening budget offices, securities 
and exchange commissions, and central bank autonomy), 4) strengthening property 
rights and reforming bankruptcy law, and 5) improving oversight of the financial 
sector. He said that the emphasis on growth must now be balanced by an emphasis 
on growth with equity. However, equity must not be sought through redistribution. 
He argues that the only way to ensure that the poor become less poor without 
triggering “Okun’s ‘Big Trade-Off’” (where increases in equity are necessarily 
matched by decreases in overall income) is to do it through economic growth. He 
asserts that even if a country only relies on trickle-down economics, the poor will 
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benefit. Despite this, Williamson also calls for a shift from the regressive taxes like 
VAT and towards more progressive direct taxes (e.g. property tax) and more 
efficient collection, with the increased proceeds “devoted to spending on basic social 
services, including a social safety net as well as education and health, so that the net 
effect will significantly reduce inequality, particularly by expanding opportunities 
for the poor” (2003: 16). 
Few of these proposed changes took place however, and in the model of the 
neoliberal state, this stage is somewhat transitional between the second stage and 
the left turns (at which point, I will argue that a different approach to dealing with 
neoliberalism prevailed). Around the time that these third stage reforms were being 
proposed, the electoral shift to the left began. State after state witnessed the rise of 
leftist presidents that verbally rejected neoliberal reforms and promised to take 
their countries in new directions.  
 
The Latin American Neoliberal State: The Overall Model 
The Latin American neoliberal state is a model that has proceeded through 
three stages of development over time. It began with stabilization and proceeded 
through a period of structural reforms. By the mid-to-late 1990s, this model was 
considered to be in crisis and its proponents at the World Bank and elsewhere were 
shifting their focus to include a concern with “governance” and an 
acknowledgement of the importance of institutions. The neoliberal state in Latin 
America thus represents a model that changes and adapts over time.   
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The Latin American neoliberal state emerges during a time of economic (and 
sometimes political) crisis. In its earliest form, parts of it begin to appear in the 
bureaucratic-authoritarian states of the 1960s. More widely, this model emerged in 
the early-to-mid 1980s in the wake of the debt crisis in Latin America. This first 
stage of the neoliberal state was focused on stabilizing the economy: government 
austerity to slow the growth of debt, getting hyperinflation under control, and 
devaluing currency as an attempt to boost exports. 
This first stage of reforms was widely recognized to be exceedingly harsh, 
especially on the poorest sectors of society. While the reforms did manage to slow 
the growth of many government deficits and helped control inflation, they were 
unpopular and failed to stimulate growth. In most cases they induced recession. 
This, coupled with their increasing hardships on the poor—who saw their existence 
further threatened by cuts to food and transportation subsidies—was addressed 
during the second stage of reforms when governments created targeted social 
policies.  
The second stage of reforms represents the structural emergence of the full-
blown Latin American neoliberal state. With government austerity reforms already 
in place, privatization now seeks to remove the state from directly engaging in 
economic activity by turning over publicly owned or controlled enterprises to 
private ownership. In an effort to further reduce the government’s role in the 
economy, trade and financial markets are liberalized. Included in this financial 
liberalization is the replacement in many countries (and failed attempts in others) 
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to privatize pensions so that the market, rather than government, safeguards 
citizens retirement incomes/savings. In many neoliberal states, tax reforms are 
implemented to shift taxation from progressive corporate and income taxes to more 
regressive forms of taxation like sales taxes.  
In order to further marketize social relations, the neoliberal state carries out 
two sets of labor reforms: one of them formally recognizes the rights of workers to 
collective bargaining (though as Anner 2008a, 2008b points out, this is often little 
more than a formality lacking enforcement). The second set of labor reforms 
“deregulates” the labor market, making it easier to dismiss/lay-off workers in an 
effort to create “flexibility” in the labor market. What predominantly ensues is an 
increase in informality. In order to deal with these informal sector workers who are 
no longer protected by the formal sector’s safety net—as well as the least well-off 
who have been further hurt by neoliberal reforms—the neoliberal state creates new 
social programs that use targeting and conditionality to alleviate the absolute worst-
off and encourage members of this group to engage in certain behaviors (like 
keeping their children in school and making routine health care check-ups.  
In the wake of several economic crises during the mid- and late-1990s, and 
after a second decade of disappointing growth rates, neoliberals began to recognize 
the importance of governance and effective institutions. The third stage of the 
neoliberal state coincides with what Leiva (2008) calls the rise of neostructuralism. 
The second stage had sought to restructure the system and once that had been 
sufficiently accomplished, in the third stage, reformers now sought to 
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“institutionalize” this new, neoliberal state by normalizing the shift to individualist 
as opposed to social economic behavior and the commodification of what had been 
public goods. Throughout much of the region, this stage failed to satisfy publics that 
were increasingly hostile to neoliberalization. This is one of the reasons that Leiva 
associates it with the leftist electoral resurgence in the region as a response to 
neoliberalism. At nearly the same time that neoliberal proponents at the IMF and 
World Bank were recognizing that financial markets needed to be well-regulated, 
Latin American citizens were shifting their support to a newly invigorated series of 
leftist parties and social movements. These leftist parties and movements were no 
longer anti-capitalist, but they were vocally anti-neoliberal and often critical of the 
United States (which was seen in the region as a major impetus behind the 
neoliberal state).54 
All three of the Latin American governments (Peru, Ecuador, and Venezuela) 
that are typically identified as radical leftists are states that have large natural 
resource endowments (particularly energy resources) to draw upon in funding 
programs that break with neoliberal orthodoxy. All three of these “neo-extractivist” 
countries are using resource extraction to fund more extensive social programs and 
other—non-neoliberal—development programs (Bebbington 2009; Gudynas 2010; 
Achtenberg 2012). Such resource wealth can be seen as a necessary but not sufficient 
                                                 
54 I will discuss Correa’s “21st Century Socialism” in the sixth and final chapters as 
fitting this assessment. Though using the term “socialism” in describing his 
developmental model. Correa does not reject the market or capitalism. He merely 
seeks to empower the state (at the national level) vis-à-vis the market and to 
subordinate the market to national priorities. This is very different from the 
explicitly anti-capitalist ideologies of the pre-neoliberal Latin American “old” left. 
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precondition for either dismantling the neoliberal state (Bolivia) or for resisting the 
creation of it in the first place (Ecuador and Venezuela). It may be a necessary 
precondition, though Ortega’s return in Nicaragua calls this into question, but it is 
not a sufficient one as Mexico—with its oil reserves—clearly illustrates. In order to 
better understand the role that resources plays in a country’s resistance to 
neoliberalization, each country must be taken on a state-by-state basis. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In this and the preceding chapters, I have argued that a comparison of the 
degree to which various Latin American states have (or have not) broken with the 
neoliberal model of development requires us to construct a model of the neoliberal 
Latin American state that is slightly generalized but not based on an ideal type. In 
this chapter, I have shown that to date, there is no such model for a neoliberal state 
even though the term is used in the literature. David Harvey represents the closest 
attempt that anyone has made in this direction although, as I argue, he is actually 
creating an ideal type of the neoliberal state through which universal comparisons 
can be made and I am only talking about a specific type of neoliberal state, one that 
developed in Latin America during the 1980s – 2000s. 
This Latin American neoliberal state exhibits seven policy traits (though the 
seventh is hotly disputed). In the next chapter, I will describe my three cases 
(Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru) in relation to this model and examine their reforms. 
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Once I have described the relative depth of these reforms in each case, in Chapter VI, 
I examine the same sets of reforms during the decade of the 2000s when two of the 
three cases (Argentina and Ecuador) experienced an electoral shift to the left. The 
extent to which these countries have abandoned the neoliberal policies favoring 
foreign capital, deregulated finance, the commodification of social relations, and 
targeted CCTs will exemplify whether the Pink Tide is really an alternative to the 
neoliberal model of development or whether it is, as some have claimed, a social 
liberalism that merely acts to buttress some of the more problematic contradictions 
of the neoliberal state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  113 
CHAPTER V 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE NEOLIBERAL STATE IN ARGENTINA, 
PERU, AND ECUADOR 
 
 
 
In every historical case, the development of the Latin American neoliberal 
state varies in its particularities, but many of these cases share some similarities. In 
this chapter, I will describe three different attempts to create neoliberal states. In 
two of these cases (Argentina and Peru) the attempt was successful and in what 
follows, I discuss exactly how these two states were neoliberal. In the third case 
(Ecuador), the attempt to create a neoliberal state was unsuccessful, having only 
partially and half-heartedly been carried out. This was possibly due to Ecuador’s oil 
reserves, which could be used to avoid some of the pressures (external and internal) 
for increased austerity during the 1980s and 1990s.  
These cases were chosen for their dissimilarity as much as for their 
similarities. Although both Ecuador and Argentina are oft-cited examples of the 
leftward shift in electoral politics in the region, and although they both had strong 
ISI periods prior to the neoliberal period, Ecuador failed to transition into a 
neoliberal state. Although both Peru and Argentina did transition into full-blown 
neoliberal states during the 1990s, Peru did not experience a subsequent electoral 
transition during the period under study here.55 Also, Peru does not have a similar 
                                                 
55 Shortly after the period covered in this study, Peru did elect a leftist President 
(Ollanta Humala) in 2011. Although not considered here, this turn may have 
interesting implications for the relationship between the creation of the neoliberal 
state and subsequent leftist electoral transitions. However, it remains to be seen 
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history of ISI development to that experienced by Argentina and Ecuador prior to 
neoliberalization and, in fact, has been one of the most liberalized countries in the 
region—economically—throughout most of its post-colonial history. Finally, 
Ecuador contains natural resource reserves in the form of oil that are not present to 
the same extent in Argentina or Peru, and Ecuador also has had large-scale political 
mobilization by indigenous groups that neither Peru nor Argentina experienced. 
All three of these cases thus provide interesting opportunities to explore the 
neoliberal state and its changing structures and processes over time. Argentina 
provides us with an example of the transition from ISI to neoliberal state followed 
by a subsequent leftist electoral shift. In this case, each transition was marked by 
severe crises. Peru provides us with the example of a relatively liberal state that 
transitions into a neoliberal state and does not experience a leftist electoral shift. 
Finally, Ecuador provides us with an example of a transition from ISI to partial 
neoliberalization, followed by a leftist electoral shift within the context of both 
indigenous political mobilization and the presence of large oil reserves. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
whether Hurtado will carry out actual leftist economic/social policies or whether he 
will follow Alan García’s path of neoliberal accommodation. 
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The Neoliberal State in Argentina  
 
The neoconservative, authoritarian, military junta that controlled Argentina 
from 1976 to 1982 attempted the first wave of neoliberal reforms in the country 
(Schamis 1991). It is important to note however that these were not primarily first 
stage reforms. The junta abolished the General Confederation of Labor (CGT), which 
was staunchly Peronist; however, this was a politically motivated rather than 
neoliberal-inspired action. José Martínez de Hoz, the junta’s economy minister and 
an outspoken neoliberal, imposed a stabilization program that included cutting 
wages, slashing tariffs on industrial goods, and moving to privatize several state-
owned enterprises (Skidmore and Smith 2005: 100). The junta’s economic policies 
briefly lowered inflation rates but also brought on a recession and failed to keep 
inflation down.  
Although the military junta had engaged in some neoliberal reforms, it was 
by no means committed to government austerity. During the junta’s period of 
control, Argentina’s debt increased enormously. Much of this debt had been accrued 
in order to fund the Dirty War against revolutionary leftist offshoots of the Peronist 
Partido Justicialist (PJ) and other leftist groups (Stiglitz 2006: 229). 
By 1981, the county was facing economic crisis and the military junta chose 
to invade the British-held Falkland/Malvinas Islands as a domestic distraction. The 
invasion started off well but quickly surrendered to a larger, better-equipped and -
trained British task force sent to counter the invasion. The economic crisis 
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worsened in 1982 and Argentina stopped paying its private foreign debt. The junta 
promised elections in 1983 and a return to elected civilian government in 1984. 
Raúl Alfonsín of the Radical Civic Union was elected president in the 1983 
elections.56 He was soon forced to go to the IMF to seek new bailout loans and the 
IMF imposed an austerity package as a condition. Argentina was soon out of 
compliance with the IMF’s conditions and future negotiations between Alfonsín’s 
government and the IMF were combative. 
Alfonsín attempted a heterodox program that included a wage/price freeze 
(Skidmore and Smith 2005: 103). He named this program the Austral Plan. The 
Austral Plan was implemented in June 1985 and was immediately successful in 
controlling inflation. The inflation rate fell from 350 percent in the first half of 1985 
to 20 percent in the second half of that year (Edwards 1995: 35). The plan consisted 
of a price freeze (mainly a freeze on the prices of public services), a public wage 
freeze and an exchange rate freeze. The Argentine government sought to control its 
fiscal deficit by raising (before freezing) public service prices and through increased 
tariff rates on imports. In order to anchor these reforms in an attempt to control 
inflation, the government rolled out a new currency, the Austral, to replace the Peso. 
In April 1986, the plan was altered and the controls on public service prices, 
public wages and import tariffs were modified to allow for “price flexibilization” in 
the form of crawling pegs which periodically revalued the currency in relation to the 
dollar (Edwards 1995). Almost immediately, the inflation rate began to rise again. 
                                                 
56 The names and terms in office for the presidents of Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru 
are listed in the Appendix for the period of time covered in this study (1980-2010).  
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By 1988, the Austral Plan was in crisis and Alfonsín attempted to move toward trade 
liberalization. In 1989, plagued by hyperinflation, Alfonsín made an early handover 
of the presidency to the President-Elect, Carlos Menem of the Partido Justicialist. 
Although the 1976-1982 junta can be described as the initiator of Argentine 
neoliberalization, Alfonsín attempted a heterodox stabilization program after the 
junta transferred power to his civilian government and reversed some of the junta’s 
economic reforms, including raising tariffs. Thus, the main role in the building of the 
neoliberal state must be attributed to the administration of Carlos Menem. In the 
following sections, I separate-out first stage reforms from second stage reforms but 
these sets of reforms actually took place over the same time period. 
   
First Stage Reforms 
In 1990, Menem announced “massive rises” in fees for public services and 
gasoline prices (Reuters 1990a). Menem also began shedding public sector jobs in 
an effort to cut government spending. That same year, he cut 80,000 civil service 
jobs and another 80,000 government contract jobs (Reuters 1990b; Jarvie 1990). 
After this ignited widespread strikes and demonstrations throughout the country, 
Menem passed a decree that limited the right to strike by workers in “vital services” 
(Barham 1990). In a public display of the importance of fiscal austerity, Menem gave 
himself a 20 percent pay cut and then decreed that all public sector employees’ 
wages would be capped at 90 percent of the president’s salary (Mead 1990a, 
1990b). 
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Also in 1990, Menem’s federal government announced that it would no 
longer pay for provincial budget deficits. These cuts to the provincial budgets, in the 
face of decentralization reforms to education, health care, and pensions—where the 
provincial governments were given greater control of the administration of these 
programs but required to take on a greater burden of their costs as well—led to 
fiscal crises in many provinces where government employees and pensioners were 
faced with pay cuts and months without pay due to budget shortfalls (The 
Economist 1994). 
As part of Menem’s austerity drive, “state-owned service or industrial sectors 
that found no buyers [during privatization], such as passenger railroad lines, were 
shut down” to save the government money (Pozzi 2000: 70). Government 
departments that were considered nonessential, such as the secretariat of state 
intelligence, were forced to make enormous cuts as well. This agency was forced to 
downsize, pushing over a thousand employees into early retirement and to sell-off 
property and assets (Avignolo 1990). 
In order to break the hyperinflation crisis, Menem’s economy minister: 
Domingo Cavallo, implemented the Convertibility Plan in April 1991. The Cavallo 
Plan brought the Peso back and used a currency board to set the exchange rate at 1 
peso to 1 dollar. The Currency board also mandated that the Central Bank would 
maintain reserves of gold and foreign currencies equal to 100 percent of Argentina’s 
monetary base (Fanelli and Frenkel 1999). Currency boards do not control what 
governments spend money on, but they restrict how much money a government can 
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spend (Rowland 2009). They essentially prevent governments from engaging in 
deficit spending and thus lower inflation. The currency board set up by Cavallo 
(along with other macro-economic policies carried out by the Menem government) 
had a dramatic effect on the inflation rate—lowering it from four- to one-digit levels 
within four years. 
 
 
Second Stage Reforms 
Privatization 
Menem was elected to the presidency after running on a populist platform 
for the PJ, which was traditionally Argentina’s populist party. Once elected, he 
announced that he would ally with the traditional rightwing of Argentine politics 
and began implementing neoliberal reforms (Ford 1990; Schwarzer 1998; The 
Economist Intelligence Unit 1996). In 1990, Argentina privatized the government 
operated telephone company Entel and its airline Aerolíneas Argentinas. Between 
1990 and 1995, Menem’s government privatized  
most public utilities – telecommunications, airlines, 
power generation and distribution, gas transportation 
and distribution, water and sewage systems, and 
passenger and cargo railways – and sold off the vast 
majority of productive facilities (including oil and gas 
extraction, coal mining and steel mills). The remaining 
privatizations include four hydroelectric power 
stations… the airports, the post office and some 
petrochemical facilities (Economist Intelligence Unit 
1996). 
 
 As Figure 1. shows, by 1995
an index score of 1.0, equivalent to “the most reformed or free from distortion or 
government intervention” on privatization (1999: 8).
Figure 1. Extent of Argentina’s Privatiza
 
 
 
 
                                                
57 Source: Morley, Machado, and Pettinato (1999). The scores for privatization in 
their index are equal to: “one minus the ratio of value
enterprises to non-agricultural GDP” (1999: 10). This is a better measurement of the 
total amount of government activity in the productive economy than Lora’s (2001) 
measurement which is based in the value of the revenues from privatization as 
proportion of total government revenues, which essentially measures how much 
money the government is making 
how much the government still owns.
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Trade Liberalization 
In 1990, Menem’s government began reducing both quantitative import 
restrictions and tariffs on both imports and exports (Lora 2001; Morley et all 1999). 
The government had eliminated import/export quotas and export tariffs by the mid-
1990s (Fanelli and Frankel 1999). 
Financial Liberalization 
Between 1990 and 1994, Argentina liberalized financial flows and FDI and 
Menem’s government consistently maintained this openness  “independent of the 
changes in the international and domestic capital markets” (Fanelli and Frenkel 
1999: 60). According to the Economist Intelligence Unit (1996), this made Argentina 
one of the most open capital markets in the world. They reported that Menem’s 
government had “removed all investment barriers to encourage inflows into 
domestic capital markets. Entering, trading and leaving the market is 
straightforward: there are no exchange controls, no registration requirements, and 
neither capital gains nor dividends are taxed. Brokers’ commissions are fixed 
competitively and there are no sectoral restrictions on foreign investors” (1996: 
32). 
 
Social Policies 
Menem’s economic policies managed to get inflation under control for a 
while. In 1989, Alfonsín’s last year in office, the annual consumer price index (CPI) 
was 3079.2 percent, but by 1994 it was down to 4.3 percent (Starr 1997: 84). In 
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addition to this, the economy grew until 1995, when the Tequila Crisis combined 
with increasing inequality and unemployment led to growing dissatisfaction with 
the neoliberal model (Patroni 2002; Starr 1997).58 Unemployment reached its peak 
under Menem at over 18 percent in 1995 (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2007: 90; Levitsky 
2005: 81). In order to deal with the rapid rise in unemployment, Menem’s 
government began the targeted conditional cash transfer (CCT) program Trabajar, 
which was expanded in 1997 as the Trabajar II program (Jalan and Ravallion 1999). 
It failed to stop poverty and inequality from rising throughout his second term as 
president, a term which was marked by continuing recession and increasing levels 
of protest (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2007; Shefner, Rowland, and Pasdirtz 
forthcoming). 
As mentioned above in the discussion of first stage reforms, in 1992 
Argentina devolved control of education and health care to the provincial level. It 
did so without completely compensating the provinces, which “are responsible for 
financing and administering public health and education services” (Bonari, Becerra, 
and Fiszbein 2004: 7). The federal government is only fiscally responsible for 
mitigating regional inequalities. Menem’s government did this over the objections of 
the provincial governments, as an austerity measure at the federal level (Navarro 
2007: 393).  
                                                 
58 As Shefner, Pasdirtz and Blad (2006) point out, even thought the economy was 
growing during this time, this growth was immiserating in that macroeconomic 
growth occurred yet poverty rates remained largely the same and inequality (which 
was already high) grew. 
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In 1994, Argentina carried out pension reforms that created a dual pension 
system with private, defined contribution, individual accounts taking over from the 
previously government operated pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system. The transition of 
many workers out of the public system caused and instant (and predictable) crisis 
that forced the Menem government to cap benefits and end the indexation of 
payments to current salaries in the public system in 1995 (Kay 1999, 2009). 
 
Tax Reform 
Although Argentina already had a value added tax (VAT), which was the 
preferred tax of the proponents of the Washington Consensus, during Menem’s 
presidency, it was raised in 1991, 1992, and 1995 (Lora 2001). Also, in line with the 
prescriptions of the Washington Consensus, the highest marginal tax rate was 
lowered from 45 percent in 1988, to 30 percent by 1990 and the maximum business 
tax rate was lowered slightly from 33 percent to 30 percent (Lora 2001). These are 
significant changes in the nominal rates, with the highest income tax rate being 
lowered by a full third. Overall, due to Argentina’s inefficient tax collections, these 
changes were not drastic and given the fact that Argentina had the lowest 
productivity rate on the VAT (Lora 2001: 11), tax reform is the least fulfilled aspect 
of the neoliberal state in Argentina. 
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Labor Deregulation 
In October 1991, Menem signed a decree that cut the national CGT out of 
direct negotiations with employers who now had the right to negotiate directly with 
their employees. The result was that by the mid-1990s, as many as “40 percent of 
the [formal] labour force worked without formal contracts or protection under the 
existing labour legislation” (Patroni 2002: 263). 
 
The Third Stage: Institutional Reforms Preempted by Crisis 
Fernando de la Rúa of the center-left Alianza por el Trabajo, la Justicia, y la 
Educación (Alianza)—a coalitional party, was elected to succeed Menem in 1999. By 
this time, the currency board, which had been created in the Convertibility Law, was 
unsustainable. Because the Peso was pegged to the Dollar, it had continued to 
appreciate even as the Argentine economy continued to face recession. This put 
downward pressure on Argentine exports (especially manufacturing) in an 
economy that was now reliant on the export model for growth. Under intense IMF 
pressure, de la Rúa enacted further austerity measures, which only deepened the 
recession. 
In March 2001, he turned to the author of the convertibility plan, Domingo 
Cavallo to take over the economy minister post. “Cavallo announced a ‘Zero Deficit 
Plan,’ cutting pensions and public sector wages by as much as 13 per cent, and 
reduced federal transfers to the provinces still further” (Grugel and Riggirozzi 2007: 
93). By November, the economy was still in free-fall and facing a wave of capital 
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flight. Cavallo announced a freeze on all bank deposits, calling it the corallito, which 
resulted in the middle-class joining the already widespread protests throughout the 
country (Levitsky 2005). De la Rúa responded to the protests with a security crack-
down that resulted in several deaths and de la Rúa’s resignation. 
De la Rúa’s vice-president had already resigned in protest over government 
corruption and so when de la Rúa resigned there was a constitutional crisis. 
Argentina passed through three presidents in the span of a month before Eduardo 
Duhalde of the PJ was installed as interim president until national elections could be 
held. Duhalde’s time in office marks the initial shift to the left in Argentina, though it 
was his successor, Néstor Kirchner, who represents the official electoral shift to the 
left—even though he is from the PJ as Menem had been. 
In the creation of the neoliberal state in Argentina, wage and inflation rates 
remained relatively stable between the two bookends of the hyperinflationary crisis 
of the late 1980s and the financial crisis of 2001. Figures 2 and 3 show this very 
clearly. Figure 2 shows the severity of Argentina’s hyperinflationary crisis in the late 
1980s. 
 
 Figure 2. Argentine Hyperinflationary Crisis: 1989
 
In Figure 3, the effect of Menem’s austerity program and the Cavallo currency 
board’s 1:1 peg between the dollar and the peso 
maintained until 2002 and during part of this time period
actually negative. 
 
                                                
59 Source: World Bank (2013). The data points that appear to be missing are actually 
negative rates. 
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 Figure 3. Argentine Inflation Rates under the Currency Board.
 
However, the neoliberal state did not create the wealth and growth that its 
proponents had predicted. During the period of second stage reforms and prior to 
the 2001 collapse, Argentina saw an increase in informality, unemployment, 
inequality, and extreme poverty. All this occurred during a period of somewhat 
anemic economic growth (in terms of GDP). 
extreme poverty in Argentina
                                                
60 Source: World Bank (2013).
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Figure 4. Changes in Extreme Poverty in the Argentine Neoliberal State.61 
 
Similarly, in Figure 5 we can see the steady increase in inequality over this period as 
the GINI coefficient increases from .501 in 1990 to .578 in 2002, after the economic 
collapse. 
                                                 
61 Source: ECLAC (2013).  
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Overall, the creation of the neoliberal state in Argentina coincided with a 
resumption of economic growth and the taming 
the cost of increasing levels of inequality and increased hardships for the already 
worst off in society. 
 
The Neoliberal State in Peru
    
Peru has historically been one of the Latin American countries most 
associated with liberal economic policies. After several governments sought to 
increase the role of the state following the Great Depression, a military coup, led by 
General Manuel Ordía—supported by the coastal sugar barons
                                                
62 Source: ECLAC (2013). “Linear GINI” refers to a line of best fit as data is only 
available for five separate years over this period.
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country to economic liberalism based on open, export-led economic policies. 
Beginning with the Ordía government in 1948 and continuing until 1968, Peru 
followed a liberal economic development program “an export-led system in which 
cyclical balance-of-payments difficulties were handled by domestic demand 
restraint and exchange devaluation, in which the entry of foreign capital and the 
repatriation of profits were virtually unrestricted and in which government 
intervention and participation were kept to a minimum” (Skidmore and Smith 2005: 
205-6, quoting Thorpe and Bertram).63 As Mauceri (1999) points out, until 1962, 
Peru contracted out its tax collection to a private firm and until 1969, the business 
sector (rather than the government) appointed the directors of the central bank.64  
After a brief period of civilian-controlled government that culminated in a 
bloody insurrection in the highlands, the military once again staged a coup in 1968. 
The 1968 military junta, led by General Juan Velasco Alvarado, began to reorganize 
Peru along corporatist lines with the intention of better facilitating industrialization. 
Velasco’s government engaged in large-scale land redistribution (including 
breaking-up the coastal sugar plantations and replacing them with communally 
owned cooperatives). His government nationalized petroleum production soon after 
the coup and began to regulate foreign investment. His government continued the 
wave of nationalizations begun with petroleum by following with the 
nationalization of mining under Minoperú and the nationalizations of ITT in 1969 
                                                 
63 Thorp, Rosemary and Geoffrey Bertram. 1978. Peru 1890-1977: Growth and Policy 
in an Open Economy. New York: Columbia University Press. 
64 The businesses responsible for selecting the directors of the central bank included 
banks that the central bank was charged with regulating.  
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and Chase-Manhattan Bank in 1970. After an increase in elite unrest, the junta 
began seizing control of media outlets in the early 1970s.  
 
First Stage Reforms 
In 1975, the junta replaced Velasco (whose health was deteriorating) with 
General Francisco Morales Bermúdez. Jo-Marie Burt says of this change: Bermúdez 
represented a new coalition of commercial and financial elites and conservative 
members of the armed forces all of whom were hostile to Velasco’s more 
progressive reforms (such as progressive labor legislation and land reform) and 
who wanted better relations with foreign capital (Burt 2003). Under IMF pressure, 
Bermúdez and his advisors—working closely with international lenders—
implemented an austerity plan (elimination of subsidies on food, freezing wages, 
and reductions in state spending) that caused increased unemployment and 
decreased wages (Mauceri 1999). However, these austerity measures led to growing 
unrest (Burt 2003). 
In 1977, he carried out Plan Túpac Amaru, which reversed many of the 
reforms Velasco had instituted. It pushed economic decentralization, austerity, 
encouraged private investment, privatized the press, called for a constitutional 
assembly in 1978 and general elections in 1980. Jo-Marie Burt calls Bermúdez’s 
policies “the armed retreat of the state,” remarking, “the state sought to disengage 
itself from an interventionist and developmentalist role in society and the economy 
and used repressive measures to deal with social protest of its retreat” (2006: 231). 
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Mauceri (1999) said that the developmentalist phase in Peru ended in the mid-
1970s with the Bermúdez government’s turn toward austerity. 
The move toward neoliberalization continued after Belaúnde won the 1980 
presidential elections and once again became Peru’s president.65 Jo-Marie Burt 
claims that Belaúnde followed the same set of neoliberal and social policies as the 
preceding junta, including the policy of shrinking the state. Belaúnde’s economic 
advisors were closely tied “to international banking circles,” were pro-free market, 
and also followed IMF recommendations (i.e. austerity) (Skidmore & Smith 2005). 
 
Heterodox Interlude 
Alan García won the 1985 elections on the APRA ticket, running on a 
nationalist/populist platform. García “promised state support for the urban and 
rural poor through a plethora of social programs” (Burt 2006: 236). APRA carried 
this through patronage networks. Once in office, García immediately carried out 
economic reforms: his government increased real wages, cut payroll and sales taxes, 
reduced interest rates, froze prices, and devalued the currency, the sol. García also 
created government investment programs to aid small-scale agriculture in the 
highlands. Lastly, he declared a default on the country’s external debt. 
                                                 
65 Belaúnde had previously served as Peru’s president from 1964 to 1968, when he 
was removed by a military coup. During this first presidency there was a major 
peasant uprising in the highlands which Belaúnde’s government brutally crushed 
leaving thousands of peasants dead and tens of thousands homeless. 
 
  133 
García’s policies created 2 years of economic growth but by 1987, 
hyperinflation set in (Burt 2006). Skidmore and Smith say that García’s policies 
resulted in a mushrooming trade deficit fueled by a consumption boom, which led to 
an exhaustion of foreign reserves. International credit froze Peru out as punishment 
for defaulting. García’s nationalization of the banks led to widespread domestic 
protests. In 1988, García’s government implemented a “shock program,” that led to a 
huge increase in unemployment. At the same time, guerrilla violence was increasing 
and the inflation rate reached 7,500 percent.  
 
The Return to Neoliberalization 
Alberto Fujimori was elected as an anti-establishment candidate who ran on 
a populist platform, offering vague promises of rejecting neoliberal policies. Once 
elected, he stunned Peruvians by reversing course and adopting an even harsher 
program than his opponent Mario Vargas Llosa had proposed (Roberts 1995). In 
Fujimori’s August 1990 stabilization program: “Price subsidies, social spending and 
public sector employment were slashed, interest rates and taxes on government 
services were increased, and exchange rates were unified, producing a de facto 
devaluation of the currency” (1995: 96). In February 1991, he began market-based 
restructuring including: deregulation of financial and labor markets, tariff 
reductions, privatization, and efforts to reform taxes (1995). He opened the country 
up to foreign investment, weakened labor, and resumed payments on Peru’s debt. 
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Second Stage Reforms 
Privatization 
Belaúnde planned for an ambitious privatization program in which his 
administration intended to sell-off over 80 public enterprises (Pastor and Wise 
1992: 87). This was an overly ambitious goal, as there wasn’t enough private sector 
capital to buy them all. This problem was exacerbated by the 1982-3 recession. On 
top of both of these factors, ministers dragged their feet throughout the process as 
eliminating or privatizing enterprises within their own sectors would erode their 
base of power (Pastor and Wise 1992). In the end, what little privatization occurred 
consisted of sales to politically-connected special interests. García’s heterodox 
program temporarily interrupted the move toward privatization. 
Fujimori’s change of direction was partly the path of least resistance in a 
system in which heterodox and socialist alternatives were seen as failures, 
significant international pressure (from IMF, World Bank, and IDB) pushed for 
neoliberal policies, and many of his close advisors were neoliberals. In 1991, 
Fujimori decreed 120 new laws (most of which were economic reforms). These 
decrees reversed what remained of the agrarian reforms and labor protections of 
the Velasco period (Mauceri 1999). Fujimori began by privatizing some small state-
owned banks, then he opened agriculture to large-scale agribusiness by disbanding 
cooperatives, lifting restrictions on land sales, and allowing large-scale capital to 
enter the agricultural sector (which it had been prevented from doing since 
Velasco). He privatized the social security system along Chilean lines – workers 
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would select retirement plans from private (largely unregulated) funds. Over all, 
Fujimori presided over significant privatizations: between 1991 and 1996, nearly a 
hundred public enterprises were sold for more than $6.5 billion in revenues 
(Dancourt 1999: 183-4). 
 
Trade Liberalization 
Peru’s “trade liberalization program was begun in 1978 under strong 
pressure from the IMF and received a boost with the change of administration in 
1980” (Pastor and Wise 1992: 89). At first, Belaúnde sought to slash tariffs and 
increase trade. During this time, the average nominal tariff was reduced from 46 
percent to 32 percent. By the end of 1981, 98 percent of all registered items could 
be freely imported, up from 38 percent in 1978. Tax subsidies from some exports 
were maintained, but Belaúnde’ government reduced their rates. Tariff decreases 
stimulated a flood of imported goods into the market, increasing competitive 
pressures on manufacturing firms, which, due to financial liberalization now had to 
borrow at higher interest rates. This led to a fall in manufacturing output and 
pressure on the Belaúnde government to rescind some of the liberalization 
measures. He responded by raising subsidies back to pre-1979 rates and raising 
tariffs back to their pre-1978 levels (Pastor and Wise 1992). 
On assuming the presidency, Fujimori slashed tariff rates. Dancourt (1999) 
reports that “Between 1990 and 1993, the average tariff went from 66 percent to 16 
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percent; 98 percent of the imported value in 1993 paid a 15 percent tariff” (1999: 
183, note 11). 
 
 
Financial Liberalization 
In 1991, Peru liberalized interest rate controls and government directed 
lending targets and in 1993, adopted most of the Basel Accord’s requirements for 
prudential regulation of banking. In Morley, Machado, and Pettinato’s (1997) 
measurements of domestic financial liberalization, Peru jumps from a score of 0.264 
in 1990, to 0.943 in 1991.66 Similarly in their study, Peru’s score on scale of 
international financial liberalization rises from 0.311 in 1989 to 0.912 in 1995. This 
score change in international financial reform represents significant amounts of 
liberalization in the form of a retreat of the state from “sectoral control of foreign 
investment, limits on profit and repatriation, controls on external credits… and 
capital outflows” (Morley et al 1997: 10). 
 
Social Policies 
Roberts (1995) says that the use of emergency social programs, like the 
Fondo Nacional de Compensación y Desarrollo (FONCODES), the nutrinional 
assistance program (PRONAA), and the residential infrastructure program 
                                                 
66 In their scale, a score of 0.0 is equivalent to complete government control and a 
score of 1.0 is the equivalent of complete freedom from government intervention, 
including regulation (Morley et al 1997: 9). 
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(PRONAVI) were centrally-directed and largely served as highly publicized 
clientelist disbursements that made it look like Fujimori was actively fighting 
poverty while in reality, they did next to nothing in terms of poverty alleviation. 
Roberts cites a study that estimated “the budget of FONCODES is approximately 
one-tenth what would be required to attend to the basic needs of Peruvians living 
below the poverty line” (1995: 105, note 72). 
As spending increased in these agencies controlled by the Ministry of the 
Presidency, social spending in other government agencies was cut. In addition, what 
little spending Fujimori’s government actually did engage in through these entities 
was based on combinations of international funding sources (including lending) and 
one-off windfall revenues from the privatization of government enterprises and 
assets. Thus, as insufficient as they were, they were still based on unsustainable 
sources of funding (Roberts 1995). A year before the 1995 elections, Fujimori 
initiated a media blitz, making daily visits to poor communities for the symbolic 
initiation of public works “often wearing an Indian poncho and woolen cap” 
(Roberts 1995: 105). He also greatly increased social spending by the state in a 
blatant attempt to influence the election (which worked to his advantage as he was 
reelected). 
 
Tax Reform 
During Fujimori’s presidency, Peru’s tax system changed from a reliance on 
personal income taxes and taxes on business profits to an increased reliance on the 
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VAT. García’s heterodox program had already decreased business tax rates from 55 
percent to 35 percent by the time that Fujimori took office, but in 1993 they were 
further decreased to 30 percent (Lora 2001: 41). Similarly, personal income tax 
rates were lowered with the highest bracket decreasing from 45 percent when 
Fujimori took office to 37 percent in 1993 and then to 30 percent in 1994 (Lora 
2001: 40). Between 1987 and 1992, the VAT tripled from 6 percent to 18 percent 
(Lora 2001: 39). 
 
Labor Deregulation 
Fujimori methodically attacked organized labor (Mauceri 1995). His 
government curtailed the ability for unions to organize and protest. It prohibited 
unions from engaging in “political activities.” It eliminated the closed shop – 
allowing for competing unions in same workplace. It limited public sector unions’ 
right to strike. It eliminated worker cooperatives. Lastly, it ended the labor 
ministry’s mediating role in collective bargaining. All of these reforms served to 
further weaken labor’s already declining importance. This was compounded by 
Sendero Luminoso’s attack on the unions from their left. 
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Third Stage “Institutionalization” of Reforms 
  
The 1992 Autogolpe had a 70-80 percent approval rating at the time it was 
carried out (Burt 2006: 249).67 Mauceri cites the New York Times and says that 
polls found his approval rating was as high as 75 percent in 1992 and remained 
above 60 percent through mid-1993 (1995: 7, note 1). “[T]he ‘fujigolpe’ represented 
the culminating response by key elite sectors seeking to reshape the scope and 
nature of state power in Peru” (Mauceri 1995: 8). Fujimori called a constituent 
assembly in 1992 and it approved a new constitution in 1993. However, this new 
constitution consolidated power in the executive branch and eviscerated democratic 
checks and balances. “The constitution adopted by the Constituent Assembly in mid-
1993 and ratified by plebiscite discarded he ‘social market’ orientation of the 
Constitution of 1979 in favor of an openly free-market agenda” (Mauceri 1999: 32). 
Fujimori won two reelections (neither of which were considered “fair” by 
international observers) but was forced to seek asylum in Japan when faced with 
corruption charges. All of these economic and social changes amounted to a return 
to Peru’s nineteenth century growth strategy of focusing on primary product 
exports (Dancourt 1999). The dramatic nature of the “Fujishock” can be seen in the 
                                                 
67 The Autogolpe, or “self-coup” was Fujimori’s coup d’état against his own 
government. In response to rising Sendero Luminoso violence, growing unrest, and 
legislative opposition to his neoliberal policies, Fujimori allied with the military and 
security forces and overthrew his own government, temporarily assuming 
dictatorial powers. During this period, a new constitution was written, granting 
more power to the presidency and allowing Fujimori to run for a second term in 
office. 
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scores in Table 1, which shows selected indicators from Morley, Machado, and 
Pettinato (1999).  
 
Table 1. Structural Reforms under Fujimori68 
Indexes of Structural Reform In Fujimori's Peru 
Year 
Trade 
Liberalization 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Capital 
Account 
Liberalization 
1988 0.541 0.248 0.311 
1989 0.552 0.282 0.311 
1990 0.563 0.264 0.631 
1991 0.745 0.943 0.85 
1992 0.929 0.929 0.9 
1993 0.935 0.932 0.9 
1994 0.941 0.93 0.9 
1995 0.941 0.929 0.912 
 
After Fujimori sought asylum in Japan and resigned the presidency, 
Alejandro Toledo (a business professor) won the special elections in 2001. Although 
Toledo’s campaign promised to increase employment and strengthen the social 
safety net, once in office, he continued to support Fujimori’s neoliberal policies 
(Skidmore & Smith 2005; Burt 2006; Cameron 2011). In 2002, over increasing 
protest, Toledo privatized two electric companies – which led to three days of 
violent protests and his reversal of the decision. “Capitulation to protest would 
become a hallmark of the [Toledo] government” (Skidmore and Smith 2005: 220). 
Toledo had promised to reform the neoliberal state that Fujimori had created to give 
it a “human face” but once in office, it became apparent that the apparatus of the 
                                                 
68 Source: Morley, Machado, and Pettinato (1999).  
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state had been so stripped of capacity that there was little he could do in the area of 
social policy without first rebuilding institutions (Adelman 2006). 
The creation of the neoliberal state in Peru had similarly negative effects on 
the poorest in society to those on the poorest in society in Argentina. In 1986, 
during García’s heterodox program, the percentage of Peruvians living on less than 
$2 per day and less than $1 per day were 11.4 percent and 27.1 percent respectively 
(ECLAC 2013). By 1999, the last full year that Fujimori was in office, the numbers 
had risen to 15.81 percent and 28.01 percent respectively. These increases were not 
as precipitous as those in Argentina, but the proponents of neoliberalism had 
promised that “pro-growth” policies were the only thing that would make the poor 
less poor. Peru’s average annual rate of GDP growth for the period 1991- 2000 
(Fujimori’s time in office) is 4.9 percent, yet this period was clearly one of unequal 
benefits from that growth, with the number of people in society facing extreme 
poverty actually increasing during this period.69 After Fujimori, social spending 
(which had only increased slightly during his presidency) increased, GDP growth 
increased overall but was susceptible to external shocks, and rates of extreme 
poverty gradually declined to pre-Fujimori levels.70  
 
 
                                                 
69 This average is calculated from World Bank data on annual percentage GDP 
growth (World Bank 2013). 
70 By 2010, the number of people living on $1 or less per day had decreased to 4.9 
percent and the number living on less than $2 per day had dropped to 12.7 percent 
(ECLAC 2013). 
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Was there a Neoliberal State in Ecuador? 
 
Ecuador is an interesting case because the presence of oil has had a 
significantly different effect on the country’s developmental trajectory. Ecuador 
joined OPEC in 1973. Between 1972 and 1982, public expenditures grew an average 
of 12 percent per year (Gerlach 2003: 35). During this same period, the average tax 
burden actually fell. The government heavily subsidized domestic oil and gasoline 
consumption. According to Gerlach, the standard natural gas tank that Ecuadorians 
used for everyday cooking sold for around $1 but cost $5 to produce (2003: 35). 
During the 1980s and 1990s, as oil prices fell, the government continually increased 
production to attempt to make up for the revenue loss. Ecuador left OPEC in 1992, 
after repeatedly exceeding its production quota. 
Gerlach (2003) classifies the period 1984-2000 as the movement toward free 
market policies in Ecuador. The following passage illustrates Gerlach’s view of this 
period. 
In seeking new loans or renegotiating old ones, every 
administration from 1981 forward enacted an austerity 
program of one type or another. The belt-tightening was 
frequently mandated by the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), the World Bank, the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the Andean Development 
Corporation, the Paris Club, or some other international 
lender, and their urging included selling off state 
enterprises judged too costly and inefficient, reducing 
government subsidies, and bringing outlays more in line 
with income through a combination of raising taxes and 
slashing expenditures (Gerlach 2003: 43). 
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Long and Igliori echo this view, arguing that though there were ebbs and flows in 
the process, until Correa’s administration came to power, no Ecuadorian president 
took significant action to alter the neoliberal model of development (2007). They 
say that political instability in Ecuador has been centered around “elite rivalries” 
and as such has not evinced systemic transformation. “Pro-business laissez-faire has 
been Ecuador’s economic trademark, regardless of whether neo-populist Abdalá 
Bucaram or technocratic Jamil Mahuad has been in power” (Long and Igliori 2007: 
215).71 
 
First Stage Reforms 
Austerity in Ecuador has often meant decreasing subsidies, which 
Ecuadorian administrations had long used to increase consumption. Beginning with 
the election of the rightist president León Febres Cordero in 1984, Ecuadorian 
regimes would continue to implement austerity (mainly in the form of decreasing 
subsidies and increasing fees for government services)—though they would do so in 
fits and starts. Febres Cordero was committed to shrinking the state and reversing 
the ISI policies that were in place in the country. In order to decrease state spending, 
Febres Cordero cut government subsidies on gasoline and transportation, raising 
gasoline prices 80 percent and transportation fees 40 percent (2003: 44). 
                                                 
71 For the terms of office of Ecuador’s presidents during this period, refer to the 
Appendix. 
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The leftist Rodrigo Borja was elected to succeed Cordero. Alhough he argued 
against his predecessors’ policies, “he continued, albeit more gradually, the policies 
of raising rates for basic services, lowering subsidies, and devaluing the currency” 
(Gerlach 2003: 45). Following Borja, Durán Ballén’s administration attempted to 
implement a much more radical series of neoliberal reforms, including austerity 
measures such as raising telephone and electricity rates 50 percent and fuel prices 
115 percent (Gerlach 2003: 45). 
Ballén’s successor, Abdala Bucaram ran a populist-style campaign. He 
demonized the rich and political elites, promised to increase subsidies, and 
promised to increase social services while campaigning. Despite this, after he was 
elected, he abandoned all of these promises and “pursued a conservative program 
based on balancing the budget, fixing the exchange rate to the U.S. dollar, and 
attracting foreign investment” (Gerlach 2003: 85).  
Bucaram announced an austerity package in December 1996, designed 
mainly by former Argentine economy minister Domingo Cavallo. The plan slashed 
subsidies: cooking gas rose from 2,900 to 10,000 sucres, water and electricity rates 
rose 115 percent, public transit prices rose 25 percent, and gasoline prices rose 20 
percent (Gerlach 2003). The increases in cost of living from the subsidy cuts led to 
“near-constant street protests, which began in earnest on January 8, 1997, and 
continued to build momentum for the rest of the year” until Bucaram was finally 
removed from power (Gerlach 2003: 86). 
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During Alarcón’s transitional government, some of Bucaram’s austerity 
measures were reversed. Alarcón began deficit spending on emergency social 
services and increased subsidies on essential food items, but these were to be 
temporary reversals of austerity as both of the main candidates in the next election 
promised to increase taxes and decrease government spending. Of the two 
candidates, Jamil Mahuad and Álvaro Noboa, Mahuad campaigned on the more 
conservative plan and was elected president. Noboa became his vice-president. 
Mahuad announced his first policy package on September 14, 1998: raising fuel and 
electricity prices 410% and increasing public transportation fees 40% (Gerlach 
2003: 124). “He eliminated state subsidies for electrical consumption and state 
subsidies for natural gas consumption” (Long and Igliori 2007: 214). In March of 
1999, Mahuad again raised gasoline prices—this time, 174 percent. 
In his time in office, Noboa continued decreasing subsidies—doubling bus 
fares, raising the price of gasoline 66 percent, and raising electricity rates (100 
percent for businesses, 60 percent for residential, and 20 percent for the poor) 
during 2000 (Gerlach 2003: 222). However, Noboa also increased pay for 
government employees from an average monthly salary of $53 to $120 (which was 
slightly above the poverty level) (Gerlach 2003: 214). He also increased social 
security payments by 40 percent. 
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Second Stage Reforms 
Privatization 
In 1992, Durán Ballén sought to privatize nearly all state-owned enterprises 
but was largely unsuccessful in the end (Gerlach 2003). He started out with the 
ambitious goal of privatizing 80 percent of state owned companies in Ecuador but 
due to political opposition and a lack of interested foreign investors, he was only 
able to privatize a handful of enterprises. “Ballén inaugurated the Macroeconomic 
Stabilization Plan and privatized the influential national cement companies Cemento 
Nacional and Cemento Selva Alegre. He also privatized the state sugar company 
AZTRA, the agricultural supplies, services and fertilizers company FERTISA and the 
[bankrupt] state-run airline Ecuatoriana de Aviación” (Long and Igliori 2007: 213). 
He also managed to sell-off some hotels and restaurants (Gerlach 2003: 88). Ballén 
reformed the oil sector through the Oil Law of 1993 to encourage partnerships with 
international oil consortiums (Long and Igliori 2007: 213). Finally, he transferred 
49% of the shares of the state-run telecommunications company EMETEL and the 
state-run electricity company INECEL (Long and Igliori 2007: 213). 
In 1996, Bucaram sought to finish the privatization reforms that Ballén had 
started. When he came to the presidency, the country still had around 200 state-
owned firms and shares of ownership in others. His only attempt at a major 
privatization was the state-owned telecommunications company EMETEL, which he 
was unable to push through before being ousted in a coup. 
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Trade Liberalization 
In 1990, Borja passed the Ley de Reforma Arancelaria, which “significantly 
reduced import duties” (Long and Igliori 2007: 213). The average tariff rate 
decreased from 39.9 percent in 1989 to 9.3 percent in 1993 (Lora 2001). Borja also 
passed the Maquila Law, which formally established free trade zones and pushed for 
the flexibilization of labor by cutting some regulations (Long and Igliori 2007: 213). 
Finally, in 1995, Ecuador formally joined the WTO. These reforms would remain 
relatively unchanged until Palacio appointed Rafael Correa to the economy minister 
post in 2005. 
 
Financial Liberalization 
Ballén passed the 1994 Law of Financial Institutions, which severely 
weakened regulatory oversight of the banking sector, allowing the industry to 
essentially regulate itself (Gerlach 2003). This followed a full-scale liberalization of 
the domestic banking sector in 1992.72 This liberalization led to a full-blown 
banking crisis by the turn of the century. In late 1998, Mahuad was forced to deal 
with the massive banking crisis, as it became apparent that the industry was 
(especially the largest three banks: Filanbanco, Banco de Préstamos, and Banco de 
Progreso) on the verge of collapse. He responded with unpopular bailouts and his 
administration was criticized for allowing bank officials suspected of corruption to 
                                                 
72 In Morley et al (1997), Ecuador’s score on the domestic financial liberalization 
component rises from 0.291 in 1991 to 0.955 in 1992. 
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flee the country before they could be charged. Following the World Bank’s advice, 
Mahuad created the Deposit Guarantee Agency (AGD) in order to try to shore-up 
depositors’ confidence in late 1998. 
When the AGD seemed to be unable to do so, “In March 1999 he ordered a 
week-long bank holiday, then partially froze deposits to limit the amount the 
nation’s more than 4 million savers could withdraw from their accounts” (Gerlach 
2003: 132). Mahuad’s reputation was crippled by the fact that he was using millions 
of dollars of state funds to bail out private banks, while he was known to have close 
ties to many of the prominent bankers who caused the crisis and then fled the 
country to avoid prosecution (Gerlach 2003: 133). As people watched their frozen 
savings evaporated by inflation, massive protests emerged. 
 
Social Policy 
Prior to the neoliberal era, the main social policies used to address poverty in 
Ecuador were subsidies to consumers. The main changes to these policies came in 
waves of austerity measures that were implemented at several stages as the country 
dealt with economic crises. The few social programs that were in place in the 
country (nutritional aid to pregnant and nursing mothers for example) were small 
and targeted at specific low-income groups. Thus, the main reforms of the neoliberal 
era came in the form of budget cuts. “The decline in social expenditures has hit 
education and health spending the hardest. During the 1990s, the composition of 
social spending shifted towards targeted social protection programs (including the 
 introduction of the cash transfer program 
for universal social services in education and health” (Vos and Ponce 2004: 45). In 
education, these cuts (beginning in 1997) 
can be seen in Figure 6, after 
pre-Mahuad period, however almost all of this increase was captured by increased 
teachers’ salaries (Vos and Ponce 2004).
 
Figure 6. Changes in Education Spending in the Ecuadorian Neoliberal State.
 
During the 1999-2001 economic crisis, the Ecuadorian government created 
the Bono de Desarrollo Humano
transfers to poor families whose children stayed in school through the age of 15 and 
to mothers whose children received routine health check
                                                
73 Source: ECLAC (2013). 
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programs targeting school-age children from poor families were rolled into this new 
program. 
Social security was the only other major social program and the attempt to 
reform it was largely ineffective. In 2001, the Ecuadorian congress passed a pension 
reform law that would have created a partially privatized system but the reform was 
challenged in court and parts of it found unconstitutional (Rofman 2003). 
 
Tax Reforms 
Ecuador’s tax reforms predominantly consisted of decreasing rates on 
personal income taxes and business taxes. As noted above, compared to other 
countries in the region, Ecuadorian governments had traditionally maintained low 
tax rates. Borja’s government carried out a decrease in taxes on individuals and 
businesses in 1990. Both the highest personal tax rate and the tax on company 
profits had been 40 percent and both were lowered to 25 percent (Lora 2001: 40-
41). In addition, unlike most other governments in the region, Ecuador’s VAT 
remained at 10 percent until 1999, when Mahuad raised it 2 percentage points.  
 
Labor Deregulation 
Throughout the period of this study, Ecuador only carried out one modest 
reform to its labor code. An amendment was passed in 1995, making it slightly 
easier to hire temporary employees. However, Lora (2001) points out that between 
  151 
1985 and 1999, the average severance cost of laying-off a worker remained 
equivalent to 4.03 months pay. This area of the neoliberal state was not completed 
in Ecuador. 
 
Third Stage Reforms: Institutionalizing… The Left? 
From democratization in 1979 up to the present, Ecuadorian society has 
been plagued by low levels of institutionalization. Two successive constitutions, 
passed in 1998 and 2007, have largely failed to create stable institutional linkages 
between the polity, the economy, and society. In addition to these institutional 
weaknesses, indigenous groups have been only partially incorporated into the 
sociopolitical system. The Ecuadorian legislature has been plagued by low approval 
ratings and fractured by political parties that “saw no place for their adversaries in 
the political system” (Gutiérrez Sanín 2006: 272). 
Presidents have not escaped scorn; throughout the democratic period (1979-
present) Ecuadorian presidents have also faced enormous and contradictory 
pressures. During this period, oil revenues continued to fall putting fiscal pressure 
on the government. Conversely, the Ecuadorian population had long been 
accustomed to low taxes and generous subsidies on everything from fuel and 
electricity to cooking oil, food and public transportation. These contradictory 
pressures made it common for politicians to denounce austerity as candidates but 
then attempt to implement austerity once in office. Whenever neoliberal reforms 
were implemented, they sparked large-scale protests and opposition. For all of the 
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above reasons, the neoliberal state in Ecuador was never fully institutionalized into 
society prior to the post-Washington Consensus era.  
 
Conclusion: The Latin American Neoliberal State 
 
As this chapter has shown, by 2000, both Argentina and Peru had fully 
transitioned to neoliberal states. Though Ecuador had taken some definite steps in 
this direction, its lack of progress in the areas of tax reforms and labor deregulation, 
and its modest progress in the areas of privatization and government austerity 
preclude it from being a neoliberal state.  
As I mentioned in the second chapter, for Robinson (2004, 2008), the 
neoliberalization of the state is part of a wider system of transformations taking 
place in the global capitalist system. In this transformation, the nation-state system 
is in the process of being eclipsed by the not-yet-complete emergence of the 
transnational state. As part of this process, according to Robinson, the transnational 
state is not replacing nation-states, rather it is displacing them as the organizing 
logic of the global system. He says that the apparatus of the transnational state “is an 
emerging network that comprises transformed and externally-integrated national 
states together with the supranational economic and political forums” (2001: 166, 
italics in original). This apparatus does not yet have a centralized institutional form. 
What there is, according to Robinson, is a loose network of institutions that have 
penetrated and transformed nation-state apparatuses in such a way that the policies 
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formed in these supranational  institutions is actually enforced by nation-state 
apparatuses of power. 
This fits well with the theory of the competition state that Cerny, Menz, and 
Soederberg propose in their edited volume Internalizing Globalization (2005).74 
According to their argument, states that have adopted neoliberal policies are no 
longer able to reintroduce nation-state level control over their economies because 
they are now too deeply intertwined with the global economy to do so without 
facing capital flight and other forms of market sanctions.  
The leftist electoral shift in Latin America suggests that the trajectories 
Robinson and Cerny et al theorize are not necessarily a given and that the nation-
state remains an important terrain of struggle—of contesting neoliberalism. So, in 
what ways does the neoliberal state strategically favor some actions/reforms/actors 
and penalize others? In the above cases, the literature clearly shows that the groups 
most advantaged by the process of neoliberalization are elites tied to transnational 
capital and citizens who are tied into the exporting of goods, services and resources. 
Movements of the left and parties like the PJ in Argentina were initially hurt by 
neoliberalization as their traditional base (organized labor) was weakened by the 
reforms that gave rise to the neoliberal state. 
However, those leftist parties that were able to create linkages with 
neoliberalism’s losers—the urban poor, the unemployed/under-employed, 
indigenous groups and movements, peasants (especially important in Peru) and 
                                                 
74 Also briefly mentioned in Chapter II. 
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landless movements, and environmental movements—were later able to make a 
resurgence (as will be seen in the next chapter in all three of these cases). 
Throughout Latin America, when currency devaluations and decreases in subsidies 
increased food costs, when privatizations led to increases in utility fees and 
increases in unemployment, and when financial deregulation increased interest 
rates, people responded with protest. In some cases (like Argentina and Ecuador) 
protests by unions, the urban poor, or the unemployed were joined by middle-class 
groups. In such instances these protests brought down democratically elected 
goevernments. As the 1990s progressed, popular dissatisfaction with many aspects 
of neoliberalism reached such proportions that it was given a name: “reform 
fatigue” (Lora and Panizza 2002; Checchi, Carrera, and Florio 2006). It was after 
periods of sustained popular mobilization against neoliberal reformers in Argentina 
and Ecuador that leftist presidents were elected. The question for the next chapter 
will be: “How durable are the aspects of the neoliberal state, and what changes can 
be made to it by leftist politicians in the short term?” 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE LATIN AMERICAN “PINK TIDE:” HOW LEFT IS THE NEW LEFT? 
 
Introduction: Extent of the Leftist Shift in Latin America  
 
The shift to the left in Latin America began in the early 2000s, but gathered 
tremendous steam by the middle of the decade. The beginning of this shift came 
with the election of Hugo Chávez in Venezuela in 1998, though he did not move 
radically to the left until after the United States-supported coup attempt against him 
in 2002. Surprisingly, Chile was the next country to elect a leftist president with 
Lagos of the Chilean socialist party assuming the presidency in 2000. In 2002, Brazil 
elected “Lula” da Silva. In 2003, after a complete economic catastrophe, Argentines 
elected the leftist Kirchner to the presidency. In 2005, Morales was elected 
president in Bolivia and Vázquez was elected in Uruguay. The real surge came in 
2006 when da Silva and Chávez were reelected in Brazil and Venezuela respectively, 
Bachelet was elected as successor to Lagos in Chile, Correa was elected in Ecuador, 
Ortega in Nicaragua, and leftist candidates Obrador in Mexico and Humala in Peru 
narrowly lost presidential races. In 2007, Fernández de Kirchner was elected as the 
successor to her husband in Argentina, Lugo was elected in Paraguay, and Colom 
defeated a more conservative candidate in Guatemala. Finally, in 2008, Morales was 
reelected president in Bolivia. By 2008, 11 of 18 major Latin American countries had 
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left-of-center presidents and this accounted for 65 percent of the region’s 350 
million people (Stokes 2009: 1). 
These various leftist governments are usually divided up based on how 
analysts perceive the depth of their attempted changes to the neoliberal state. As I 
show later in this chapter, Correa’s policies push Ecuador much farther from the 
neoliberal model than the Kirchners’ policies do for Argentina. In Argentina’s case, I 
argue that the left turn does not represent a turn away from neoliberalism 
altogether. Rather it represents a turn in focus within the neoliberal state to a higher 
level of social protections from the worse vicissitudes of the neoliberal state. I call 
this turn the fourth stage of neoliberalism. It is a stage that legitimizes the neoliberal 
state’s focus on the competition for attracting foreign capital and remaining open to 
the global capitalist system.  
 
Attempts to Explain the New Left in Latin America 
Is the Left a Possible Alternative to Neoliberal Globalization? 
In attempting to answer the question of whether or not the left turn in Latin 
America constitutes a post-neoliberal state, we must first determine just what the 
left turn is. Even if left-leaning presidents are elected to office, can they alter the 
shape of the neoliberal state? The institutions and functions of the nation-state 
changed a great deal in Latin America during the neoliberal period. Some social 
scientists argue that these changes are deep and possibly irreversible. William 
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Robinson’s (2006) argument about the transformation of the nation-state during the 
neoliberal era is succinctly summed up in his essay “Promoting Polyarchy in Latin 
America.” In it, he builds on his theory of global capitalism to describe the way that 
democratization and neoliberalization were carried out simultaneously in Latin 
America to create a particular kind of state and set of institutions.  
Referring to the type of democratization that occurred in the 1980s and 
1990s in Latin America as “polyarchy,” Robinson describes a purposeful 
restructuring of the state by internationally oriented elites to insulate social control 
and economic policies from popular pressure (hiding behind market mechanisms 
and market logic). He says that these changes are meant to be functional and 
resilient ways of reinforcing neoliberalization. They are difficult or impossible to 
change from within institutional channels. Constitutional revisions, protest, or 
popular rebellion are required to substantially change anything. However, Robinson 
also says that polyarchic states are undermined by inherent contradictions (such as 
their inability to deal with growing populations of dissatisfied poor people) that 
make them inevitable failures. They must continually resort to more and more overt 
repression to maintain social control and this makes their exploitative nature more 
obvious.  
Cerny, Menz, and Soederberg (2005) see neoliberal globalization as a 
political process of convergence on what they term the “competition state.” For 
them, neoliberalism as a developmental discourse is not confined to the 1980s and 
1990s. By defining neoliberalism as “the assertion that the market is the core 
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institution of modern – capitalist – societies and that both domestic and 
international politics and policy-making are (and should be) primarily concerned 
with making markets work well,” these authors change the focus on neoliberalism 
from a set of policy prescriptions to a way of seeing the world (2005: 12, italics in 
original). This allows them to logically argue that neoliberalism is still consolidating 
its place as a hegemonic discourse of development while changing and evolving 
“from raw market orthodoxy in the 1980s” to social or embedded neoliberalism in 
the Twenty-First Century (2005: 3).75 For Cerny et al, “Although there may be room 
for maneuver, there is nevertheless no going back to insulated, autonomous, 
abstractly sovereign nation-states able to craft their own national models according 
to wholly domestic conceptions” (2005: 3). They go on to say that the nation-state is 
not retreating but rather “its mode of authority is changing” (2005: 4). For them, the 
nation-state is organizing itself around the process of global capital flows and is thus 
becoming an apparatus of competition for attracting capital. These processes are 
durable and ongoing and the authors do not hold out much hope that states like 
those in Latin America that experienced neoliberalization in the 1980s and 1990s 
can reorient away from market logics. 
                                                 
75 See also Goldman 2005 for a similar discussion of the way that the World Bank 
has changed its environmental policy to incorporate criticisms within what 
Goldman calls a “green neoliberalism.” In addition to this, Vilas (2006) states that 
“during the last decade the question of social inequality has been incorporated into 
the agendas of the most relevant actors of financial globalization and neoliberal 
capitalist restructuring, such as the IMF, the IDB, and the World Bank” (2006: 233). 
He argues that this is a response to the need to strengthen institutional stability in 
the face of unrest due to the unpopularity of these institutions’ neoliberal 
conditionalities in the past. It is also an indicator of a possible ideological shift 
underway that the new Latin American left may also be a part of. 
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The Left as Neostructuralism 
Leiva (2008) takes an entirely different course but arrives at nearly the same 
destination as Cerny et al in his study of “Latin America’s post-neoliberal turn.” 
Focusing on the neostructuralist writings of the United Nations’ (UN) Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), Leiva argues that they do 
not provide a real alternative to the institutional restructurings and increased 
inequalities that neoliberalism created. He argues that neostructuralism is gaining 
ideological ground in Latin America (in countries like Argentina, Brazil, and Chile) as 
its window of opportunity has opened as a result of the failure of the 1960s 
revolutionary Left and the 1980s free-market Right. For Leiva, neostructuralism is 
touted as four simultaneous and complementary things: 1) an alternative to 
neoliberalism, 2) a comprehensive development strategy, 3) an integrated policy 
framework, and 4) a grand narrative about the possible. 
Leiva is critical of neostructuralism’s ability to provide a real alternative to 
neoliberal globalization because at its root it is “a sanitized analysis of Latin 
American political economy and society scoured clean of conflict and power 
relations” (2008: xxvi). Neostructuralism, as put forth by ECLAC, ignores class, 
gender, and labor control, as well as the power of transnational and financial capital. 
According to Leiva, neostructuralist writers privilege economic growth, business 
climate, and the interests of transnational capital first. After that has been 
privileged, social policies that emphasize social cohesion and do not threaten or 
impede market forces are needed to promote this good, stable business climate. In 
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addition, ECLAC (in its current incarnation) explains persistent inequality as 
“structural heterogeneity” that is not the result of transnationalization but 
“segmented transnationalization” – which is basically a way of saying “not enough 
capitalist globalization” (2008: 222, italics in original). For Leiva, Venezuela and 
Bolivia represent neodevelopmentalist states that are 
A genuine attempt at reshaping existing power 
structures through a gradual reform process that 
promotes a mixed economy and strengthened state role 
that channels economic surplus and steers the 
development process to serve the less powerful. It is a 
self-aware and explicit goal of transforming the status 
quo by redirecting society’s economic surplus that most 
clearly differentiates these two experiences from Latin 
America’s neostructuralism (2008: 225). 
 
This view of the bulk of the Pink Tide countries fits well with Robinson’s and Cerny 
et al’s arguments that neoliberalism is unlikely to be reversed from within the 
institutional channels that were designed by certain elites working through their 
governments, which carried out the reforms in order to insulate these groups and 
their economic institutions from popular pressures. From this perspective, any 
attempt to change the developmental practices of nation-states in Latin America 
must have significant non-institutional bases pressuring the state from below and 
outside in order to effect real social change. This is why Leiva writes 
neostructuralism off as merely the institutionalization of neoliberal globalization 
and the reorientation of the nation-state to the service of international capital flows. 
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The Left as Neo-Developmentalism 
In making their case that Kirchner’s Argentina represented a break with 
neoliberal policies, Grugel and Riggirozzi (2007) directly challenge the views 
presented by Robinson, Cerny et al, and Leiva. Grugel and Riggirozzi classify 
Kirchner’s policies as neodesarrollismo (neodevelopmentalism). They point out that 
he was crucially different than early- to mid-Twentieth Century developmentalist 
states in that Kirchner’s government’s actions in relation to markets are selective, 
often temporary, and specifically targeted at limited goals like inflation, 
unemployment, and tax reforms. They say that this often appears ad hoc to analysts 
but that there is a logic to such interventions. It is a “new role for the state,” 
designed to re-create an independent decision-making role for national 
governments in a global capitalist system (2007: 100). This new role for the state 
includes a renewed emphasis on production for the domestic market (including a 
reindustrialization drive) as well as the targeted development of some more 
competitive sectors of production for export, similar to the path followed by the 
East Asian NICs. 
 
A Tale of Two Lefts 
  
The majority of studies that examine the new left turns in Latin America 
divide them into two or three broad categories. The most common is to refer to 
them as a reformist and a more radical left. These broad distinctions usually lump 
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Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador into the more radical or revolutionary left, while 
placing Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, (and sometimes Argentina and others) into the more 
reformist left. For Castañeda (2006), this distinction is a “bad” or “wrong” 
revolutionary left and a “good” or “right” reformist left—though the deeper the 
desired reforms, the more wrong the left is for Castañeda.  
In his exploration of the left turns, Cameron (2009) excoriates Castañeda for 
his dichotomous classification of the lefts, saying they “make blunt instruments for 
analysis” (2009: 333). He points out that Castañeda makes the mistake of claiming 
that populism is a leftwing phenomenon and ignores indigenous movements and 
their importance in countries like Peru and Ecuador. According to Cameron, 
Castañeda’s analysis has been more influential than its merits warrant: “even when 
analysts disagree with Castañeda, they often wind up appearing to accept or refine 
his classification of cases” (2009: 335). A good example of this at work is the edited 
volume by Weyland, Madrid, and Hunter (2010). In his chapter in that volume, after 
acknowledging the controversy and problems of dichotomizing the left as Castañeda 
does, Weyland adopts Castañeda’s very classification, referring to it as a “moderate 
left” and a “contestatory left,” arguing that “Simple classification schemes emphasize 
a basic difference in the political orientation and strategy of Latin America’s 
contemporary lefts” (Weyland 2010: 3). 
Even in studies that use this simple, dichotomous classification of the Latin 
American Left, there is a recognition that a wide divergence in goals, methods, and 
outcomes exists that is the result of specific, historical terrains of struggle.  All 
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analyses tend to agree that although each country in the region has similarities in 
historical experiences, they all have different, unique internal social struggles that 
form different political possibilities, limiting the types of reforms that are possible at 
any given time. 
 
Left Turns as Post-Neoliberal State 
A very common theme in studies of the new left in Latin America is that it 
was somehow a reaction to neoliberalism. This theme follows three interrelated 
theses: first, the left turns are often seen as a reaction to the failures of the 
neoliberal state or to its inability to prevent a backlash reminiscent of Polanyi’s 
double-movement. Second, closely related to that is the thesis that the left turn is an 
attempt to deal with the second crisis of incorporation. Finally, some writers have 
put forward the idea that the left turns (especially the more radical ones) are an 
attempt to move beyond the liberal democracy/market economy model that the 
region has followed since the third wave of democracy. It is important to examine 
this three-part theme more deeply because it strikes at the very heart of the 
questions guiding this project. 
Beasley-Murray, Cameron, and Hershberg (2009) introduce an argument 
that flatly counters the dire predictions by Robinson and Cerny et al. They agree that 
in the policy sphere, “Neoliberal restructuring and changes in the global order 
restrict the range of conceivable options” but argue that this is exactly why social 
movements have risen up to change the existing order (2009: 321). They argue that 
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neoliberalism stripped protectionist policies and re-inserted Latin American states 
into the world economy when commodity prices were relatively high but those 
prices subsequently fell. At the same time, under neoliberalism, “Most Latin 
American states have lost whatever capacity they once had to provide security for 
the population” (2009: 322). This violation of people’s conception of the moral 
economy then led to social protest and the rise of the new left as a competing 
political option across the region (Shefner and Stewart 2011). Sandbrook (2012) 
makes this case in his “neo-Polanyian” analysis of the “post-Washington consensus” 
global South and its attempts to address neoliberalism’s failures.  
Several analysts of the left turn indicate that this new Latin American left is 
attempting to fundamentally move beyond the neoliberal framework to a “post-
liberal” society (Arditi 2008, 2010; Beasley-Murray, Cameron, and Hershberg 2009; 
Cameron 2009; Moreno-Brid and Paunovic 2010; Weyland 2010). For Arditi and 
Beasley-Murray et al, the transformation is away from “constituted power” – the 
power bestowed by a formal, liberal constitutional framework – to “constituent 
power” – the power of the demos in a more participatory system. Similarly, Walsh 
(2011) discusses several states – particularly Ecuador – which call themselves 
“plurinational” democracies. She argues that they are reframing development in 
terms of buen vivir as opposed to prioritizing economic growth.76 
                                                 
76 The term buen vivir, refers to living well, a focus on quality of life that is not solely 
tied to economic well-being. In Ecuador the term is used to refer to living a life that 
is fulfilling because it is focused on healthy community, family, and environment. 
Material wealth is only important to buen vivir to the extent that it frees individuals 
from want and insecurity (Walsh 2011). 
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For Moreno-Brid and Paunovic, post-liberalism becomes a possibility as 
governments move towards a more populist macro-economic set of policies, which 
they say are “a set of policies that… are geared to improve social or economic 
conditions of a majority or to boost the economy’s rate of expansion” but without 
increasing inequality (2010: 197). These types of policies are what Weyland (2010) 
refers to as “contestatory” left policies that are often based on shaky economic 
foundations and set on unsustainable trajectories in the long run. However, 
according to Moreno-Brid and Paunovic (2010), the greatly increased terms of trade 
that many of these countries now have (as a result of the traumatic social 
dislocations and currency devaluations that the neoliberal era brought about), as 
well as the commodity boom of the mid-2000s, have made such policy shifts 
possible. These concurrent events have opened up policy-making space that would 
not have been available to leftist governments a decade ago. 
According to Nilsson (2009) and Petras and Veltmeyer (2009), only 
Venezuela has taken advantage of these macro-economic changes to attempt a real 
structural change in society. French (2009) disputes the implications of this 
argument insofar as it makes other leftist governments (like that of Lula in Brazil) 
seem to be mere rhetorical posturing rather than a shift in ideology away from 
neoliberalism. According to French, the different rhetorical styles of presidents like 
Lula and Chávez – as well as their different policy implementations and proposals 
owe more to the inherited differences their governments face in their respective 
historically specific societal terrains. French argues that Lula and Chávez are 
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ideologically similar, but that different states simply require different paths to the 
same ultimate goals. 
The most persuasive assertion that a more than rhetorical move away from 
neoliberalism is occurring is in Arditi’s (2008, 2010) argument that the center of 
gravity in the political discourse has shifted in Latin America, opening up space for 
alternative visions of society to be imagined and seriously proposed. He argues that 
the electoral victories by the left are important but that the really important marker 
is the way that even in states where the left has not experienced national electoral 
victories, it has made serious challenges to the non-leftist parties (for example in 
Mexico and Peru). Even more important claims Arditi, is the fact the left now seems 
to be driving the political discourse and the right is forced to respond rather than 
set the terms of the debate. 
He is joined in this assertion by Beasley-Murray et al (2009), Nilsson (2009), 
and Reygadas and Filgueira (2010) who all separately argue that the particular 
dislocations and increases in inequality brought about by neoliberalization have 
forced the right to cede the discourse of democratization to the left. Though the 
right was able to dominate this discourse throughout the 1980s and 1990s as many 
Latin American states transitioned from authoritarianism to shallow neoliberal 
democracy, the failure of neoliberal policies to continue to expand participation to 
many disadvantaged groups in society led to what Reygadas and Filgueira call “the 
second crisis of incorporation” in Latin America (2010: 173). The left emerged from 
electoral defeat and from the provinces of many countries to take up the rhetoric of 
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democratization against the failures of the neoliberal policies that the right had 
championed (and which had demonstrably failed to incorporate many different 
disadvantaged groups). 
 
Defining the Left Turns in Latin America 
So, what is the new left in Latin America? This study follows the more 
inclusive definition of the left provided by Levitsky and Roberts (2011), who state 
that:  
The Left refers to political actors who seek, as a central 
programmatic objective, to reduce social and economic 
inequalities. Left parties seek to use public authority to 
redistribute wealth and/or income to lower-income 
groups, erode social hierarchies, and strengthen the 
voice of disadvantaged groups in the political process. 
In the socioeconomic arena, Left policies aim to combat 
inequalities rooted in market competition and 
concentrated property ownership, enhance 
opportunities for the poor, and provide social 
protection against market insecurities. Although the 
contemporary Left does not necessarily oppose private 
property or market competition, it rejects the idea that 
unregulated market forces can be relied on to meet 
social needs… In the political realm, the Left seeks to 
enhance the incorporation of underprivileged groups 
and erode hierarchical forms of domination that 
marginalize popular sectors (2011: 5). 
 
If this left is to accomplish the goals and aspirations that Levitsky and Roberts 
attribute to it, then the assertions of Cerny et al, Robinson, and Leiva will have to 
prove to be mostly or completely wrong. 
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The Latin American Neoliberal State During the 2000s: Is the Left 
an Alternative, or a Fourth Stage? 
 
Peru: Continuation of the Neoliberal State 
As discussed in the previous chapter, after Fujimori’s resignation in 2001, 
Alejandro Toledo was elected as his replacement. Although Toledo’s campaign 
promised to increase employment and strengthen the social safety net, once in 
office, he continued Fujimori’s neoliberal policies instead (Skidmore and Smith 
2005; Burt 2006; Cameron 2011). Toledo was less successful than Fujimori in 
furthering neoliberalization, though, as evidenced in his inability to prevail in 
privatizing two electric utilities over opposition and protests. Burt (2006) 
recognizes the established neoliberal state in Peru (though not in that specific term) 
when she says, “The radical restructuring and privatization of the state and state-
society relations were seen by new liberals as key to both reviving the process of 
capital accumulation and depoliticizing social struggles by removing the state as the 
main actor directing economic and social development” (2006: 248).  
The 2006 presidential elections were a major test for the neoliberal state in 
Peru with the two front-runner candidates being the leftist Ollanta Humala squaring 
off against the architect of Peru’s failed attempt at heterodox reforms from the 
1980s, Alan García Pérez of the APRA party. Humala was a leftist candidate with ties 
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to Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez.77 Though Humala won the higher percentage 
of votes in the first round, he did not win an outright majority, which forced a runoff. 
In this second round, García managed to pick up a much greater proportion of the 
urban poor in Lima than Humala. Due to the fact that APRA is a populist machine 
party, not an ideological party, García was able to run to the right of Humala and 
consistently promised to continue neoliberal policies in office. 
Garcia’s regime relied on support from rightwing parties and he placed 
neoliberal technocrats in key positions in his cabinet. According to Cameron (2011) 
“he pursued orthodox, growth-first, macroeconomic policies” (2011: 388). These 
included free-trade agreements with the United States and Canada. He also carried 
out a series of austerity reforms, including cutting the salaries of senior civil 
servants and parliamentarians. He ran fiscal surpluses, yet did not carry out social 
policies to deal with the high levels of poverty (especially in the highlands-which 
voted for Humala) that persisted throughout the neoliberal period. In fact, during 
years where the GDP was growing, both education and health care spending 
decreased and all other social spending lagged behind the average for the region. 
However, he did increase spending on social security. Also, during the years of GDP 
growth, poverty decreased, though this decrease was very regionally unequal. 
Although Cameron (2011) states that he could have done so, García did not repeal 
                                                 
77 It is interesting to note that after the period being studied here, though Humala 
was eventually elected in 2010, and though he again campaigned on firm leftist 
promises, once in office, he pulled a Fujimori-like switch and appointed many of 
García’s neoliberal technocrats to positions in the cabinet and negotiated tax deals 
with the major mining consortiums that were even more favorable to them than 
they had been under García (Poole and Rénique 2012: 4).  
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generous tax benefits enjoyed by large mining companies. García granted “generous 
concessions” to Spanish telephone company Telefónica.  
The most telling evidence of the continuation of the neoliberal state in Peru 
during this period however, is that the Peruvian state was so anemic after years of 
neoliberalization, it couldn’t spend all of the windfall public funds coming in as a 
result of the resource boom in the mid-2000s. “After years of cutbacks and layoffs, 
Peru was unable to administer an economic bonanza to achieve redistributive goals” 
(Cameron 2011: 392). Also, in the midst of large-scale protests, some of which 
turned bloody, García’s government passed decrees that made it easier to sell 
collectively-owned land to mineral investors – without consultation with the 
communities that would be affected by the extraction. This friendliness to business 
is represented in the Heritage Foundation’s (2013) Index of Economic Freedom 
scores for Peru for the period 1995-2013. In Figure 7, the scores for the categories 
business, monetary, and trade freedom all increase so that by the end of García’s 
presidency, they are all higher than they had been during Fujimori’s terms in office. 
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Figure 7. Selected Index of Economic Freedom Score for Peru (1995-2013).78 
The neoliberal state has remained in place in Peru but the country has seen similar 
reductions in extreme poverty and in levels of inequality as Ecuador has. In addition, 
despite the continuation of the neoliberal state, social spending in all categories has 
maintained a steady increase during the period of this study.79 The rate of increased 
spending is not as steep as in Ecuador under Correa or Argentina under the 
Kirchners, but it increases none-the-less. 
                                                 
78 Source: Heritage Foundation (2013). In this index, created by a partnership 
between the Wall Street Journal and the Heritage Foundation, a score of 0 would 
indicate complete government control of the sector while a score of 100 would 
indicate complete freedom from government control/influence/regulation of the 
sector. 
79 The categories ECLAC (2013) divides social spending into are: Education, Health, 
Housing and Other, and Social Security. As percent of GDP and in per capita terms, 
Peru steadily increased spending in each of these areas throughout the 1990s and 
2000s. 
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As shown in Table 3 in the concluding section of this chapter,  Peruvian 
governments after Fujimori did not reverse any of the neoliberal reforms that had 
been carried out in the areas of government austerity, privatization, trade 
liberalization, financial liberalization, tax reforms, social policies, and labor market 
deregulation. 
 
Ecuador: “21st Century Socialism” 
As the previous chapter stated, Ecuador very frequently experienced 
presidential candidates who ran on anti-neoliberal platforms and then attempted to 
implement neoliberal reforms once in office (with varying degrees of success). Lucio 
Gutiérrez came to power this way in 2002. Having run a vaguely leftist campaign 
with major backing from the powerful CONAIE movement and the indigienous 
political party Patchakutik, both of whom were staunchly anti-neoliberal, once in 
office Gutiérrez allied with the rightist Partido Social Cristiano (PSC) and adopted 
neoliberal economic policies, angering his supporters and contributing to an 
internal implosion of CONAIE. Gutiérrez actively participated in splintering CONAIE 
by using cooptation and clientelist distributions to play member groups and 
communities against one another.  
By 2005, Gutiérrez’s neoliberal turn and rampant corruption and cronyism 
had created a mounting wave of unrest that led to his ouster. Gutiérrez’s vice 
president, Alfredo Palacio, came to power in 2005. Palacio had been openly critical 
of Gutiérrez’s swing to the right and conversion to neoliberal orthodoxy. Palacio 
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appointed Rafael Correa, “a relatively unknown radical economist” who was critical 
of the IMF and World Bank to the position of economy minister (Long and Igliori 
2007: 217). His appointment suggested a more heterodox approach. Correa quickly 
scuttled a free trade agreement with the United States and began planning an 
integrationist trade policy with Venezuela, designed to distance Ecuador’s import 
economy from the United States’ export market. “Correa lasted less than four 
months in the government before business, congressional and US pressures forced 
his exit from the Ministry of the Economy” (Long and Igliori 2007: 217). 
His ouster did nothing to lessen his popularity and in 2006, Correa ran for 
president on a platform that castigated what he called the partidocracia which, he 
said, had devastated Ecuadorian society through economic mismanagement and 
corruption. After winning the 2006 election, Correa moved quickly to suspend 
congress (which was dominated by the opposition) and convene a constituent 
assembly, in which his party: the Patria Altiva y Soberana (PAIS) held 80 of the 130 
seats, to draft a new constitution, which was passed by referendum in 2008. 
Correa’s government also quickly moved to renegotiate contracts with foreign oil 
companies. In these negotiations, his government raised “the state’s share of 
windfall oil profits from 50 percent to 99 percent” (Madrid, Hunter, and Weyland 
2010: 168).  
According to Conaghan (2011), “Building a vigorous, proactive central 
government—a state capable of sustaining a new model of economic 
development—became the defining policy objective of the Correa presidency” 
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(2011: 275). The new constitution was an essential part of this process. Although 
social movements and other groups had a large role in bringing Correa to office and 
in the drafting of the constitution, once in office Correa saw Ecuador’s various civil 
society groups as an obstacle to the goal of creating a new, more powerful state. He 
often refers to indigenous, environmental, and women’s rights groups as the 
“infantile left.” The new constitution gives the state administrative, regulatory, and 
management control over: all energy-related industries, from extraction to refining 
to delivery; telecommunications; resource management and extraction – renewable, 
mineral, and biogenic; transportation; and water (Madrid, et al 2010: 168; Conaghan 
2011: 280). 
Under the new constitution, Correa’s government was able to undertake 
significant changes to the shape and functioning of the state. Because the 
constitution forbade the government from borrowing at usurious rates, Correa was 
able to declare one third of Ecuador’s debt illegal and thus invalid, effectively 
defaulting on it. The constitution also reestablished a national planning agency. This 
agency announced a development plan for 2009-13 that declared “targeted import 
substitution industrialization, ecoturism, and ‘responsible’ mineral and oil 
extraction [would be] prioritized as the bases for future development” (Conaghan 
2011: 277). This model is highly dependent on the state, which in turn, is highly 
dependent on revenues from extractive industries (especially oil).80 
                                                 
80 There is a growing body of literature on this “neo-extractivism” in Latin America 
(Bebbington 2009; Gudynas 2010; Achtenberg 2012). During the neoliberal period, 
the state’s privatization of natural resource extraction to multinational corporations 
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In 2009, Ecuador began to face a worsening trade gap due to the global 
recession. Correa raised tariffs and some import quotas as a response. As I 
mentioned above, counter to the prescriptions of neoliberalism, as economy 
minister, he had refused a free trade deal with the United States, preferring to 
pursue regionally oriented trade agreements. Ecuador joined ALBA in 2009 and 
joined UNASUR in 2010. 
Correa was able to substantially change the way taxes worked in Ecuador. In 
2008, the government instituted a 0.5 percent tax on capital leaving the country and 
then raised this tax rate in steps until it reached 5 percent by 2011. The government 
also created a windfall profit tax on extraction of natural resources by companies 
that had been granted concessions by the government. Finally, the government 
implemented a tax on assets held outside the country by Ecuadorians and 
Ecuadorian companies. 
Because of increases in revenues from these new taxes and tariffs, Correa’s 
government was able to increase spending on social programs. Figure 8 shows this 
increase in spending compared to the period just prior to Correa’s presidency.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
and wealthy elites, who primarily exported the resources to the global market, was 
criticized as “extractivism.” Neo-extractivism is a strategy used by the new lefts in 
resource rich countries like Bolivia, Ecuador, and Venezuela to fund more generous 
social programs by renegotiating contracts with the companies doing the extracting 
to increase government revenues. They also frequently impose more regulation on 
the process of extraction. 
 Figure 8. Social Public Expenditure
 
This increase in social public expenditure was most pronounced in 
social security as seen in Figure 9, below
 
                                                
81 Source: ECLAC (2013). 
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 Figure 9. Per Capita Social Security Spending in Ecuador under Correa.
 
Correa introduced new programs that offered free heath services to pregnant 
women and children as well as other health care initiatives. The 
Humano monthly payment was increased from $35 to $50, paid for by an increased 
tax on bank profits (Weisbrot, Johnson, and Lefebvre 2013: 14). In response to the 
global economic crisis that began in 2008, Correa instituted a strong stimulus 
package (equal to 5 percent of GDP in 2009) and this quickly pulled Ecuador out of 
recession, resuming pre-rece
beginning of the recession (Weisbrot, et al 2013: 16). By the end of 2012, Ecuador 
had reached 4.1 percent unemployment, its lowest recorded level.
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Table 2. Social Spending in Ecuador.83 
 Social Public Expenditure as % of GDP 
Years Education Health 
Housing 
and Other 
Social 
Security Total 
1990 2.56 1.13 0.53 0.26 3.95 
1991 2.72 0.84 0.53 0.34 3.9 
1992 2.88 0.95 0.53 0.21 4.04 
1993 2.66 0.69 0.53 0.28 3.63 
1994 2.5 0.69 0.53 0.47 4.19 
1995 2.77 0.96 0.53 0.37 4.43 
1996 2.86 0.93 0.17 0.58 4.54 
1997 2.22 0.77 0.21 0.29 3.49 
1998 2.68 0.77 0.21 0.2 3.87 
1999 2.19 0.68 0.06 0.44 3.37 
2000 1.74 0.63 0.13 0.35 2.86 
2001 2.32 0.89 0.63 0.62 4.46 
2002 2.81 1.05 0.22 0.34 4.42 
2003 2.38 1.09 0.2 0.38 4.05 
2004 2.63 1.14 0.23 0.29 4.29 
2005 2.56 1.14 0.23 0.74 4.68 
2006 2.61 1.21 0.2 0.72 4.74 
2007 5.92 1.33 0.38 1.17 8.81 
2008 3.53 1.62 0.86 1.29 7.3 
2009 5.42 1.77 0.45 1.71 9.35 
2010 5.47 2.07 0.38 1.92 9.84 
 
By far, Ecuador’s biggest change under the Correa administration has been in 
the area of financial reforms. In 2007, Correa capped interest rates for domestic 
lending and passed regulations that capped or eliminated many fees and 
commissions charged by banks, in order to better protect consumers and make 
credit more widely available. Under the new constitution, far deeper changes were 
                                                 
83 Source: ECLAC (2013). The shaded section indicates the period when Correa was 
president and constitutes the left turn era. Although Correa assumed the presidency 
in 2006, the shaded area begins with 2007 to account for policy lag. 
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made to the financial system. The central bank was formally placed under the 
executive branch of government. The constitution also “prohibited ‘financial entities 
or groups, along with their legal representatives, board members and shareholders’ 
from owning any controlling shares in the media” (Weisbrot et al 2013: 13, quoting 
Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008: article 312).  
The constitution explicitly defined three areas of the financial sector: (1) 
public, (2) private, and (3) popular and solidarity-based (Constitution of the Republic 
of Ecuador 2008). Correa sought to greatly expand the third sector by creating the 
Programa de Finanzas Populares in 2008. Also in 2008, Correa’s government passed 
the “Law Creating a Financial Sector Safety Net” under the new constitution. It 
established a bailout fund for banking crises, financed by a tax on banks and other 
financial institutions, which were required to pay 3 percent of their deposits that 
were subject to reserve requirements. In 2012, this was increased to 5 percent with 
an annual increase until it reaches 10 percent  in 2017 (Weisbrot et al 2013: 7). 
In 2009, the government created a Domestic Liquidity Coefficient, which 
requires banks to hold 45 percent of their liquid assets domestically. In 2012, this 
amount was increased to 60 percent. Finally, the Anti-Monopoly Law of October 
2011 prevents institutions from engaging in multiple types of financial activities, 
effectively separating institutions into banking, financial services, and insurance 
provision—none of which may provide two or more of these services. 
Ecuador, having not completed the transformation into a neoliberal state 
during the 1980s and 1990s, has moved much further away from the image of a 
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neoliberal state than either Peru or Argentina. Part of the reason for this is that 
Ecuador has had oil reserves that mitigate some of the pressures on the government 
to enact austerity policies. However, Peru also has large quantities of extractive 
resources that might have provided that country the same opportunities… but 
didn’t. Another contributing factor has to be that, due to its oil wealth, Ecuador 
never thoroughly neoliberalized in the first place, which gave Correa a very different 
starting point than many other presidents of the new left in Latin America have had. 
Ecuador’s endemic political instability since democratization is also a contributing 
factor. This instability and the very low levels of satisfaction that most Ecuadorians 
expressed towards their democratic institutions were a major factor in Correa’s 
ability to draft a new constitution that concentrated much more power into the 
executive branch which was a necessary precondition to the types of reforms he has 
been able to carry out.  
Correa refers to the state that he is constructing as “21st Century Socialism,” a 
term shared by Venezuela’s Hugo Chávez and Bolivia’s Evo Morales for their 
respective development projects. The term is meant to signal a difference from the 
socialism of the twentieth century. For these leaders, the term refers to an “increase 
in state regulation and power, but in a democratic manner” that does not eliminate 
the market and does not seek to reverse globalization (Kennemore and Weeks 2011: 
267). Although the platform of 21st century socialism espouses grand ideals, many of 
which are enshrined in Ecuador’s 2008 constitution, in many ways the “Citizens’ 
Revolution” has fallen far short of reaching them. Correa’s government has taken 
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some steps toward the creation of a welfare state, but it is still engaging in reforms 
that are clearly in line with neoliberal ideals as well. 
In 2009, Correa’s government enacted a new law that sought to encourage 
more foreign investment in mining. The following year, CONAIE staged a series of 
protests around the country against the government’s decision to carry out water 
privatization (Kennemore and Weeks 2011: 276). In early 2010, Correa forced his 
foreign minister to resign after the minister had allowed donors to attach 
conservation conditions to their donations to a UNDP project. Correa called the 
minister’s actions “environmental infantilism” (Kennemore and Weeks 2011: 276). 
Such actions are in clear tension with a constitutional document that recognizes 
nature as having rights of its own, separate from its use value to human beings 
(Constitution of the Republic of Ecuador 2008: title II, chapter 2, section 7, article 71). 
To all appearances, Correa’s 21st century socialism has begun the move towards the 
creation of welfare state capitalism but this assessment is based solely on the 
performance of half a decade. As can be seen in Table 3 in the last section of this 
chapter, even though Ecuador never fully constructed a neoliberal state, Correa’s 
government has still manage to reverse neoliberalizations in all seven major policy 
areas of the neoliberal model. 
 
Argentina: The Neoliberal State in Its Fourth Stage 
 
The fourth stage of neoliberalism is characterized by the neoliberal state’s 
turn towards social protections that legitimize the prior sets of neoliberal reforms 
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such that “reform fatigue” and other manifestations of discontent with 
neoliberalization are prevented from threatening to alter the neoliberal state. The 
reforms of the fourth stage are similar to those of the third stage that focused on 
poverty and inequality. These reforms take on the criticisms of neoliberal poverty 
alleviation policies that sought to address poverty as an individual (as opposed to a 
structural) problem. As such, they acknowledge the structural nature of the issue 
but continue the same, targeted transfer programs that the proponents of neoliberal 
reforms championed—albeit in expanded form. This is the base area of fourth stage 
reforms. Different states will undoubtedly have differing sets of additional reforms 
(expanded coverage of health care or pensions, greater labor protections, expanded 
state spending, etc…). The specific details of this stage are also still evolving as it is 
currently manifesting itself. Complete enumeration of it is not possible without the 
benefit of hindsight, which we do not have yet. 
Following its 2001 economic collapse and De la Rua’s ouster, Argentina’s 
presidency passed through two interim presidents, neither of whom lasted longer 
than a week before Eduardo Duhalde of the PJ took over as interim president. This is 
a process that is often mentioned whereby Argentina had four presidents within a 
month. In January 2002, when Duhalde took over, he devalued the peso and ended 
the currency peg, allowing the peso to float. This resulted in further devaluation 
(Haslam 2010; Etchemendy and Garay 2011).  
In order to fund emergency social programs to deal with the crisis, Duhalde 
imposed a 20 percent tax on earnings from hydrocarbon exports. The biggest social 
  183 
program created by Duhalde was the Programa Jefas y Jefes de Hogares 
Desempleados (unemployed heads of households), which at its peak enrollment was 
providing emergency relief for 20 percent of Argentine households. It was a 
targeted, conditional cash transfer (CCT) program that provided about “US$40 per 
month to unemployed heads of household with children under the age of eighteen, 
contingent on vaccination of the children and participation by the adult in workfare 
training” (Huber and Stephens 2012: 188). The program suffered somewhat by 
political manipulation in the form of Peronist clientelism (Giraudy 2007; Huber and 
Stephens 2012). Duhalde also created a targeted food assistance program. 
When elections were held in 2003, Néstor Kirchner from the PJ won over 
Menem who also ran as a PJ candidate. Néstor was followed in 2007 by his wife 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Though usually defined as leftists, the two 
Kirchners’ policies defy easy left-right classification, however, they are clearly not 
radical leftists (Etchemendy and Garay 2011). Néstor Kirchner was very popular 
due partly to his anti-neoliberal discourse. On assuming the presidency, Néstor 
Kirchner continued servicing the IMF debt but refused to sign a new agreement that 
would have come with austerity conditionalities attached (Etchemendy and Garay 
2011: 287). He also rhetorically attacked the IMF, blaming it for Argentina’s crisis. 
He began negotiating with private bondholders over the debt that Duhalde 
defaulted on. According to Etchemendy and Garay (2011), 
The final outcome when the restructuring process was 
completed in 2005 would have been unthinkable in the 
heyday of financial globalization in the 1980s and 
1990s: the Argentine government obtained a reduction 
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of about 55% in the defaulted nominal debt capital, 
refused to service the interest rates unpaid throughout 
the default period, extended considerable the average 
maturity, and lowered the exchange rate risk, as about 
half of the new bonds were denominated in local 
currency (Etchemendy and Garay 2011: 289-290). 
 
Though their rhetoric was fiercely anti-neoliberal, the Kirchners did not seek 
to roll back the privatizations of the 1990s. Re-nationalization only occurred in a 
few instances, all characterized by severe conflicts and companies willing to divest. 
The 2002 devaluations had hurt the providers of privatized, contracted public 
utilities and they wanted to raise rates, renegotiate for better terms with the 
government, or both. Néstor Kirchner’s government carried out “hard bargaining” 
with these firms – even nationalizing four of them (Haslam 2010). In the 
negotiations, the government was primarily concerned with keeping the cost down 
for the consumers rather than with the companies’ profitability. In fact, the 
nationalizations seemed to be more a pragmatic response to a lack of interest by 
foreign investors willing to invest capital than an increase in interest by the state in 
reestablishing itself in the market. Overall, Haslam (2010) is correct that the 
regulatory changes in Argentina regarding finance and FDI amount to “tinkering on 
the margins of the neoliberal model” (2010: 228). 
In labor policy, the Kirchners have pulled together an alliance between their 
governments and the main Peronist labor confederation (CGT). Néstor Kirchner 
decreed nominal wage increases and raised the minimum wage. His government 
also fostered a new bargaining-conflict  dynamic between employers and unions, 
refusing to mediate between employers and the CGT (Etchemendy and Garay 2011). 
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In 2004, Néstor Kirchner rolled back regulations designed to increase labor market 
flexibility and strengthen the role of the national labor federations vis-à-vis local 
unions. Etchemendy and Collier (2007) call this “segmented neocorporatism” in 
which government, labor federations, and business groups negotiate labor policies, 
including minimum wages but these agreements only apply to the formal sector. It 
was possible to leave out workers in the informal sector because the Kirchners have 
been mostly successful in coopting the protest movements that had been so 
instrumental in bringing down de la Rua’s government in 2001. 
Faced with a legacy of high levels of protest and organized and 
confrontational groups of unemployed (e.g. the piqueteros movement), Néstor 
Kirchner responded by coopting the largest and least radical groups and ignored the 
smaller, more radical ones (Etchemendy and Garay 2011). “Through public 
inducements, which initially included participation in public works and government 
support for microenterprises and, later on, pension expansion and new income 
transfers… Néstor and then Cristina Kirchner negotiated a reduction in protest 
activitity and mobilized loyal groups both in support of government policies and 
against adversaries” (Etchemendy and Garay 2011: 287). 
The Kirchner’s trade restrictions and tax policies were tied up in their 
attempt to maintain growth with low to moderate inflation. They mainly did this 
through regulation or the threat of regulating price controls on wage-indexed goods 
and through subsidies to large companies to keep wages high. In 2004, when the 
economy began to recover strongly from the 2001 crisis, the inflation rate began to 
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rise. Néstor Kirchner issued threats of price regulations to Shell, Exxon, Repsol-YPF, 
and Petrobras if they would not “voluntarily” agree to keep gasoline prices from 
rising. There were also tensions between the companies and the Kirchner 
government over taxes on oil production. Néstor Kirchner’s government kept 
pressure on the oil companies to keep prices artificially low and thus, help to control 
inflation without formally legislating price controls. 
In 2006-2007, Néstor Kirchner raised export taxes – tied proportionately to 
increases in the global price on oil. Later the government banned the export of 
naphtha to keep domestic prices low (Richardson 2009). Another tactic the 
Kirchners used involved how price rises would be spread in society. Until 2008, 
utility providers were only allowed to raise rates on their large, industrial 
customers. The government subsidized electricity generation; public and private 
mass transit companies; rail companies; and producers of meat, dairy, and wheat 
flour, all in order to control inflation while continuing to stimulate growth and quiet 
potential dissent (Etchemendy and Garay 2011: 292). 
In March 2008, Cristina Kirchner’s government proposed adjustable export 
taxes on soybeans that, depending on world commodity prices, would rise from 35 
percent to as high as 97 percent (Etchemendy and Garay 2011: 291). This ignited 
what the press called the “farm war” as outraged farmers began the biggest business 
lockout in Argentina’s history. Farmers refused to sell crops and in some places even 
destroyed them. They imitated the piqueteros and began to block roads in rural 
areas. The protests soon spread to the city as middle and upper-middle class 
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urbanites joined in the protests. At this point, the CGT’s unions counter-protested in 
favor of the government. As these protest were reaching a fever pitch, the proposed 
tax bill came up for a vote in congress and was narrowly defeated.  
 Changes in social policy stand out as the most significant changes that the 
Kirchners have made to the neoliberal state in Argentina. Most of their changes have 
been in the expansion of access and wider inclusion (especially among informal 
workers) in programs that provide transfers, services, and pensions. Upon coming 
to office in the wake of the economic crisis (and faced with the demands of a 
mobilized series of protest movements), Néstor Kirchner quickly implemented 
employment initiatives. He created emergency public works designed to improve 
social public infrastructure in the areas of water, sewage, paving roads and 
sidewalks, and building and repairing community facilities. Unemployed workers 
federations were hired to build 27 percent of the housing units in the Programa  de 
Emergencia Habitacional (emergency housing program) (Etchemendy and Garay 
2011: 295).  
Néstor Kirchner also oversaw the extension of family allowances to children 
of low-income families under the Plan Famílias, which was a targeted CCT program 
requiring regular school attendance and medical check-ups by the children (Huber 
and Stephens (2012).84 He also implemented a microenterprise program designed 
by the Duhalde administration. In 2004, it financed around 350,000 micro-
                                                 
84 CCT programs are generally targeted cash transfers, conditional on the recipients 
completing some type of training program, attending school, receiving routine 
health check-ups, or other activities deemed important for their economic success. 
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entrepreneurs for start-up costs and some materials and tools costs. In 2009, 
Cristina Kirchner expanded the Universal Child Allowance, a targeted CCT program 
aimed at the poor and informal sector workers. The Asignacíon Universal por Hijo 
para Protección Social “covers all under- or unemployed persons who earn less than 
minimum wage and have children under the age of eighteen” (Huber and Stephens 
2012: 189). By 2010, it covered 3.4 million children. It was conditional on health 
check-ups and school attendance and payments were based on family size. 
Cristina Kirchner oversaw the re-nationalization of the pension system. 
Néstor Kirchner began the process by first allowing workers to opt out of the 
private plans and into the public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system if they so chose. The 
pension system was also strengthened by labor reforms that increased employer 
contributions (which had been substantially lowered during the 1990s). The private 
pension plan had been severely weakened after the 2001 crisis because the 
government had pressured the funds to buy government bonds, which the 
government later defaulted on. At the time of the default, the funds portfolios were 
about 64 percent state bonds (Huber and Stephens 2012). The government pension 
was also expanded to cover previously excluded groups so that the system had near 
universal coverage. In 2009, Cristina Kirchner finished the process of re-
nationalization; the private side of the system was facing further troubles as the 
result of the 2008 global financial crisis.  
As extensive as some of these policy changes are (e.g. pension system re-
nationalization, labor market re-regulation), most of the changes that created the 
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neoliberal state in Argentina in the first place—privatization of industries, trade 
liberalization, financial liberalization—were left mostly intact. In the case of 
privatization (the most controversial and disliked of neoliberal reforms) it was 
almost completely untouched by the Kirchners’ reforms. When we look at the places 
where the Kirchners did step in to interfere with the market, it was strictly in the 
areas of social protections, which neoliberalism had not dealt with. However, their 
actions were often carried out in a way that neoliberal reformers at the World Bank 
and IMF in the 1990s would have preferred: through targeted CCT programs. For all 
intents and purposes, the reforms carried out by the Kirchners are more akin to a 
fourth stage of the neoliberal state than they are to a post-neoliberalism. As a fourth 
stage, the neoliberal state turns to social protections that fail to significantly alter 
either the shape or intent of the neoliberal state but rather legitimize a “competition 
state” by providing just enough social protections to lull the population into 
quiescence while still attempting to maximize economic competitiveness in a global 
system, attract foreign capital, and prioritize fiscal discipline. 
This does not mean that the Kirchners’ policies had no effect on the living 
condiditons for Argentines. Their presidencies coincided with a significant decrease 
in Argentina’s level of inequality. Figure 10 shows how inequality steadily increased 
in Argentina during the creation of the neoliberal state, peaking during the 2001-
2002 economic crisis. Following the crisis and the election of Néstor Kirchner, the 
GINI steadily declines until it dips below its level when Menem took office in 1990. 
 
 Figure 10. Argentina’s Changes in Levels of Inequality.
 
As Figure 11 shows, this decline in inequality 
of extreme poverty in Argentina.
 
                                                
85 Source: ECLAC (2013). The data po
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 Figure 11. Changes in Extreme 
 
 
Conclusion: Legitimizing the Latin American Neoliberal State
 
The new left in Latin America espouses a very different agenda than the pre
neoliberal state period. No longer anti
while maintaining a critique of the market failures attributed to neoliberalism. It 
argues that a strong state is important for economic development with social 
protections within a global capitalist system, but does not seek to reverse the 
privatizations that so characterized the building of the neoliberal state in the region. 
                                                
86 Source: ECLAC (2013). 
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-capitalist, this new left embraces the market, 
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On the ground, the presidents of the new left have engaged in various alterations to 
the neoliberal state but of the states that are usually cited as those farthest from the 
neoliberal model: Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador; only Bolivia had a complete 
neoliberal state like Peru and Argentina. Ecuador and Venezuela did not carry out 
most of the neoliberal reforms prescribed by proponents of neoliberalism. This can 
be seen in Figure 12, which graphs the aggregate scores for Argentina, Ecuador, and 
Peru in the “Index of Economic Freedom.” Though this composite score is not a 
perfect measure of neoliberalization, it is a reflection of the Wall Street Journal’s and 
Heritage Foundation’s perception of the degree of economic openness for these 
countries. Based on their measures, Ecuador was never as liberalized as Argentina 
or Peru. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  193 
 
Figure 12. Index of Economic Freedom Scores.87 
 
When we take a closer look at Argentina and Ecuador, the left turns 
(especially in the case of Argentina) function more as means to legitimize some of 
the deeper structural aspects of the neoliberal state. The state is smaller than it was 
during the ISI period in most of Latin America. Even leaders of the left are concerned 
with making their countries attractive to globalized capital flows. They are 
interested in freer trade—especially regionally—for the most part and many are 
actively seeking trade deals with East Asian nations in order to lessen their export 
reliance on the United States’ market. In countries like Argentina and Peru, the 
social safety net may be broader and more generous than in the 1990s, but it is still 
                                                 
87 Source: Heritage Foundation (2013). 
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based on the principle of increasing individual human capital—treating poverty as 
an individual rather than a structural phenomenon.  
According to Panizza (2005) the new left in Latin America has adopted many 
of the same policy stances as the neoliberals they replaced. “These include the 
importance of a sound fiscal policy, the importance of low inflation, an awareness of 
the inefficiencies associated with many forms of state intervention and state 
ownership, the acceptance of the primacy of the market in setting up prices, the 
abandonment of economic protectionism in favour of at least relative economic 
opening and regional integration and a general welcoming of foreign investment” 
(2005: 727).  
 
Table 3. The Lefts’ Reforms of the Neoliberal State’s Policies.88 
Reforming the Neoliberal State: The Left’s Dismantling of Neoliberalism 
Neoliberal 
Policies 
Reformed? 
Government 
Austerity 
Privatization 
Trade 
Liberalization 
Financial 
Liberalization 
Social 
Policy 
Tax 
Reform 
Labor 
Market 
Deregulation 
Le
ft
 T
u
rn
 P
er
io
d
 
Argentina Yes No Partial* Partial Yes** No Yes 
Ecuador Yes Partial Partial Yes Partial Yes N/A 
Peru No No No No No No No 
* Refers mainly to export taxes on agricultural products 
** Denotes a mostly, but partial yes. 
 
                                                 
88 This table is an illustration of my arguments regarding the alteration of neoliberal 
policies in each of the seven major areas, for each of the three cases.  
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If we look at the logic of neoliberalism as it developed over time (in actual 
policy implementation), it begins with shock austerity measures in relation to an 
externally precipitated crisis of debt—the stabilization stage. Then it moves into a 
series of deeper societal/economic/political reforms (often overlapping in time with 
the stabilization stage) designed to fundamentally reorient society by primatizing 
the market—structural adjustment. At this point in Latin American history (mid-to-
late-1990s), it becomes apparent that many of these reforms are problematic when 
applied without properly functioning institutions (and the culture that surrounds 
them) and certain types of efficiencies. At this point the IFIs, particularly the World 
Bank, begin pushing for a third stage of reforms—an institutional turn. However, the 
crises of the late-1990s, the resurgence of the left, and general “reform fatigue” have 
already taken their toll and the rightist and center-right neoliberal politicians begin 
to be replaced by a new left. This new left comes to power and surprises many 
(including many of their constituents) by continuing many aspects of the neoliberal 
state, yet doing so with greater social protections and some real (some merely 
rhetorical) incorporation of previously excluded groups (indigenous groups, 
informal sector workers, the unemployed). At this point we have not yet seen a true 
break from neoliberalism and shift to a new development model, what we see 
instead is the fourth stage of the neoliberal state. Whether this fourth stage is the 
beginning of that shift remains to be seen. 
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CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The neoliberal state is the product of a current of thought that has its origins 
in the Austrian School, The London School of Economics, and the Chicago School of 
Economics. For Hayek and Mises, it started as a war of ideas to preserve what they 
thought was the heart of liberalism—economic laissez-faire (Stedman Jones 2012). 
Dismissed by mainstream economics as hopelessly backward in its early days, its 
proponents saw neoliberalism’s position vis-à-vis mainstream economics and the 
policy-making sphere as a political and ideological struggle. Eventually, 
neoliberalism started to spread as a counter-hegemonic discourse to Keynesianism 
in the advanced capitalist nations and to structuralism and dependency theory in 
the developing world. It was not embraced (beyond Chile) in Latin America until the 
early 1980s debt crisis called ISI policies into question for many. The adoption of 
neoliberalism as the alternative was not the first choice for many countries; it nearly 
always took significant pressure from the IMF and World Bank to implement 
neoliberal reforms. 
Most countries in the region did enact liberalizing reforms even in spite of 
the reticence of politicians and the objections of citizens. Neoliberalization came in 
stages, with the different stages following different logics. I argued in previous 
chapters that there were three of these stages. The first two stages are distinct from 
one another in terms of extent and intent of neoliberalization rather than as a 
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temporal distinction. In the first stage, countries were focused on the debt crisis and 
high- and in some cases hyper-inflation. As these countries lined up at the IMF for 
assistance, they were pressured (in some cases forced) to carry out austerity 
packages – decreasing government spending, cutting subsidies, and cutting or 
scaling back social programs. In this stabilization stage, the main focus was narrowly 
on fiscal and balance of payment problems. 
The second stage was much broader and more ambitious. This was the 
structural adjustment stage. In this stage, privatization of government-owned 
enterprises, trade liberalization, financial liberalization, changes to social policies to 
reflect neoliberalism’s focus on poverty as an individual issue, tax reforms away 
from progressivity and towards more “neutral” forms, and deregulation of the labor 
market were the major goals. This was an attempt to completely change the 
structure of state and society, privileging the neoliberal conception of market 
efficiency and the importance of scaling back the state and reorienting it to the 
promotion of a good business climate.  
After completing most of the second stage of reforms, I argue that the 
structure and orientation of the state apparatus had changed enough that it became 
a recognizably new type of state. This is captured in my model of the Latin American 
neoliberal state. Ecuador did not carry out enough of these reforms to have become 
a recognizable neoliberal state. However, both Argentina and Peru carried out 
significant reforms in nearly every category of the two stages of reforms and as such 
are full examples of the Latin American neoliberal state. In the case of Argentina, I 
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argued in the previous chapter that the left turn is not a significant departure from 
the neoliberal state model. What the Kirchners’ policies constitute instead is a 
fourth stage of neoliberalism—one that seeks to address inequality and poverty 
better, but leaves most of the rest of the model in place. 
Proponents of neoliberalism promised that the reorientation of the state 
away from market intervention and regulation would allow the creative wonders of 
the market to unleash rapid and dynamic growth. Many of neoliberalism’s 
proponents were aware (and warned policy makers) that this transformation would 
include painful short-term dislocations for many people—especially for the poor 
and workers in industries that would necessarily shed jobs as they became more 
efficient. Governments sought to address these (what were expected to be) short-
term hardships in various ways: targeted conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, 
clientelism, and the use of NGOs to provide services the state no longer would. 
These hardships were exacerbated by the overall decrease in government spending 
and changes to social policies such as education and social security privatizations, 
the decentralization of administration and funding of education and health care to 
the provincial level, and the drying up of resources for clientelist networks. 
Many states (like Ecuador) learned hard lessons about deregulation. 
Deregulation later often led to an increased risk of crises and increased vulnerability 
to external shocks in financial systems. When the developmental aspirations of 
neoliberalism were not met, when unexpected crises occurred, and when the small 
amounts of growth that did occur often turned out to be immiserating, even 
  199 
proponents of neoliberalism recognized that changes were necessary. Thus, by the 
late 1990s, the international financial institutions (IFIs)—especially the World Bank 
and Inter-American Development Bank began pushing for what they called a 
“second generation” of reforms to address these issues. I call this the third stage of 
neoliberalism. This third stage of reforms was actually an attempt to head-off 
deeper (and more threatening to neoliberalism) Polanyian double movement 
challenges (Craig and Porter 2005) that stemmed from the region’s second crisis of 
incorporation (Reygadas and Filgueira 2010; Luna and Filgueira 2009), which 
neoliberalism had exacerbated. The “poverty reduction” and “social inclusion” 
strategies that governments and the World Bank began designing can’t be 
considered a real “social neoliberalism” (or “neoliberalism with a human face”); 
these strategies are merely the appearance of addressing poverty exclusion without 
changing the systemic aspects of the problem (Craig and Porter 2005). However, the 
appearance of the poverty reduction/social inclusion strategies did mark a shift in 
the discourse that opened neoliberalism up to criticism that it had once been 
immune to (because neoliberalism was touted as economic common sense). 
In Latin America, the third stage turned out to be too late. Across the region, 
voters turned rightist and center-rightist governments out of office and many 
countries in the region began a series of electoral left turns. These new leftist 
politicians and parties differed from the old Latin American left in that they strongly 
criticized neoliberalism but mostly accepted the market and many aspects of global 
capitalism. 
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Does the Left Matter? 
In the previous chapter, I argued that in the cases I studied, where the 
neoliberal state was fully developed there either was no left turn (Peru) or the left 
turn that did occur failed to create an alternative developmental model to the 
neoliberal state (Argentina). In the latter case, the left turn is mainly concerned with 
carrying out social policy reforms that broaden and deepen the social safety net, 
primarily for neoliberalism’s losers and organized labor, which makes up the core 
constituency of the Peronist PJ that has most recently governed Argentina. As I 
showed in the previous chapter, these changes to the safety net consisted of re-
nationalizing the pension system and broadening it to cover the unemployed and 
informally employed, effectively universalizing it. The Kirchners also carried out 
labor reforms that reversed much of the changes wrought during the Menem 
presidency but in a way that favored organized (formal sector) labor and largely left 
out the informal sector.  
As can be seen in Table 4, the lefts in Argentina and Ecuador have clearly had 
an impact in increasing total social spending. Although spending in all three cases 
increased over time, there is a higher rate of increase after the left comes to office in 
both of these countries compared to the previous periods. There is also a higher rate 
of increase than there was in Peru. 
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Table 4. Total Per Capita Social Spending: Argentina, Ecuador, and Peru.89 
Total Per Capita Social Spending 
    
Years Peru Argentina Ecuador 
1990 79 632 91 
1991 76 728 93 
1992 86 795 95 
1993 120 850 84 
1994 138 920 100 
1995 164 891 105 
1996 158 880 109 
1997 180 926 85 
1998 185 965 94 
1999 208 999 77 
2000 214 964 67 
2001 230 944 108 
2002 245 739 109 
2003 247 775 102 
2004 259 826 116 
2005 272 943 132 
2006 270 1057 139 
2007 288 1249 261 
2008 309 1384 229 
2009 354 1601 292 
2010 378 * 314 
 
 Much of the broadening of the safety net consisted of increasing the disbursements 
of targeted CCT programs and broadening their coverage. A more hopeful analyst 
might propose that such increases in spending, and the revival of the state as an 
agent of its citizens’ well-being represents a significant shift in both ideology and the 
structure of the state. I agree with this view to a point, but such a view must be 
qualified by the fact that this is only a partial alteration to the full set of changes 
                                                 
89 Source: ECLAC (2013). The shaded area signifies the years of Correa’s and the 
Kirchners’ presidential terms. 
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wrought by the neoliberalization of the state. This increased role in social protection 
is manifested mainly as an extension of the neoliberal state’s social policies and thus 
does not constitute an alternative model. Much of the rest of the neoliberal state has 
been left intact by the Kirchners. They have not significantly altered trade openness 
nor financial flows, neither did they take any steps to re-nationalize industries 
privatized under Menem during the period covered in this study. Thus, I argue that 
the left turn in Argentina is a fourth stage of the neoliberal state. In this stage, the 
government attempts to pacify the most restive groups in society by buying them off 
in order to legitimize the neoliberal state as a developmental model.  
Ecuador has clearly moved farther from the neoliberal model of 
development, though the term 21st Century Socialism is a dubious claim. Correa has 
taken few steps towards anything resembling socialism. The country appears to be 
somewhere in between a European-style social democracy (though with far less 
developed institutions) and state-directed capitalism. In reality, it is neither. 
Ecuador is dangerously close to creating a fiscally unsustainable budget as the 
country builds more extensive social programs on the increased revenues that the 
state extracts from oil production. Once again, the critiques of neo-extractivism 
should be taken seriously, especially given that the increase in social spending and 
historically low levels of unemployment have not led to the same level of decreasing 
rates of poverty and inequality that are seen in Argentina. In fact, Ecuador’s 
reductions in poverty and inequality are nearly the same as neoliberal Peru’s. If 
commodity prices fall, Ecuador may find itself over-extended and unable to continue 
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spending right when it is most needed. The fact that Ecuador’s economy is 
dollarized only exacerbates this potential problem. 
As dire as these critiques sound however, the left does matter – in the sense 
that it does change aspects of the neoliberal state and these changes have an impact 
on the lives of the poor. In Argentina, the Kirchner years witnessed a continual 
decrease in rates of both poverty and extreme poverty. In 1999, Menem’s last year 
in office, 12.7 percent of the Argentine population was below the poverty line and 
2.7 percent was in extreme poverty (ECLAC 2013). These numbers increased after 
the 2001 collapse to 31.3 percent and 12.1 percent respectively in 2002. By 2011, 
despite the “Great Recession,” the poverty rate was down to 2.4 percent of the 
population and extreme poverty was 0.6 percent—a dramatic decrease. Although 
growth slowed in 2008, the Great Recession only held back GDP growth for one year 
as 2009 saw a resumption of pre-2008 rates of growth. Much of the reduction of 
poverty in Argentina is no doubt due to this economic growth but the growth is 
clearly more broadly shared than during the Menem years. All three of the countries 
in this study recovered pre-recession GDP growth rates by 2009, though Ecuador’s 
rate continued to lag behind both Peru and Argentina.  
Though the left in Ecuador has been in power for a shorter period than in 
Argentina, Correa has, so far, failed to make a similar reduction in poverty rates to 
that of the Kirchners in Argentina. During the García years in Peru, poverty rates 
were reduced from around 40 percent of the population to around a quarter—as 
they similarly were in Ecuador—and economic growth, though not nearly as robust 
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as in Argentina, surpassed Ecuador’s growth (under Correa). The big difference 
between the left turn period and the neoliberal state in my cases has been the 
dramatic drop in unemployment. During the Kirchners’ presidencies in Argentina 
and Correa’s presidency in Ecuador, rates of unemployment have greatly declined—
in Ecuador to an historic low. Peru has seen a steady, but much less dramatic decline 
in its unemployment rate. 
In the struggle to define what constitutes legitimate economic and social 
policies and which policies are pernicious, neoliberals and the new left in Latin 
America have moved towards a convergence. They do not share all of the same 
views, but the neoliberal ideals of liberalizing the market have swayed the left more 
than the principles of the left (equality, the subordination of the market to social 
principles) have swayed neoliberals. In Latin America, the neoliberal state is still the 
hegemonic model of development. It has entered a new, fourth stage, one in which 
more attention is being paid to the problems of poverty and inequality so far. 
However, this focus serves only to legitimize the neoliberal state. Where the 
neoliberal state developed (in this study: Argentina and Peru), it is still in place. 
Whether Arditi (2009) is right and this represents a true shift in the center-of-
gravity of the discourse; whether Luna (2010), Reygadas and Filgueira (2009), and 
Craig and Porter (2005) are correct and the leftward shift might solve the second 
incorporation crisis in the region, both remain to be seen. It is possible that the 
fourth stage has now opened up the neoliberal discourse and that some of the new 
leftist governments may solve the second incorporation crisis. It is also possible that 
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the neoliberal model has simply adapted and is minimally addressing social 
discontent in a way that will (at least temporarily) provide a fix that preserves the 
neoliberal state. 
In the end, the left turns in Latin America might best be seen the way that 
Markoff (1996, 1997) describes democratization as a series of transnational waves. 
In Latin America, the discourse has shifted and this opens up some space to change 
the center-of-gravity, but when there was a similar opening in the late 1970s for 
neoliberalism, there was a supportive international structure in place, nourishing it 
and providing ideological, political, material, and propagandistic support for the 
radical restructuring of the state along neoliberal lines. The question now is: is there 
an analogous international structure in place to do the same thing for the new Latin 
American left? This process has partially begun with the creation of regional 
solidarity organizations like UNASUR, ALBA, the Bank of the South, and the recently 
formed Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). As yet 
however, this process is dominated by state-level actors.90 If these institutions can 
knit together such a supportive international structure, then are these lefts radical 
enough to attempt such deep changes in a very economically and politically different 
world than existed prior to the neoliberal turn?   
                                                 
90 Whereas the support structures for the neoliberal transition were both 
international (but effectively dominant to Latin American states) and subnational 
social movements (albeit elite ones with transnational scope). 
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Argentine Presidents and Terms in Office: 
 
Military Junta 1976-1983 
Raúl Alfonsín 1983-1989 
Carlos Saúl Menem 1989-1999 
Fernando de la Rúa 1999-2001 
Adolfo Rodríguez Saá 2001-2001 
Eduardo Duhalde 2001-2003 
Néstor Kirchner 2003-2007 
Cristina Fernández de Kirchner 2007-present 
 
 
Ecuadorian Presidents and Terms in Office: 
 
Jaime Roldós Aguilera 1979-1981 
Osvaldo Hurtado Larrea 1981-1984 
León Febres-Cordero 1984-1988 
Rodrigo Borja Cevallos 1988-1992 
Sixto Durán Ballén 1992-1996 
Abdalá Bucaram 1996-1997 
Rosalía Arteaga 1997-1997 
Fabián Alarcón 1997-1998 
Jamil Mahuad 1998-2000 
Gustavo Noboa 2000-2003 
Lucio Gutiérrez 2003-2005 
Alfredo Palacio 2005-2007 
Rafael Correa 2007-present 
 
 
Peruvian Presidents and Terms in Office: 
 
Military Junta 1968-1980 
Fernando Belaúnde Terry 1980-1985 
Alan García Pérez 1985-1990 
Alberto Fujimori 1990-2000 
Valentín Paniagua 2000-2001 
Alejandro Toledo 2001-2006 
Alan García Pérez 2006-2011 
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